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THE PERFORMANCE OF REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are a relatively 
new and unfamiliar type of financial intermediary. Enabling 
tax legislation was passed in 1960 and REITs were formed 
starting in 1961, the effective date of the law. The REIT 
industry held $300 million in assets at the end of 1961, its 
first year in existence; by year-end 1974 the industry's 
total assets were $21.2 billion. Most of the growth in indus­
try assets from its inception until the end of 1974 occurred 
during the years 1972, 1973, and 1974. During this three 
year period industry assets increased $13.1 billion.^
Purpose of REITs 
The reason special tax legislation was passed allowing 
the formation of REITs was to provide an investment vehicle
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book (Washington, D. C.: National Associ­
ation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc., 1975), 14.
so that the small investor could participate in real estate 
investments. The small investor for years has been able to 
participate in security investments through the medium of 
investment companies, both open-end and closed-end. The 
investment companies pool the resources of many investors who 
are too small to acquire a diversified portfolio on their 
own, and the investor then shares on a pro-rata basis in the 
total value of the investment company's portfolio. Since 1961 
the REITs have had essentially the same tax status as invest­
ment companies. The investor is now able to invest in real 
estate investments such as shopping centers, office buildings, 
and mortgage loans by buying shares of a REIT whose invest­
ment objectives parallel his own. REITs are analogous to 
closed-end investment companies for people desiring to invest 
in real estate.
REITs provide their shareholders with securities that 
represent fractional ownership rights in real estate invest­
ments. The investments made by any particular REIT may be in 
the form of (1) ownership of real property —  an equity trust, 
(2) ownership of mortgages secured by real property —  a mort­
gage trust, or (3) a combination of both equity and mortgage 
investments —  a hybrid trust. The shares of the REITs are 
traded just like the shares of other closed-end investment 
companies; some are listed on various exchanges and some are 
traded over-the-counter.
History of REITs 
REITs as they exist today can trace their existence to 
January 1, 1961, the effective date of the Real Estate Invest­
ment Trust Act. The involvement of the business trust form 
of organization with real estate, however, predates the Act 
by over 100 years. The state law of Massachusetts did not 
allow corporate real estate investments, so starting sometime 
in the mid-nineteenth century the business trust began being 
used in Massachusetts as the vehicle for real estate invest­
ments. The old Massachusetts trust was largely responsible 
for the early development of cities such as Boston, Detroit, 
and Chicago. Supreme Court decisions handed down during 
1935 that called for all business trusts to be taxed at cor­
porate rates effectively ended business trust investments in 
real estate.^ Legislation was quickly passed setting up 
special tax provisions for trusts investing solely in secu­
rities (regulated investment companies), but not until 1955 
were serious efforts made to obtain for trusts investing in 
real estate the same tax treatment that had been given to the
4
regulated investment companies. After several unsuccessful
2
H. Cecil Kilpatrick, "Taxation of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts and Their Shareholders," Taxes 39 (December 1961): 
1042.
^See for example Morrissey v. Commissioners, 269 U. S. 
344 (1935).
^David C. Cates and Frank L. Harwell, Jr., "Banks' Big 
Stake in 'REIT' Field," Bankers Monthly 87 (August 15, 1970); 
19.
attempts to pass the needed legislation, the Real Estate 
Investment Trust Act was passed in 1960, to be effective 
January 1, 1961.^
Prior to 1968 only a handful of REITs existed.
Starting in 1968 and continuing into the early 1970s the 
REIT industry experienced tremendous growth. Total assets 
for the industry went from zero at the end of 1960 to $900 
million at the end of 1967 to $14.2 billion at the end of 
1972. Likewise the number of trusts went from zero to 49 
to 186 over the same period.^ By the end of 1972, 34 REITs 
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 36 were 
listed on the American Stock Exchange. All REITs that were 
old enough to have at least a full year of dividend paying 
history posted an over-all return of almost 16 percent dur- 
I ing 1972.^
Two major factors contributed to the rapid growth of 
REITs during the early 1970s. First, the traditional sources 
of construction and development loans, the primary types of 
loans made by REITs, had been severely restricted during the 
credit crunch of 1969-1970. Commercial banks were quite stin­
gy in allocating their construction funds, preferring to meet
^E. Norman Bailey, "Real Estate Investment Trusts; An 
Appraisal," The Appraisal Journal 34 (October 1966): 486-489.
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 11-14.
^James E. Lewis. "An Examination of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts," The Appraisal Journal 41 (July 1973): 350.
the heavy corporate loan demand. The savings and loan 
associations were likewise unable to participate much in 
construction lending at this time due to heavy outflows of 
deposits. The second major factor associated with rapid REIT 
growth in the early 1970s was the ability of REITs to pro­
vide better service to their customers. Borrowers were at­
tracted to REITs not only because the trusts had construction 
money available, but also because the trusts would generally 
provide faster processing of the applications than would the
O
more traditional construction lenders.
As previously mentioned, the Real Estate Investment 
Trust Act was passed in 1960 so that trusts investing in real 
estate could enjoy the same general tax provisions that apply 
to regulated investment companies investing solely in secu­
rities. Regulated investment companies can be of an open-end 
or a closed-end capital structure; the former are more numer­
ous and are generally referred to as mutual funds. Although 
the 1960 Act does not specify the type of capitalization a 
REIT should have, the Securities and Exchange Commission re­
quires REITs to be closed-end because the nature of their 
investments is such that they lack the liquidity needed for
9
an open-end structure. Another important difference between 
REITs and regulated investment companies is the amount of
^Robert E. Brewer, "REITs in Transition," The Appraisal 
Journal 42 (July 1974): 431.
^J. Richard Elliott, Jr., "More Room at the Top,"
Barron's 42 (February 19, 1962): 5.
leverage used. Open-end investment companies are not levered; 
closed-end investment companies may be levered provided they 
borrow no more than one-third of the amount of their share­
holders' equity. REITs have commonly levered themselves into 
having debt-to-equity ratios of four or five.^^
REITs have certain disadvantages and advantages compared 
to corporations as a vehicle for public real estate ownership.
A trust must receive at least 75 percent of its gross income 
from rents, mortgage interest, and gains from the sale of 
real e s t a t e . C o r p o r a t i o n s  are relatively free from any 
restrictions concerning investment and income requirements.
In certain instances the corporation may have difficulty 
avoiding a holding company penalty if too much passive in­
come is earned or preventing treatment as a collapsible corpo­
ration if property is not held long enough. REITS are re­
stricted in that they cannot engage in profit-sharing rental 
arrangements with their tenants, except for fixed percentage
leases negotiated at the beginning of the lease. Corporations
12are unrestricted in their rental income arrangements.
Organizers of REITs are restricted as to how much they 
may benefit from the trust. The organizers may own shares in 
the trust, provided that five or fewer beneficiaries do not
l°Lewis, 351.
^^Peter A. Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," 
Financial Analysts Journal 27 (May-June 1971): 33.
^^Lewis, 357-359.
own more than 50 percent of the trust. Since a REIT cannot 
manage its own properties, trust organizers frequently own 
the advisor to the trust instead of shares in the trust 
itself. Ownership (by the organizers) of the trust's ad­
visor is allowed provided they do not own any shares in the 
trust. The organizers of a corporation are unrestricted as 
to the management of their own properties.
Income tax treatment of REITs versus the treatment
afforded corporations is the area of greatest advantage to 
the trust form of real estate ownership. Earnings distri­
buted to the REIT shareholder are not subject to double 
taxation as are corporate distributions. The qualifying 
trust which elects to be treated as a REIT merely acts as a 
conduit for the income. The trust pays no income tax on 
distributed earnings; only the shareholder pays a tax on the 
earnings passed through to him. Another advantage the trust 
possesses is that the income disbributed retains its charac­
ter as to its eligibility for favorable long-term capital 
gains tax treatment. Corporate distributions are taxed as 
ordinary income.
REITs have existed throughout their brief history 
without any special regulation by governments at either the 
state or federal level. Certain requirements must of course 
be met in order to qualify for REIT tax status, but the spe­
cial tax treatment is elective and the Internal Revenue
l^Lewis, 357-359. ^'^Lewis, 357-359
8Service does not function in a regulatory capacity for the 
t r u s t s . T h e  Securities and Exchange Commission is involved 
with enforcing disclosure provisions relating to new secu­
rities offerings and reports to shareholders, but their regu­
lation is no different for REITs than any other industry 
under their jurisdiction.^^
Tax Environment of REITs
The Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960 added 
sections 856-858 to the Internal Revenue Code. Essentially 
the new law gave the same tax treatment to REITs as had pre­
viously been available to regulated investment companies, 
namely exemption from federal income taxation provided cer­
tain requirements are met.^^
The following are the principal requirements necessary
18
for a REIT to receive favored tax status:
1. At least 90 percent of the gross income of 
the REIT must be derived from dividends, 
interest, rents, gains on the sale of secu­
rities and real property, and refunds of 
taxes on real property.
2. At least 75 percent of the gross income of 
the REIT must be derived from rents.
Sidney I. Roberts, Arthur A. Feder, and Herbert H. 
Alpert, "Congress Approves Real Estate Investment Trusts; 
Exacting Rules Made," The Journal of Taxation 13 (October 
1960): 197.
^^Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," Financial 
Analysts Journal, 75.
^^Kilpatrick, 1044.
^®See sections 856-857 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 for complete details.
mortgage interest, gains from the sale 
of real estate, dividends from or gains 
on the sale of shares of other REITs, 
and refunds of taxes on real property.
3. Less than 30 percent of the gross income of 
the REIT may be derived from the sale of 
securities held less than 6 months or real 
property held less than 4 years.
4. At the end of each quarter 75 percent of 
the value of the REIT's total assets must 
consist of real estate (including mort­
gages) , cash, cash items, and government 
securities.
5. The REIT must be a passive investor rather 
than an active participant in the opera­
tions of its properties. But the active 
manager of a REIT's properties can own up 
to 35 percent of its stock.
6. At least 100 persons must own shares, and 
five or fewer persons cannot own more than 
50 percent of the shares during the last 
half of any tax year.
7. At least 90 percent of the REIT's ordinary 
income must be distributed to the share­
holders within one year after the close of 
the taxable year.
Considerable confusion as to the correct interpre­
tation of various terms and provisions of the new law abounded 
during the early months of the life of the Real Estate Invest­
ment Trust Act. Uncertainty existed as to what was meant by
the term "real property," a phrase that obviously abounds
19
throughout the three sections added to the Code Other 
problems that were eventually clarified by detailed regula­
tions included the separation of the trust and the independent 
contractor who was to manage the properties, determination of
l^Kilpatrick, 1053.
10
the correct measure of value to be used in meeting certain 
percentage requirements, and determination of how to allocate 
rent receipts between real and personal property.
Although the Real Estate Investment Trust Act does 
run substantially parallel to sections 851-855 of the Code, 
those sections dealing with regulated investment companies, 
the treatment of REITs differs from the treatment of regu­
lated investment companies in four ways. First, a corpora­
tion cannot qualify as a REIT. To qualify as a trust, the 
organization must be either an unincorporated trust or an
n 1
unincorporated association. Second, a REIT cannot hold 
property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary 
course of its business. A third distinguishing feature of 
REITs compared to regulated investment companies is that the 
REIT must hire an independent contractor to handle the actu­
al management of the properties in order to guarantee the
22
passiveness of the trust's income. Fourth, a REIT will 
lose its favored tax status if as much as 30 percent of its 
gross income comes from sales of securities held less than 
six months or from sales of real estate held less than four 
years. This fourth factor is designed to insure that the 
trust's income will be passive and primarily related to real
20Paul E. Anderson, "Real Estate Trust Regulations Are 
Criticized at Hearings," The Journal of Taxation 14 (May 1961) 
315.
21
Roberts, Feder, and Alpert, 194.
^^Kilpatrick, 1045-1046.
11
21estate. Regulated investment companies have similar but 
less stringent requirements on income sources.
Types of REITs
REITs are of three basic types —  equity, mortgage,
and hybrid. As of December 1974, the end of the period this
study covers, 25 percent of REITs were equity trusts, 32
percent were mortgage REITs, and 43 percent were hybrid 
24REITs. The activities of each of these types of REITs will 
now be covered.
Equity REITs
Virtually all of the REITs formed in the beginning
stages of the industry were equity trusts because of general
uncertainty as to what the new law meant by requiring REIT
25investments to be in real property. The trustees of the 
REITs were certain that outright ownership of real estate 
fulfilled the Revenue Code requirements. As it became evi­
dent that mortgages secured by real property also met the 
Revenue Code requirements, movement away from the pure equity
REIT began. Overall, until the late 1960s most REITs were
2 6small trusts involved with owning real property. As of
^^Roberts, Feder, and Alpert, 195-196.
^^This breakdown of REIT type is calculated from infor­
mation contained in the Membership Directory 12-74 published 
by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts.
^^Kilpatrick, 1053.
Peter A. Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts,"
12
December 1974, ownership of real property accounted for
27
slightly more than 21 percent of all REIT investments.
Although equity REITs own many different types of
properties, the most commonly held are apartment buildings,
shopping centers and office buildings. Warehouses, hotels,
28
and motels are also popular REIT holdings. A few trusts
specialize in rather unique holdings such as Stadium Realty
Trust's equity financing of the stadium for the Boston Pa-
29
triots Football Club. REITs can acquire ownership of a 
property in a variety of ways. Existing improved properties 
may be purchased outright. New properties can be acquired 
either by contracting for improvements on land the trust 
already owns or by investing in a joint venture with a devel­
oper. A final way that some REITs have acquired ownerhsip 
property, often only partially improved, is by foreclosure 
of a mortgage or by taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure.^®
There are two provisions in the tax law affecting REITs 
that have particluar significance to equity trusts. First,
Financial Analyst's Handbook, vol. 2 (ed. Sumner N. Levine; 
Homewood, Illinois : Dow Jones-Irwin, Inc., 1975), 659.
27
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 18.
2 8Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," Financial 
Analyst's Handbook, 699.
29Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," Financial 
Analysts Journal, 35.
^®National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 Fact Book, 18-19.
13
REITs are prohibited from holding property primarily for sale 
in the ordinary course of their b u s i n e s s . T h e  requirement 
against acting as a dealer means that REITs cannot build pro­
perties and sell them shortly after completion as many real 
estate investors might. The result is that equity REITs must 
keep properties in their portfolios for a reasonable time
32before selling them for prudent portfolio management reasons. 
The second tax law provision bearing directly upon the opera­
tion of equity REITs is the requirement that the trusts use
3 3independent contractors to manage the properties owned.
The equity REIT is hence forced to play the role of a passive 
investor or lose its favored tax status.
Mortgage REITs
Almost 79 percent of all REIT investments are comprised
34of mortgages of various sorts. As of December 1974, there
were 55 REITs which invested in nothing except mortgages
35secured by real estate. The types of mortgage loans held 
by REITs are shown in Table 1.
^^Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 856 (a)(4)
32National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 21.
^^Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 865 (d)(3).
34
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 18.
^^This statement is based on information concerning in­
vestment objectives of the 173 members of the National Associ­
ation of Real Estate Investment Trusts contained in the Asso­
ciation's Membership Directory 12-74.
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TABLE 1
MORTGAGE LOANS HELD BY REITS 
(December 1974)
Type of Mortgage Loan
Percentage of All Mortgages 
Held by REITs
first mortgage construction 49
first mortgage land 5
first mortgage development 15
first mortgage long-term 12
first mortgage short and
intermediate-term (on
completed properties) 10
junior 9
100
SOURCE: National Association of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 26.
As shown in Table 1, construction loans account for 
almost half of the mortgages held by REITs. Construction 
loans are obtained by developers to cover the majority of 
expenses incurred during the construction of a project. The 
typical developer does not operate with his own funds but 
rather borrows the money necessary to pay his contractors.
A first lien on the land and improvements is given to the 
lender as security for the loan. REITs make interim con­
struction loans on an assortment of properties, but they have 
tended to concentrate in residential properties. Table 2 
gives a breakdown on the types of construction loans REITs 
held as of the end of the study period.
15
TABLE 2
TYPE OF REIT HELD CONSTRUCTION LOANS
(December 1974)
Percentage of All Construction
Type of Property Loans Held by REITs
mobil home parks 1
condominiums 35
single-family homes 8
apartments 22
office buildings 10
shopping centers 8
hotels and motels 7
other commercial 7
industrial 2
100
SOURCE: National Association of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 27.
First mortgage land loans made up the smallest 
category of mortgage loans held by REITs at year-end 1974. 
Most REITs shy away from holding mortgages on unimproved 
land, preferring instead the greater security of having 
improved real estate as collateral.
As shown in Table 1, first mortgage development loans 
were the second largest category of mortgage loans held by 
REITs during 1974. Development loans are obtained to finance 
the site improvements needed prior to the commencement of 
construction. The kinds of site improvements usually en­
countered are clearing and leveling the land, installing 
utilities, and building roads. Many of the development loans
16
that REITs have made involve single-family home tracts which 
require extensive and expensive development before any con­
struction can take place. REITs usually make development 
loans on projects for which they intend to also make the 
construction loans.
The fourth type of mortgage loans held by REITs are 
the long-term first mortgages. Most permanent REIT financ­
ing consists of conventional loans on income producing 
property, usually apartments. Original loan maturities of 
15 to 30 years are common. REITs have been relatively in­
active since the early 1970s in providing long-term mortgages
because of the unfavorable spread between long-term mortgage
37
rates and the cost of long-term funds for REITs.
First mortgage short-and intermediate-term loans on 
completed properties accounted for one-tenth of all REIT held 
mortgages as of the end of 1974. These loans differ from the 
long-term mortgages in maturity and repayment procedures. 
Mortgages classified as short-and intermediate-term have 
maturities of ten years or less and do not require cimorti- 
zation as is usually the case with long-term mortgages. A 
developer will sometimes make use of short-or intermediate- 
term financing in one of two possible situations. First, the 
developer may want to operate the property for a few years to
National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 27-28.
37National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 28.
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prove its worth so that permanent financing can be obtained 
on the most favorable terms possible, i.e., the developer can 
likely arrange better financing on a three year old 95 per­
cent leased office building than on a new office building 
having only half its space leased. The second situation in 
which a developer might use short-or intermediate-term REIT 
financing occurs during periods of high long-term mortgage 
rates. A developer finishing a project at such a time may 
prefer to finance with a REIT for a few years, oftentimes 
with the REIT that provided the construction financing, until 
the long-term rates go down. When the long-term rates do
decline the developer will obtain permanent financing and pay
38
off the mortgage held by the REIT.
Table 1 shows that as of the end of 1974 REITs were 
holding nine percent of all their mortgages in junior liens 
of one type or another. Because of the very high risk of 
junior mortgages most trusts are not at all interested in 
making them, but there are a few REITs which specialize in 
junior mortgages. One type of junior mortgage loan which 
REITs make are wraparound mortgages. Wraparound mortgages 
are used in connection with properties having existing senior 
mortgages which carry favorable interest rates. The wrap­
around mortgage is a junior lien covering the entire amount 
of borrowed money, but only the amount of the junior lien in 
excess of the previously existing mortgage is actually
38
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 28.
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advanced. The lender on the wraparound receives payments on 
the new, enlarged sum and continues the payments on the pre­
viously existing original loan. The main advantage to the 
borrower of using the wraparound technique is achieving a 
lower downpayment.^^
Hybrid REITs
A hybrid REIT invests in both real estate equities and
mortgages secured by real estate. Of the 173 member trusts
of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
in December 1974, 74 followed investment policies involving
both equities and mortgages. In contrast, 44 REITs invested
40
solely in equities and 55 made only mortgage investments.
Most of the more recently formed REITs have been of the hy­
brid variety, sometimes called combination REITs. Operating 
as a hybrid trust allows flexibility in selecting investments 
from the variety of equities and mortgages available which 
differ greatly in attractiveness from time to time.^^
REIT Advisors 
Since tax regulations require REITs to be passive
^^Sherman J. Maisel and Stephen E. Roulac, Real Estate 
Investment and Finance (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1976), 47-48.
^^The investment policies followed by the various 
member REITs were obtained from data in the Association's 
Membership Directory 12-74.
41Schulkin, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," Financial 
Analyst's Handbook, 694-695.
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investors, a trust usually hires an advisor to run the REIT's 
day-to-day operations concerned with managing the trust's 
investments. The advisor also frequently seeks new invest­
ment opportunities for the trust and presents the proposed 
investments to the REIT's trustees for a final decision. The 
trustees of a REIT are elected by the shareholders and gener­
ally function much the same as a corporate board of directors. 
Duties of the REIT's advisor will also likely include liabil­
ity management for the trust. Liability management for a 
REIT would involve periodic public offerings and private
placements of debt and equity securities and the more frequent
42management of commercial paper sales and bank borrowings.
Most REITs have been organized by individuals or a 
group that upon creation of the trust served as advisor to the 
REIT.^^ The advisor is paid a fee that is based on the in­
vested assets of the REIT. An annual fee of one percent to 
one and a half percent of invested assets is common; extra 
incentive compensation may be provided for if the trust ex­
hibits extraordinary performance. Other than receiving a 
management fee the advisor may collect separate fees for act­
ing as 1) underwriter on REIT security offerings, 2) broker 
in selling REIT owned properties, 3) insurance agent for REIT 
owned properties, and 4) appraiser for properties the REIT
^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 7-8.
^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 8.
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44is considering buying or selling or lending money on.
A REIT advisor may own shares in the trust. The tax
law does, however, limit the ownership of the trust by the
advisor to a maximum of 35 percent if the REIT is to keep its
45favored tax status. In actuality most advisors do not have
46major share holdings in their REITs.
REIT advisors have varied backgrounds. Almost 60 
percent of all REIT assets as of December 1974 were managed 
by firms connected with commercial banks, life insurance com­
panies, or real estate related firms such as mortgage compa­
nies or real estate brokerage firms. Advisors owned by 
commercial banks, bank holding companies or bank holding
company subsidiaries managed nearly one-third of the industry's
47
$21.2 billion assets at year-end 1974.
Economic Importance 
Real estate investment trusts provide professional 
real estate portfolio management to both large and small in­
vestors. REITs provide a vehicle for real estate investment 
for those lacking the expertise or funds to make real estate 
investments on their own.^^ Since the shares of most REITs
^^Lewis, 354.
'^ I^nternal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 856 (d)(3)
'^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 9.
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 7-8.
^^Benton E. Gup, Financial Intermediaries; An Intro­
duction (Boston: Houghton Millfin Company, 1976), 204.
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are either listed on one of the national stock exchanges or
actively traded in the over-the-counter market, REIT investors
enjoy a high degree of liquidity. The liquidity afforded
REIT shareholders has aided the trusts in growing to a place
of economic importance. Since 1961 REITs have provided the
real estate sector of the economy with a new source of funds
for owning and financing real property. As a result of REIT
activities, employment and the construction of a variety of
49types of properties have increased.
From 1961, the first year of the REIT industry, to 
1974, the end of the period of this study, the assets of real 
estate investment trusts grew from $300 million to $21.2 
billion. Most of the growth that resulted in REITs becoming 
a major financial institution occurred since 1970.^^ The 
majority of REIT assets are held by relatively large trusts.
As of year-end 1974 some 15 percent of the REITs held over 
53 percent of the industry's a s s e t s . T h e  asset structure 
will of course vary from trust to trust depending upon the 
type of REIT and therefore its investment objectives. Table 
3 presents the balance sheet for the industry.
The economic impact of REIT investments is felt in
49National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1974 REIT Fact Book (Washington, D. C .: National Associ­
ation of Rerl Estate Investment Trusts, Inc., 1974), 16.
50
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1974 REIT Fact Book, 14.
^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1974 REIT Fact Book, 12.
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TABLE 3
REIT INDUSTRY BALANCE SHEET 
(Year-end 1974)
Assets (billions) Liabilities (billions)
First Mortgages:
Land loans $ .90 Commercial paper $ .71
Development 2.34 Bank term loans
and revolving
Construction 7.75 credits in use 5.78
Completed Bank lines in use 5.29
properties :
Senior non-
0-10 yr. convertible debt .38
maturity 1.51
Subordinated non-
10+ yr. convertible debt 1.01
maturity 1.95
Convertible debt . 6 8
Junior Mortgages:
Mortgages on
Land, develop­ property owned 1.65
ment & const. .39
Other liabilities .47
Completed
properties 1.05 Shareholder's
equity 5.20
Loan loss reserves (.61)
Land leasebacks .54 $21.17
Property owned 3.72
Cash and other
assets 1.63
$21.17
SOURCE; National Association of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 37.
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varying degrees across the country. Table 4 presents the 
geographic distribution of REIT investments. As shown in 
Table 4 over 52 percent of all REIT investments as of 
December 1974 were in the states of Florida, Texas, Califor­
nia, Georgia, New York, and Virginia. Five of these six 
states are southern or western states, reflecting the fact 
that REITs concentrate their investments in the faster grow­
ing parts of the country. REITs hold some investments in all 
50 states, Washington, D. C ., United States Territories, 
Canada, and other foreign countries, although as Table 4 
shows, the investments in some areas are quite minimal.
The economic importance of REITs can be viewed from 
the perspective of dividends paid to shareholders. REITs 
paid 474 and 455 quarterly dividends totaling over $464 mil­
lion and $412 million during the years 1972 and 1974. The 
greatest amounts were paid by REITs during 1973 when trusts 
paid 550 quarterly dividends totaling over $599 million in 
dividends to shareholders. The decline of REIT prosperity 
was readily reflected with the 1975 results when only 217
quarterly dividend payments totaling less than $139 million 
52
were made. The dividends paid by REITs as a percentage of
all corporate cash dividends paid during the years 1972
53
through 19 75 are 1.7, 2.0, 1.3, and 0.4.
"Dividends Paid by REITs," REIT Statistics (January
1976), 6.
C -5
REIT dividends as a percentage of all corporate cash 
dividends were computed based on data found in REIT Statistics 
and the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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TABLE 4
GEOGRAPHIC DISBURSEMENT OF REIT INVESTMENTS 
(December 1974)
Area
Amount
(millions)
Percentage of Total 
REIT Investment
Florida $ 3,538.4 18.16
Texas 2,042.5 10.48
California 1,929.9 9.90
Georgia 1,115.6 5.72
New York 915.8 4.70
Virginia 702.8 3.61
Maryland 624.7 3.21
Colorado 606.0 3.11
Illinois 592.5 3.04
Ohio 574.7 2.95
Pennsylvania 528.2 2.71
U.S. Territories 476.9 2.45
Louisiana 425.2 2.18
Michigan 420.9 2.16
North Carolina 417.5 2.14
Oklahoma 347.4 1.78
New Jersey 346.8 1.78
Arizona 303.6 1.56
Indiana 276.2 1.42
Massachusetts 274.7 1.41
Tennessee 220.1 1.13
Missouri 211.7 1.09
South Carolina 205.1 1.05
Nevada 202.2 1.04
Washington 185.9 .95
Alabama 176.5 .91
Minnesota 168.6 .87
Washington, D. C . 164.6 .84
Hawaii 153.6 .79
Kentucky 144.2 .74
Iowa 140.8 .72
Mississippi 139.1 .71
Utah 117.2 .60
Wisconsin 109.7 .56
Connecticut 108.8 .56
Kansas 84.3 .43
Oregon 71.1 .36
Delaware 64.2 .33
New Mexico 59.3 .30
Canada 57.5 .29
Arkansas 43.7 .22
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TABLE 4 —  Continued
Area
Amount
(millions)
Percent
REIT
of Total 
Investment
Nebraska 40.0 .21
West Virginia 27.6 .14
New Hampshire 24.1 .12
Idaho 20.8 .11
Foreign (other than 
Canada) 14.8 .08
Maine 13.1 .07
Alaska 12.4 .06
Vermont 12.4 .06
Rhode Island 11.6 .06
South Dakota 9.4 .05
Wyoming 7.4 .04
North Dakota 3.9 .02
Montana 1.8 .01
*Does not add to 100
$19,487.7 
percent due to rounding
99.99*
SOURCE: National Association of Real Estate Invest­
ment Trusts, Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 5, 42-43.
A final area in which to view the economic signifi­
cance of REITs is their activity in the primary securities 
market. During the years 1961 to 1974 inclusive, REITs tapped 
the capital market 383 times, raising a total of $6.652 bil­
lion with a wide variety of offerings. These figures do not 
reflect 61 private placements which raised $833 million for 
the trusts nor does the dollar amount include various best
efforts offerings, but the amounts raised with best efforts
54
offerings are relatively small. The public offerings of
"Listing of REIT Public Offerings and Private 
Placements, REIT Statistics (July 1975), 8-14.
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REITs over the first 14 years of their existence were 2.6 
percent of all publicly offered stocks and bonds during the 
same period. During 1971, however, when REITs raised a 
record $1,738 billion through the public sales of their
securities they accounted for 4.6 percent of all publicly
55offered stocks and bonds for the year.
Significance and Objectives of the Study 
Recent studies concerning REIT performance have inves­
tigated the relationships between various performance measures 
and one or two independent variables such as leverage or 
dividend payout r a t i o s . T h e s e  studies have been deficient 
primarily in the performance measures selected. The perfor­
mance measures generally used have been void of any risk 
dimension. This study seeks to make further application of 
capital market theory to the study of REIT performance.
The principal objective of this study is to investi­
gate the performance of REITs. One of the main questions to 
be answered concerns the ability of REITs to diversify their 
portfolio holdings. Given the legal constraints on assets 
eligible for REIT ownership, can REITs invest in a real estate
55These calculations are based on data contained in 
various issues of REIT Statistics and the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin.
^^See for example: Charles Henry Wurtzebach, "A Risk-
Return Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts" (Ph.D. dis­
sertation, University of Illinois, 1975) and David George 
Shulman, "Leverage, Dividends, and Rates of Return on Equity 
Real Estate Investment Trusts" (Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of California, Los Angeles, 1975) .
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related portfolio and achieve the risk reduction benefits 
associated with diversification? Diversification will pro­
vide risk reduction unless the combined assets are perfectly 
positively correlated.
A related area of investigation concerns the viability 
of REITs as an investment medium. Does the performance of 
REITs justify investor interest? Comparisons of REIT perfor­
mance to various standards, all on a risk-adjusted basis, 
will be used as criteria for evaluating the viability of the 
trusts as an investment medium.
A further question to be studied involves identification 
of factors significantly affecting REIT performance. From 
among factors which past research and logic dictate to be 
important in influencing performance, which will be found 
significantly influencing the one-parameter, risk-adjusted 
performance measures? These one-parameter, risk adjusted per­
formance measures derived from the capital asset pricing model 
are in sharp contradistinction to performance measures used 
in other studies. It is believed that the use of the afore­
mentioned performance measures and a more complete set of 
explanatory variables than used in past studies will yield a 
better understanding of the interrelationships affecting REIT 
performance.
Hypotheses Tested 
Hypotheses were tested in addressing each of the three major 
areas of this study. The null hypothesis used to examine the
28
ability of REITs to diversify was that the average correla­
tion coefficient between returns on real estate investments 
available to REITs is not significantly less than +1.
Various hypotheses were tested to investigate the 
viability of REITs as an investment medium. First, null 
hypotheses were tested that no significant differences exist 
between the average performance of REITs and the market.
The one-parameter performance measures of Treynor, Sharpe, 
and Jensen were used both for the REITs and the market. The 
second of the approaches used to ascertain the viability of 
REITs as an investment medium consisted of comparing theo­
retical and empirical capital market lines (CML). The null 
hypotheses tested were (1) no significant differences exist 
between the slopes of the theoretical and empirical CMLs and
(2) no significant differences exist between ' 'le intercepts 
of the theoretical and empirical CMLs. The last approach 
used to examine the viability of REITs involved comparisons 
between a theoretical security market line (SML) and an 
empirical SML. The null hypotheses tested were (1) no sig­
nificant differences exist between the slopes of the theo­
retical and empirical SMLs and (2) no significant differences 
exist between the intercepts of the theoretical and empirical 
SMLs.
In determining factors significantly related to the 
performance of REITs the null hypotheses tested were that 
no significant association exists between REIT performance
29
and the :
1. sponsorship of the trust
2. type of trust
3. size of the trust
4. extent of financial leverage employed
5. quality of the trust's investments, and
6. management fees paid to the trust's advisor
Limitations
This study is restricted because of certain limitations 
concerning the time periods investigated, the companies and 
REITs included in the samples, and the variables selected for 
analysis. The years 1972 and 1974, though important in terms 
of growth and stock market acceptance for the REIT industry, 
may not best reflect the structure of REIT performance. The 
samples used are restrictive in that ultimately they are 
determined by data availability.
A final limitation concerns the variables used. Perfor­
mance measures other than the three one-parameter measures 
used are found in the literature. Though the ones selected 
have a sound theoretical foundation in the capital asset pric­
ing model, other performance measures are possibly superior.
As for the factors chosen as explanatory variables to explain 
REIT performance, the ones chosen are those which logic and 
previous research have shown to be important. The possibility 
remains, however, that factors not investigated could be 
significant in explaining REIT performance.
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Organization of the Study 
Chapter II contains four major sections. The first 
section reviews research that has been conducted on REITs. 
Next, the capital asset pricing model, which provides the 
theoretical underpinning for this study, is reviewed. The 
third part of the chapter reviews various aspects of diver­
sification. The final section of Chapter II reviews perfor­
mance measurement —  return measures, risk measures, and 
one-dimensional performance measures.
Details of the samples utilized, sources of data 
employed, and time periods studied are presented in Chapter 
III. The one-dimensional performance measures of Treynor, 
Sharpe, and Jensen that are used throughout much of the 
study are explained. The particulars of the various tests 
used to examine the three questions addressed by this study - 
Can REITs diversify? Are REITs a viable investment medium? 
What factors contribute to REIT performance? —  are detailed 
in the remainder of the chapter.
Chapter IV presents and analyzes the results of the 
various tests discussed in the preceeding chapter.
The final chapter gives a brief summary of the paper 
and a statement of the conclusions reached as a result of 
the study. Recommendations for further study conclude Chap­
ter V.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature reviewed is divided into four major 
groupings. First, research conducted on REITs is reviewed. 
Next, the capital asset pricing model is briefly reviewed 
since it serves as the basis for the performance measures 
applied to REITs later in the paper. Third, various aspects 
of diversification are reviewed. Finally, performance 
measurement is viewed from the perspectives of return mea­
sures, risk measures, and one-dimensional performance mea­
sures.
Research Studies 
This section of the chapter reviews ten studies that 
are representative of research conducted on REIT performance.
A chronological presentation of the research articles is made 
in order to highlight the ever increasing sophistication of 
the research conducted.
Kahn
One of the early research studies on REITs was conducted 
by Sanford R. Kahn.^ Although much of his work was descriptive
^Sanford R. Kahn, "An Evaluation of the Real Estate
31
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Kahn did seek to provide some measures of REIT performance. 
Kahn used a sample of 21 trusts in conducting his study. 
Approximately half of all REITs which had registered secu­
rity offerings with the SEC as of June 21, 1966 were included
2
in the sample.
Indexing the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at 
100 beginning January 1962 and computing his own stock price 
average for real estate investment trusts, also indexing it 
at 100 beginning January 1962, Kahn determined that by the 
end of 1965 the DJIA had greatly outperformed the REIT aver­
age. The DJIA ended the period with an index value of almost 
140; the computed REIT average ended the period with an index
3
value of almost 98.
In addition to measuring REIT performance by comparing 
REIT share price movements with the DJIA movements, Kahn made 
some intra-industry performance measures. Two types of data 
were examined for some indication of perfo. aance variations 
among REITs. Trusts were found, as of the end of 1965, to 
have price-earnings ratios ranging from 11 to 31. The more 
recently formed REITs tended to have the higher price/earning
4
ratios. Dividend yield was also used as a performance mea­
sure due to the high payout ratios required for the REITs to 
retain their favored tax environment. Dividend yields for
Investment Trust" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Cincin­
nati, 1967).
^Kahn, 65. ^Kahn, 67-78. ^Kahn, 71-72.
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1965 ranged from three percent to eight and three-fourth 
percent, averaging almost six and one-fourth percent.^
Performance, as measured in various ways by Kahn, fails 
to explicitly take risk into account. Kahn's performance mea­
sures are all essentially return related. The nearest Kahn 
gets to discussing performance in risk-return terms is the 
computation of debt/equity, net income/gross assets, and net 
income/equity ratios for his sample REITs.^
Faulkner
Another work concerning REIT performance was undertaken
7
by Phillip G. Faulkner. Faulkner concentrated on equity 
return as his performance measure. Equity return was defined
O
as cash flow divided by the equity investment. Faulkner 
does acknowledge a risk-return philosophy but only illus­
trates the concept with an example of a subordinated ground 
lease having a 16 percent return compared to a relatively
9
safe purchase-leaseback arrangement returning 7 percent.
Most of Faulkner's paper deals with an examination of vari­
ous specific REIT investments in apartment complexes, office 
buildings, and shopping centers. Equity returns are found to 
average about 10 percent.
^Kahn, 72-73. ^Kahn, 75-82.
^Phillip G. Faulkner, "REITs - Equity Returns in a Fish 
Bowl," The Appraisal Journal 38 (October 1970): 485-494.
^Faulkner, 486. ^Faulkner, 487. ^^Faulkner, 487-491.
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Hines
Mary Alice Hines produced one of the first works to 
apply any meaningful statistical analysis to the investigation 
of REIT performance.^^ Hines relied on dividend yield as 
her performance measure, thus the literature at this time was 
still one-dimensional in viewing performance. Explicit treat­
ment of risk was missing. Hines did discuss the riskiness of 
REITs in terms of their holdings of second mortgages and the 
management fees they incurred, but nothing is found concern­
ing risk in relation to either market return or variability 
of REIT return.
Superior performance was found by Hines for her sample 
of mortgage REITs during the years 1970 and 1971. The trusts 
showed greater price appreciation and larger dividend yields
for the period than the stocks on Standard & Poor's 500 Com-
13posite Index.
The statistical part of the paper consisted of two 
uses of regression analysis. First, stepwise regression was 
used and five variables were found to be highly correlated 
with dividend yield for the sample REITs; (1) book value to 
market value, (2) short-term bank loans to total liabilities 
and net worth, (3) short-term bank loans to total debt,
(4) interest expense to interest income, and (5) interest
l^Mary Alice Hines, "Risk, Yields, Capitalization, and 
Management Fees of Mortgage Trusts," The Appraisal Journal 
41 (October 1973): 484-503.
^^Hines, 498-502. ^^Hines, 491-493.
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income to total a s s e t s . S i m p l e  linear regressions were 
next run between leverage and share price and then between 
leverage and earnings per share. No significant relation­
ships were found between leverage and either share price or 
earnings per share. The findings concerning leverage are 
weakened because the sample used consisted of a mere eight 
trusts, all that provided the needed data.^^
Hinson
Dolan Ray Hinson investigated REITs to determine 
whether the rates of return differ among equity, mortgage, 
and hybrid trusts. He also addressed the secondary ques­
tion of whether or not returns earned by REITs differ between 
trusts sponsored by financial institutions and those with 
independent sponsors. Hinson's study covered 125 trusts from 
1970 through the first quarter of 1973.^^ Three different 
measures of performance were used: (1) operating net cash
flow as a percentage of average total assets, (2) net cash
flow as a percentage of average equity, and (3) net profit
17as a percentage of average equity. All of the performance 
measures used by Hinson were return oriented and lacking in 
any specific recognition of risk. Using all three of the
l^Hines, 494-495. ^^Hines, 502-503.
l^Dolan Ray Hinson, "Comparisons of Performance Among 
Equity, Combination, and Mortgage Real Estate Investment 
Trusts" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of South Carolina, 
1973), 1-2.
l^Hinson, 42-43.
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above mentioned performance measures, no significant difference
in performance among equity, mortgage, and hybrid trust was 
18found. Likewise, Hinson's study detected no significant 
difference in performance between independent and institution­
ally affiliated EEITs.^^
Keintz
The efforts of Richard J. Keintz in a study of life
insurance company sponsored trusts did not advance the tech-
20
niques employed to evaluate REIT performance. Keintz 
compared REIT share prices to the DJIA as an indication of 
performance. The REITs were found to have outperformed the 
DJIA during 1970 and 1971 and to have underperformed the 
DJIA during 1972 and 1973. Further, the trusts sponsored by
21life insurance companies generally outperformed other REITs.
Elebash
Cross-sectional multiple regression analysis was
employed by Clarence C. Elebash in his investigation of the
performance of construction and development real estate invest- 
22ment trusts. The study was based on a sample of 36
^^Hinson, 74. ^^Hinson, 83.
20 Richard J. Keintz, "An Analysis of the Impact of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts Formed by Life Insurance Companies" 
(Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Wisconsin, 1974).
Z^Keintz, 175-177
22Clarence C. Elebash, "Construction and Development 
Real Estate Investment Trusts and the Influence of Sponsor­
ship" (D.B.A. dissertation. The Florida State University,
1975), 92.
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construction and development REITs; the time periods covered
23were the second and fourth quarters of 1972 and 1973.
Three different performance measures are used as 
dependent variables in the regression runs: (1) return on
capital, (2) the ratio of market price to book value, and
(3) the yield on market value. All of the performance mea­
sures Elebash used were void of any recognition of risk.
They were simply various return measures. The independent 
variables consisted of five internal financial variables and 
a dummy variable to represent trust sponsorship. The finan­
cial variables were: (1) short-term investments as a per­
centage of total assets, (2) leverage, (3) return on port­
folio, (4) interest expense as a percent of debt, and
(5) total a s s e t s . D u m m y  variables were used in classify­
ing the REIT sponsors as commercial banks, mortgage bankers,
25life insurance companies, or independents. Return on port­
folio, leverage, total assets, and sponsorship were found to 
be significant in explaining REIT performance as measured by
2 f i
Elebash.
Shulman
Equity REITs were the subject of a study by David 
George Shulman. He studied a split sample of nine trusts 
from December 31, 1963 to December 31, 1974 and added seven 
more trusts for investigation from December 31, 1970 to
Z^Elebash, 73-74. ^^Elebash, 110. ^^Elebash, 90. 
^^Elebash, 127.
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n n
December 31, 1974. The study uses as performance measures 
the risk-adjusted performance measures of Treynor and Jensen,
no
computed based upon quarterly returns. Comparisons of per­
formance measures of the equity REITs, a sample of 15 closed- 
end investment companies, and Standard & Poor's 500 Composite 
Stock Index indicate that equity REITs fared about the same 
as closed-end investment companies and performed almost con-
n Q
sistently worse than the market as a whole. No statistical 
tests of significance, however, are conducted by Shulman to 
verify the comparative performances. Evidence was found that 
the portfolios of equity REITs were not well diversified.^® 
Finally, the risk-adjusted returns of the trusts were not 
significantly related to either leverage or dividend payout 
ratio.
Wurtzebach
One of the best efforts to date in using a risk-adjusted
measure for REITs has been the research of Charles H. Wurtze-
32bach. Wurtzebach studied 39 trusts from the third quarter 
1970 through the fourth quarter 1973. Hypotheses tested were:
(1) leverage has a significant impact on REIT return, (2) REIT
27David George Shulman, "Leverage, Dividends and Rates 
of Return on Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts" (Ph.D. dis­
sertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975), 53.
ZBghulman, 53-59. ^®Shulman, 77-79. ^Og^yiman, 71.
31shulman, 104.
32Charles H. Wurtzebach, "A Risk-Return Analysis of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1975).
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return is cyclical in nature, and (3) risk and return are
33positively related for REITs.
Wurtzebach used six different return measures. They 
were; (1) quarterly holding period returns, (2) geometric 
mean of the quarterly holding period returns, (3) quarterly 
holding period returns after deducting any return of capital 
from the total distribution, (4) geometric mean of the quar­
terly holding period returns after deducting any return of 
capital from the total distribution, (5) quarterly dividend
34
yields and (6) geometric mean of quarterly dividend yields.
Two measures of risk were used, the standard deviation of
35return and the beta coefficient. Although the exact risk-
return relationships varied depending on the risk measure
used, no statistically significant relationships were found
between risk and return for REIT shareholders. Risk-return
relationships were found not altered appreciably by using the
36various return measures.
A time series multiple regression analysis was employed 
to determine the functional relationship between return and 
a group of independent variables consisting of real gross 
national product. Treasury bill yields, leverage as measured 
by the debt-to-equity ratio, and standard deviation of return. 
For the entire sample real gross national product and Treasury
^^Wurtzebach, 20-22. ^^Wurtzebach, 49-53.
^^Wurtzebach, 53-56. ^^Wurtzebach, 98-101.
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bill yields were found to be significantly, negatively related 
to return, thereby supporting the hypothesis that REIT returns 
are countercyclical in nature. Leverage and standard devia­
tion were not statistically significant in relation to re-
o n
turn. Notice that Wurtzebach used return as his dependent
variable; like Elebash and others he did not combine risk and
return into a single performance measure. Wurtzebach did use
one-parameter performance measures derived from the capital
asset pricing model, namely Treynor's and Sharpe's performance
indexes, to rank the performance of the REITs in his sample.
The rankings by the two indexes yielded very similar results.
The rankings of trust performance also provided evidence that
hybrid trusts outperformed both equity and mortgage trusts and
38
that mortgage trusts outperformed equity trusts.
Valachi
A more recent writing on REIT performance attempts to 
predict performance in the gross sense of success or failure. 
Donald J. Valachi used discriminant analysis on a paired 
sample of fifteen failed and fifteen non-failed REITs to see 
if financial ratios could be used in predicting trust failure. 
Failure was defined as entrance into: (1) a bankruptcy pro­
ceeding, (2) technical insolvency, or (3) an explicit agree­
ment with creditors to reduce outstanding debt or interest on 
that debt. Findings of the study indicate that a discriminant 
function based on financial data drawn primarily from REIT
^^Wurtzebach, 109-114. ^®Wurtzebach, 116-117.
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annual statements can reliably discriminate failed from non­
failed REITs up to two annual reporting periods prior to the 
failure. Valachi's research effort is consistent with those
previously mentioned in avoiding a combination risk and return
39performance measure.
Cooley
The relationship between the use of debt and the
performance of mortgage REITs was the subject of a study by
40
Clyde Jensen Cooley. Cooley examined 37 mortgage REITs
from 1971 through 1975. Only those trusts with assets ex-
41ceeding $10 million were included in the sample. Jensen's 
one-dimensional performance measure was regressed against 
debt/equity ratios for the sample t r u s t . T h e  regressions 
found significant and inverse association between Jensen's 
performance measure and mortgage REIT's use of debt.^^
Based on average return, with no consideration of the risk 
component of performance, the sample of 37 mortgage REITs 
experienced substantially poorer performance than the market, 
as proxied by the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock
Donald J. Valachi, "A Discriminant Analysis of Finan­
cial Ratios as Predictors of Real Estate Investment Trust 
Failure," Dissertation Abstracts International-A 37 (September
1976): 1972.
40
Clyde Jensen Cooley, "The Impact of Debt on Mortgage 
Real Estate Investment Trust Shareholder Returns" (Ph.D. disser­
tation, University of Utah, 1977), 12.
41 42 43
Cooley, 123-124. Cooley, 191. Cooley, 196-199.
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44Index. The study produced evidence that mortgage REITs do not 
hold well diversified p o r t f o l i o s . *5 The mortgage trusts 
studied consistently had negative values for Jensen's perform­
ance measure, thus showing that the shareholders were receiving 
returns lower than the rational investor would expect to earn 
in an efficient market, given the level of risk incurred.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The previously reviewed research studies on REITs have 
shown that performance has typically been measured by some 
return surrogate. A basic postulate underlying finance theory 
is that assets of the same risk level should have the same 
expected rate of return. An explicit statement of the rela­
tionship between risk and return is available from the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM). The next three sections of the 
paper will briefly review the assumptions incurred in the 
derivation of the model, a statement of the CAPM, and tests 
conducted on the model.
Assumptions of the CAPM 
As with any model, a number of simplifying assumptions 
are necessary for the development of the CAPM. The assumptions 
involve certain generalizations concerning investor behavior 
and conditions existing in the capital markets. The following
44cooley, 158. ^^Cooley, 137-139.
46cooley, 137-139.
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assumptions allow derivation of the CAPM:
(1) All investors are single period expected 
utility of terminal wealth maximizers who 
choose among alternative portfolios on the 
basis of mean and variance (or standard 
deviation) of return. (Note: represent­
ing preferences in terms of mean and 
standard deviation yields identical re­
sults to those obtained in a mean- 
variance representation.)
(2) All investors can borrow or lend an 
unlimited amount at an exogenously 
given risk-free rate of interest and 
there are no restrictions on short sales 
of any asset.
(3) All investors have identical subjective 
estimates of the means, variances, and 
covariances of return among all assets.
(4) All assets are perfectly divisible and 
perfectly liquid (i.e., all assets are 
marketable, and there are no trans­
action costs).
(5) There are no taxes.
(6) All investors are price takers.
(7) The quantities of all assets are given.
Statement of the CAPM
William F. Sharpe developed the CAPM in his classic
article "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilib-
48
rium Under Conditions of Risk." Sharpe's CAPM relates the
Michael C. Jensen, "The Foundations and Current State 
of Capital Market Theory," Studies in the Theory of Capital 
Markets (ed. Michael C. Jensen; New York : Praeger Publisher,
Inc., 1972), 5.
48
William F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory
of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk," The Journal 
of Finance 19 (September 1964): 425-442.
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expected return on any asset or combination of assets to the 
riskless rate of return and the expected market return:
E(Ri) = Rf + 6i{E(R^) - Rf}.
The model states that the relationship between return and 
risk should be linear. Although the CAPM was derived on an 
ex ante basis, the model is readily converted to an ex post
49
form for use in measuring realized risk-return relationships.
Tests of the CAPM 
A model as simple as the CAPM which tries to depict 
something as complicated as security returns is not likely 
to be found to be an exact representation of real world 
happenings. Such is certainly the case with the CAPM. Vari­
ous tests of the model have been conducted and the consensus 
is that systematic risk and realized return are positively 
related, although perhaps not exactly as the CAPM specifies.
Two of the earlier tests of the model were conducted 
on individual securities. Jacob used both monthly and annual 
returns for 593 New York Stock Exchange stocks covering two 
ten year periods from 1946 through 1955 and 1956 through 1965 
to test the relationship between realized return and systematic 
risk. A statistically significant positive relationship was 
found. The observed relationship was not, however, as strong
^^Franco Modigliani and Gerald A. Pogue, "An Intro­
duction to Risk and Return." Financial Analysts Journal 
30 (May-June 1974): 77.
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as predicted by the CAPM.^^ Miller and Scholes studied 631 
stocks from 1954 through 1963 to determine the relationship 
between realized annual returns and systematic risk. Although 
the interpretation of results was complicated by multicol- 
linearity among the independent variables, the general obser­
vation was that stocks with high systematic risk tend to have 
high rates of return. This positive relationship is expressed 
in the CAPM.^^
The Jacob and Miller and Scholes tests of the model are 
inefficient. There are two problems with testing the CAPM 
using individual securities. First, since betas of individ­
ual securities are typically measured with some error, some 
are overestimated and some are underestimated, the measure­
ment errors tend to weaken the relationship between risk and 
return. Second, much of the variation in security return is
random, i.e., unsystematic risk. The CAPM seeks to relate
52return with systematic risk only.
To alleviate the two problems mentioned, some tests of 
the model have been conducted using portfolios of securities
50
Nancy Jacob, "The Measurement of Systematic Risk for 
Securities and Portfolios: Some Empirical Results," Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 6 (March 1971): 815-
8341
^^Merton H. Miller and Myron S. Scholes, "Rates of 
Returns in Relation to Risk: A Re-examination of Some Recent
Findings," Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets (ed. Michael 
C. Jensen; New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972), 47-78.
52
Modigliani and Pogue, 80.
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rather than individual securities. Black, Jensen, and Scholes
grouped all New York Stock Exchange stocks into ten portfolios
for each year during a 35 year period from 1931 through 1965.
The relationship between monthly return and portfolio beta was
computed for the 35 year period and for many subperiods. The
work by Black, Jensen, and Scholes provides substantial support
for realized return being a linear function of systematic risk,
although once again the returns were less than those indicated
by the CAPM.' Blume and Friend used monthly returns for
portfolios covering three time periods during 1955 through
1968 to test the CAPM. They concluded that the linear model
is a tenable approximation of the relationship between risk
and return for New York Stock Exchange stocks during the
period of their s t u d y . I n  their test of the CAPM, Fama and
MacBeth included a specific term to test for nonlinearities
in the risk-return relationship. Although not exactly as
specified by the model, Fama and MacBeth found a linear associ-
5 5ation between realized portfolio return and systematic risk.
c o
Fisher Black, Michael C. Jensen, and Myron Scholes, 
"The Capital Asset Pricing Model; Some Empirical Tests," 
Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets (ed. Michael C. 
Jensen: New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972), 79-121.
^^Marshall E. Blume and Irwin Friend, "A New Look at 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model," The Journal of Finance 28 
(March 1973: 19-33.
55See Modigliani and Pogue page 82 for a brief summary 
of Eugene F . Fama and James D. MacBeth, "Risk, Return, and 
Equilibrium: Empirical Tests." Unpublished Working Paper No,
7237, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 
August, 1972.
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Diversification 
The fact that investors diversify their investment 
holdings is a generally observable phenomenon. A reasonable 
assumption, therefore, is that investors are maximizing their 
utility when they diversify. As will be discussed, diversifi­
cation is beneficial in that it almost always reduces the 
risk of the portfolio. The next two sections discuss naive 
diversification and Markowitz diversification.
Naive Diversification 
Naive diversification can be defined as "not putting 
all of your eggs in one b a s k e t . T h e  benefits of naive 
diversification come about as a result of averaging out the 
unsystematic risk components of the individual stocks, leav­
ing only systematic or market risk. No attention is paid 
to the covariance of returns between securities. The impli­
cation of naive diversification is that the investor should 
own many different securities in order to reduce portfolio 
risk. Naive diversification often leads to excessive or
superfluous diversification which can actually increase port-
5 8folio risk rather than reduce it.
^^Jack Clark Francis and Stephen H. Archer, Portfolio 
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1971), 154.
57
John Lintner, "Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal 
Gains from Diversification," The Journal of Finance 20 
(December 1965): 589.
^®Francis and Archer, 164-165.
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The question is then raised as to how many securities 
are needed to achieve the benefits of naive diversification. 
In a study of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
Evans and Archer found the relationship between portfolio 
risk and the number of randomly selected securities in the 
portfolio to be as indicated in Figure 1. As shown in Fig­
ure 1, a portfolio consisting of as few as 8 securities 
will have eliminated almost all of the risk that can be 
eliminated, i.e., —  risk is brought down near the systematic 
level. The opportunity to reduce the dispersion of portfolio
returns by increasing the size of the portfolio is rapidly 
59
exhausted.
Markowitz Diversification 
In his pioneering work in 1952 Markowitz provides a 
theoretical justification for diversification.^^ The E-V 
hypothesis of Markowitz implies avoiding investing in secu­
rities with high covariances among themselves in order to 
reduce the portfolio's risk without sacrificing any of its 
r e t u r n . T h e  lower the correlation between expected returns 
of the securities in the portfolio, the less risky the port­
folio will be. Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship
59Lawrence Fisher and James H. Lorie, "Some Studies on 
Variability of Returns on Investments in Common Stocks," Journal 
of Business 43 (April 1970): 117.
^^Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," The Journal 
of Finance 7 (March 1952): 77.
^^Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," 89.
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FIGURE 1
NAIVE DIVERSIFICATION AND RISK REDUCTION
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SOURCE: John L. Evans and Stephen H. Archer, "Diversifi­
cation and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis,"
The Journal of Finance 23 (December 1968), 765.
FIGURE 2
THE EFFECTS OF MARKOWITZ DIVERSIFICATION
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SOURCE: Jack Clark Francis and Stephen H. Archer,
Portfolio Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, inc., 1971), 25.
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between the correlation of expected return and portfolio risk. 
As shown in Figure 2, Markowitz diversification allows for 
the total elimination of risk if the portfolio consists of 
two perfectly negatively correlated securities. Two such secu­
rities are rarely, if ever, found. As additional securities 
are added to the portfolio it becomes more and more difficult 
to maintain the low correlations between all possible pair 
combinations. The result, as shown in Figure 3, is that 
although Markowitz diversification can reduce portfolio risk 
below the systematic level, the portfolio risk will approach 
the systematic level as securities are added to the portfolio 
because of the scarcity of securities which covary inversely 
with each other.
FIGURE 3
LIMITS OF MARKOWITZ DIVERSIFICATION
1 8
systematic risk estimate = .1166
.1 2
06
number of randomly selected securities 
in the portfolio
SOURCE: Jack Clark Francis and Stephen H.Archer.
Portfolio Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1971,), 157.
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Performance Measurement
Proper measurement of an investment's performance will
6 2include two dimensions —  rate of return and risk. The 
general shortcoming of previous research on REIT performance 
has been viewing performance only from a return perspective. 
The next two sections of the paper briefly review various 
methods available for measuring returns on and risk of secu­
rity investments. The last section reviews one-parameter 
performance measures that incorporate return and risk informa­
tion about the investment.
Rate of Return 
A rate of return measure for an investment should 
reflect the total benefits derived from ownership of the asset 
over a specified time period. Total benefits obtained from 
owning a share of common stock during any period consist of 
capital appreciation or depreciation plus any dividends re­
ceived during the period. The computation of a proper return 
measure and the appropriate measure of central tendency for 
this return measure will now be discussed
Holding-period return
A holding-period return (HPR) can be calculated for 
any asset. In general terms the HPR is:
Eugene F. Fama, "Risk and the Evaluation of Pension 
Fund Portfolio Performance," Modern Developments in Invest­
ment Management (ed. James Lorie and Richard Brealey; New 
York: Preager Publishers, Inc., 1972), 469.
r = 
t
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capital gain or loss + current 
income resulting from ownership
purchase price
In more specific terms relating to common stock, the HPR 
formulation would be^^
^t =
p - p + d 
t+1 t t
Pt
where :
r^ = HPR for the share during period t
p^^^ = price for the share at the end of period t
p^ = price of the share at the beginning of period t
d = cash dividends received on the share during 
^ period t
By combining price change and income yield into a
single measure, the HPR formulation ignores any difference
between capital gains and dividends. Obviously, for tax
reasons, the difference may be of considerable importance for 
64
some investors. The HPR is also sensitive to the time
period selected. Some would call the above described HPR a 
holding period yield (HPY) and suggest that a proper HPR 
would equal HPY + 1.^^ The advantage of using a HPR that
Jack Clark Francis, Investments; Analysis and Manage­
ment, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976) , 19-21
G^Henry A. Latane"* and Donald L. Tuttle, Security 
Analysis and Portfolio Management (New York: The Ronald Press
Company, 1970), 62-63.
^^Donald E. Fischer and Ronald J. Jordan, Security 
Analysis and Portfolio Management (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey : Prentice-Hall Inc., 1975), 90-92.
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equals HPY + 1 is in dealing with negative yields. This 
paper uses the first formulation as its HPR. Negative re­
turns , when encountered, can be handled through proper pro­
cedures .
Arithmetic mean of HPRs
Investors sometimes desire to make use of an average 
of successive HPRs. The arithmetic mean is one method of 
obtaining a measure of central tendency of HPRs. Cootner 
favors an arithmetic mean due primarily to downward bias in 
the geometric mean.^^
The arithmetic mean of multiperiod HPRs can be, how­
ever, very misleading. Suppose a share of stock XYZ is 
purchased at $100, rises to $200 at the end of the first 
period, and falls back to $100 at the end of the second peri­
od when the share is sold. The returns are 100 percent and 
negative 50 percent for the first and second periods respec­
tively. The arithmetic mean of the HPRs is 25 percent;
100% + (-50%) = 2 5 %
2
The share purchased at $100 and sold two periods later at $100 
obviously did not earn an average of 25 percent; it clearly 
earned a zero return.
®®Paul H. Cootner, "Stock Market Indexes-Fallacies and 
Illusions," The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 204 (Septem­
ber 29, 1966); 18-19.
^^Francis, 683-684.
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Geometric mean of HPRs
The geometric mean of successive HPRs provides the true 
average rate of return over multiple periods. The geometric 
mean is the average compound rate of return. Computation of 
the geometric mean is:^^
r = (n (1+r -1
g t=l t
where r^ = geometric mean
r^ = HPR for period t 
n = number of holding periods 
Using the above example, the geometric mean is found to be 
zero.
The geometric mean of HPRs is the measure of central 
tendency used in this paper. The arithmetic mean is only an
approximation of the true multiperiod rate of return. As the
variance of the HPRs decreases, the approximation becomes 
closer. Specifically the approximation is:^^
_ 2 1/2
r = {r + var(HPR)}
9
where r = arithmetic mean
r^ = geometric mean
var (HPR)= variance of PHRs
^^Francis, 685.
^^William E. Young and Robert H. Trent, "Geometric 
Mean Approximations of Individual Security and Portfolio 
Performance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
4 (June 1969); 184.
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Risk
Risk is the factor often left out of performance 
measurement. As long as the market pays a premium for risk 
bearing, one should take account of risk in any evaluation of 
performance. In general, risk is measured by fluctuations of 
the investment's returns. The more unstable the returns are, 
the greater is the risk and the less desirable is the invest­
ment due to investors' opposition to risk and the accompanying 
uncertainty. Finance theory usually assumes investors to be 
risk averse. This section of the paper looks at the division
of total risk into systematic and residual components and
reviews various risk surrogates.
Systematic and unsystematic risk
Total risk, or total variability of return, of an asset 
can be split into two components: (1) that part which remains
even when the asset is included in a naively selected effi­
cient portfolio and (2) that part which can be eliminated when 
the asset is included in a naively selected efficient port­
folio.^^ The part that remains is called systematic or undi- 
versifiable risk. The part that can be eliminated is called 
unsystematic, diversifiable, or residual risk. The breakdown 
of total risk into systematic and unsystematic components was
first discussed by S h a r p e . S h a r p e  seeks to show that a
^^Fama, "Risk and the Evaluation of Pension Fund 
Portfolio Performance," 484.
^^Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices," 425-442.
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consistent relationship exists between expected returns and
72
systematic risk. Using systematic risk as his risk surro­
gate, Sharpe lays the foundation for the CAPM.
Systematic risk is caused by factors which simulta­
neously affect the returns of all assets being considered. 
Changes in the economic, political, and sociological environ­
ment can give rise to systematic risk. Unsystematic risk is 
the part of total risk that is unique to the particular asset. 
Labor strikes, management errors, inventions, and advertising 
campaigns are examples of factors that can cause unsystematic 
risk.^^
Various risk surrogates
Although the inclusion of risk with return as a proper 
component of performance measurement is well accepted, there 
remains the problem of measuring risk. Fortunately there is 
some evidence that correlations among different measures of 
variability of return are very high.^^ Various means of risk 
quantification are now reviewed.
Standard deviation
The standard deviation of HPRs is a very logical and 
often used risk measure. The popularity of the standard
^^Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices," 436.
^^Francis, 316-318.
James H. Lorie and Mary T. Hamilton, The Stock 
Market: Theories and Evidence (Homewood, Illinois : RTchard
51 Irwin, Inc., 1973), 241.
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deviation (or its square, the variance) as a risk measure is
75no doubt due in large part to its early use by Markowitz. 
Uncertainty, and hence risk, is greater the more returns 
fluctuate. Variations of HPRs about their mean are measured 
by the standard deviation. Standard deviation is a measure 
of total variability of return, i.e., the standard deviation 
includes both systematic and unsystematic risk.
A criticism of the standard deviation as a risk mea­
sure is that it is statistically inappropriate. Implicit in 
the use of the standard deviation of expected return as a 
risk measure is that the future HPRs will be normally distri- 
buted. Usually HPRs are assumed to be normally or lognor-
mally distributed. This assumption is justified by the
77central limit theorem. Fama has found that HPRs do not
follow a normal distribution but rather conform to a stable
Paretian distribution. A stable Paretian distribution has an
7 Ainfinite variance. The problem of using the standard devi­
ation is obvious if there is an infinite variance. Standard 
deviation is still considered to be an appropriate risk mea­
sure, however, because the distributions of HPRs do not differ
79greatly from normality.
^^Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," 77-91.
^^Latane' and Tuttle, 598.
^^Eugene F. Fama, "Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian 
Hypothesis," Journal of Business 36 (October 1963): 428.
7 ftFama, "Mandlebrot and the Stable Paretian Hypothesis,
425. 70
'^Latane and Tuttle, 605.
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Beta coefficient
The beta coefficient is a risk measure that has received
much attention since Sharpe's 1964 introduction of systematic
80risk. Beta is the measure of systematic risk. Blume has
provided a brief summary of the rationale for using the beta
81coefficient of the CAPM as a risk measure. The CAPM uses
beta as the relevant risk measure for any asset or portfolio,
8 2efficient or not. Because unsystematic risk can be elimi­
nated through diversification, an investor will only be com-
8 3pensated for the systematic risk he undertakes. Systematic
risk is inherent and unavoidable in the market.
A least-squares regression in which an asset's HPRs
are the dependent variables and the market's HPRs are the
independent variables yields a line called a characteristic
line. The slope of an asset's characteristic line is its
8 4beta coefficient.
Mean absolute deviation
Like the standard deviation, the mean absolute deviation 
is a measure of total variability, i.e., total risk. The
8 0
Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices," 439.
®^Marshall E. Blume, "On the Assessment of Risk," The 
Journal of Finance 26 (March 1971): 1-4.
82Lorie and Hamilton, 201.
8 3John L. Evans and Stephen H. Archer, "Diversification 
and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis," The
Journal of Finance 23 (December 1968): 761-767.
84
Francis, 331.
59
Bank Administration Institute recommended the use of the mean 
absolute deviation as a risk measure in a study on measuring 
the investment performance of pension f u n d s . A s  a measure 
of total risk, the mean absolute deviation offers the advan­
tage of being more stable through time and therefore a more 
reliable estimate of risk than the standard deviation.
Another important advantage of the mean absolute deviation
is that the measure is less affected by extreme values than
8 7the standard deviation.
Modified quadratic mean
While acknowledging the standard deviation as a widely 
used risk measure in performance measurement, Levy alleges 
the risk surrogate has three major weaknesses. First, Levy 
claims the standard deviation measures absolute rather than 
relative dispersion. Second, the standard deviation is com­
puted using the arithmetic mean as the measure of central 
tendency; Levy asserts that the geometric mean is the proper 
measure of central tendency. Third, and the most serious 
defect of the standard deviation according to Levy, the stan­
dard deviation considers all variability of return adverse 
when in fact the investor only suffers when he experiences
®^Fama, "Risk and the Evaluation of Pension Fund Port­
folio Performance," 4 77.
8 6
Lorie and Hamilton, 235.
8 7william A. Spurr and Charles P. Bonini, Statistical 
Analysis for Business Decisions (Homewood, Illinois : Richard
b. Irwin, Inc., 1973), 84.
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88
downside variability.
For a risk measure that will be free of the suggested 
defects of the standard deviation, Levy uses a modification 
of the quadratic mean of the logarithms of sub-period rela­
tives. The modification suggested is that all logarithms
89greater than zero are considered zero. By considering all 
logarithms greater than zero as zero, Levy proposes that he 
has a risk measure for downside vulnerability rather than 
total variability.^^
Semi-variance
Although Markowitz develops his efficient set of
portfolios using variance as the risk measure, he also con-
91siders semi-variance as a possible risk surrogate. Semi­
variance measures variability in one direction, usually from 
the mean downward.
Markowitz states that an analysis based on semi­
variance tends to produce better portfolios than those based 
on the variance. This advantage is because an analysis based 
on semi-variance seeks to eliminate low returns whereas an
O O
Robert A. Levy, "Measurement of Investment Perfor­
mance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 3 (March 
1968): 43-45.
p Q
Levy, "Measurement of Investment Performance," 45-46. 
^^Levy, "Measurement of Investment Performance," 51.
Q 1
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), 188.
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analysis based on variance seeks to eliminate returns that 
deviate from the mean on both the high and low sides. Con­
sidering advantages of using variance such as its greater 
convenience and familiarity, Markowitz recommends an analy­
sis based on variance. Use of semi-variance is relegated
93to use as a secondary risk measure.
One-Dimensional Performance Measures
The evaluation of an asset by the two dimensions of
risk and return is not new. Markowitz developed the efficient
94frontier in risk-return space. Assets on the efficient 
frontier are preferred to all assets not on the efficient 
frontier. Without developing the theory farther, however, 
selection of a preferred asset lying on the efficient fron­
tier is dependent solely on the investor's attitude toward 
risk. Capital market theory has provided a basis for the 
combining of risk and return attributes of an asset into one­
dimensional performance measures that allow an evaluation of 
an asset for any investor. Various one-dimensional perfor­
mance measures found in the literature are now reviewed in 
chronological order.
Treynor's reward-to-volatility ratio
The first published one-dimensional performance measure
^^Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 193-194 
^^Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," 82.
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95was developed by Jack L. Treynor. Treynor's performance
measure is
bi
where = Treynor's performance measure for asset i
r^ = the average return on asset i
= the average risk-free interest rate
= the beta coefficient of asset i 
The performance measure is nothing more than a ratio in which 
the numerator reflects the excess return earned by the asset 
and the denominator reflects risk of the asset. Excess re­
turn is defined as the difference between the average return 
earned by the asset and the risk-free rate of return. A 
risky asset is expected to earn an excess return to compen­
sate for added uncertainty undertaken in comparison to the 
risk-free asset. The denominator of Treynor's performance 
measure is the beta coefficient of the asset being considered, 
Thus Treynor views systematic risk as the appropriate risk 
measure to use in arriving at a one-dimensional performance 
measure.
Sharpe's reward-to-variability ratio
A year after Treynor's publication of the reward-to- 
volatility ratio William F. Sharpe presented a very similar
95jack L. Treynor, "How to Rate Management of Invest­
ment Funds," Harvard Business Review 43 (January-February 
1965): 63-75.
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one-dimensional performance measure that has been called a 
reward-to-variability r a t i o . S h a r p e ' s  performance measure
IS
r - r 
S P f
P —
0 
P
where = Sharpe's performance measure for portfolio p
r^ = the average return on portfolio p
r^ = the average risk-free interest rate
0p = the standard deviation of return on portfolio p
There are two differences between the performance 
measurement models of Treynor and Sharpe. The first and most 
obvious difference is found in the risk measurement used. 
Treynor uses the systematic risk measure of beta; Sharpe used 
the total risk measure of standard deviation. The difference 
in risk measurement is the only computational difference be­
tween the two measures. The numerators of both performance 
measures are indicators of excess return as measured by the 
difference between realized return and a risk-free return 
proxy.
The second difference between the models is their 
applicability. Treynor's model is the slope of the security 
market line and Sharpe's model is the slope of the capital 
market line. Originating in the security market line, Trey­
nor's performance measure applies to any individual asset or
^^William F. Sharpe, "Mutual Fund Performance," Jour­
nal of Business 39 (January 1966): 119-138.
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portfolio of assets, efficient or not. Sharpe's performance 
measurement model is more restrictive in its applicability. 
Since Sharpe's model comes from the capital market line, it 
is appropriate only for efficiently diversified portfolios.
Levy's performance measure
Robert A. Levy developed a performance measurement
model that essentially is a modification of Sharpe's reward-
97to-variability ratio. For the numerator of his perfor­
mance measure, which he calls a reward-to-vulnerability 
ratio. Levy uses the logarithm of the geometric mean of sub­
period risk-bearing relatives minus the logarithm of the 
sub-period risk-free relative. The risk measure Levy uses
in the denominator of his model is the modified quadratic
98mean of the logarithms of the relatives. The modified 
quadratic mean is defined earlier in this chapter. Levy 
summarizes his performance measure in this way;
If the logarithm.of the geometric mean of 
sub-period relatives is used as a measure of 
return and the modified quadratic mean of the 
logarithms of sub-period relatives is used as 
a measure of risk, the regression of return on 
risk ... will be approximately linear and the 
slope of the regression line (the reward-to- 
vulneratility ratio) can serve as an excellent 
composite measure of performance.
35-52.
9?Levy, "Measurement of Investment Performance,"
98Levy, "Measurement of Investment Performance," 48.
99Levy, "Measurement of Investment Performance," 52.
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Jensen's total selectivity method
Michael C. Jensen viewed the performance measures of 
Treynor and Sharpe as reflecting relative performance; Jensen 
developed a measure of absolute p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e  basic
model used is
''it - "ft = “i + billet - "ft>
where r^^ = the quarterly holding period return on portfolio i
r = the average risk-free interest rate during quar-
ter t
a. = the intercept that measures the forecasting 
^ ability of the manager of portfolio i
b^ = a measure of systematic risk for portfolio i
r = the holding period return of a market portfolio
for quarter t (measured by Standard & Poor's 500 
Composite Stock Index)
If the portfolio manager has superior forecasting ability, 
the intercept, will be positive. Inferior forecasting by 
the portfolio manager will manifest itself in a negative 
intercept. It is important to note that Jensen's perfor­
mance measure, a , refers only to the portfolio manager's
^ 102 
ability to select assets.
Fama's performance measure
Eugene F. Fama developed an investment performance 
measure that offers finer breakdowns of performance than are
lOOMichael C. Jensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds in 
the Period 1945-1964," The Journal of Finance 23 (May 1968): 
389-416.
Jensen, "Performance of Mutual Funds," 394 
^^^Jensen, "Performance of Mutual Funds," 390.
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available from the other models r e v i e w e d . ^^3 Fama's basic
model is
{r. - r^} = {r. - r^(3i)> + ~ r^}
where r^ = the return on portfolio i
r^ = the risk-free interest rate
r (6.) = the return on a portfolio consisting of the
^  ^ risk-free asset and the market portfolio and
having risk 3^ equal to 3^.
Fama calls the {r^ - r^} term his measure of overall 
performance. The {r^ - term is called selectivity
and it measures how well portfolio i did relative to a naive­
ly selected portfolio with the same level of risk. The 
(rj^(3i) - r^} term is called risk and it measures the return 
from the decision to take on positive amounts of risk. The 
risk term is what is new in Fama's model; the selectivity
component, or some variation of it, is what Treynor, Sharpe,
104
and Jensen used as their performance measures. After
breaking overall performance into the selectivity and risk 
components, Fama provides various more detailed subdivisions 
of both selectivity and risk.^^^
Criticisms of one-dimensional 
performance measures
The combination of risk and return parameters into
^^^Eugene F. Fama, "Components of Investment Perfor­
mance," The Journal of Finance 27 (June 1972): 551-567.
^^^Fama, "Components of Investment Performance," 557,
^^^Fama, "Components of Investment Performance," 557-
562.
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one-dimensional risk-adjusted performance measures is inher­
ently attractive due to its simplicity and usefulness in 
comparing performance of investments having different returns 
and r i s k s . T h e  attractiveness of the one-dimensional 
performance measures is not, however, without some short­
comings. Several of the criticisms of one-dimensional per­
formance measures are now briefly reviewed.
Friend and Blume found the one-dimensional performance 
measures of Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen seemed to yield seri­
ously biased estimates of p e r f o r m a n c e . O f  the various 
assumptions underlying these measures, the one of equal bor­
rowing and lending rates for all investors most clearly causes
108
a bias against risky portfolios. Friend and Blume conclude
by stating their preference for using the two traditional 
parameters of risk and return to measure investment perfor­
mance instead of the more elegant one-dimensional measures
that require an explicit functional relationship between
 ^  ^ 109
risk and return.
Black, Jensen and Scholes empirically tested the CAPM 
using both cross-sectional and time series t e s t s . T h e y  
found results contrary to those expected from the traditional
Irwin Friend and Marshall Blume, "Measurement of 
Portfolio Performance Under Uncertainty," American Economic 
Review 60 (September 1970): 561.
^^^Friend and Blume, 574. ^^^Friend and Blume, 569.
109priend and Blume, 574.
^^^Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 81.
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form of the CAPM, thereby casting doubt on the one-dimensional 
performance measures derived from it.^^^ Black, Jensen, and 
Scholes did develop and test a similar model having rate of 
return a linear function of two f a c t o r s .
Blume and Friend conducted tests on the CAPM and 
rejected the model as an explanation of the observed returns 
on all financial assets because it implies untenable esti­
mates of the rates of return on risk-free a s s e t s . T h e i r  
regression did, however, show linearity between realized 
return and beta for common stocks. The CAPM, and the one­
dimensional performance measures derived from it, may there­
fore be useful in explaining the risk-return relationship 
for common stocks but not all financial assets due to 
segmentations within the markets involved.
ll^Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 113-114. 
ll^Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 115.
^^^Marshall Blume and Irwin Friend, "A New Look at the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model," The Journal of Finance 28 
(March 1973) ; 30.
^^^Blume and Friend, "A New Look at the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model," 30-32.
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of this chapter is to explain the 
design and methodology of the research conducted to investi­
gate the performance of real estate investment trusts. The 
research design is structured on the theoretical framework 
of the capital asset pricing model which was reviewed in 
Chapter II. The importance of the development of a research 
design based upon a sound theoretical framework cannot be 
overemphasized, especially when applied to an empirical study.
After explaining the samples used, the sources of 
data, and the time periods involved in the study, the vari­
ous performance measures used are presented. The final three 
major divisions in the chapter detail the procedures used to 
address the problems (1) can REITs diversify? (2) are REITs 
a viable investment medium? and (3) can factors significantly 
affecting REIT performance be identified?
Sources of Data
The financial information used in this study was 
gathered from published sources. The sources used to obtain 
the financial data were Moody's Banking and Finance Manual
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for the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977; Moody's 
Dividend Record for 1972 and 1974; and The Daily Stock Price 
Record for the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange, and the Over-the-Counter Market for 1972 and 1974. 
For sample REITs whose fiscal years do not correspond to the 
calendar years under study, the necessary balance sheet and 
income statement data were obtained by prorating the data for 
the fiscal years which include the selected calendar years. 
The type and sponsorship of each REIT was ascertained from 
the Membership Directory 12-74 and the Handbook of Member 
Trusts 1974-1975 respectively; these two sources are publi­
cations of the National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (NAREIT), a trade group.
Samples Used 
Two samples were needed to conduct the various 
investigations within this study. First, a proportional 
stratified sample of 16 real estate related firms was se­
lected from companies listed on the Primary, Secondary, 
Tertiary, and Over-the-Counter Industrial Files of Compustat 
for studying the ability of REITs to diversify.^ To be eli­
gible for inclusion in this sample the companies must have 
had available in the aforementioned sources the data neces­
sary to allow the computation of holding period returns for
For details on proportional stratified sampling see 
Ya-Lun Chou, Statistical Analysis, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt,
Reinhard, and Winston, 1975), 396-398.
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the years studied. The firms selected to proxy returns 
available on real estate investment open to REITs come from 
the following industries: savings and loan associations,
real estate land development, subdividing and/or developing, 
real estate operative builders, and miscellaneous real es­
tate companies. The industries and firms were selected to
coincide as closely as possible with the legal constraints
2
under which REITs must operate. The sample of 16 real es­
tate related firms was chosen to yield 120 different pair 
combinations of representative real estate investments for 
which correlation coefficients were computed and examined.
A large number of combinations was desired in order to 
have degrees of freedom of sufficiently large size to con­
duct the desired statistical tests. The 16 companies used 
to proxy real estate investments are listed by industry in 
Appendix A.
A second sample was needed to provide data for the 
remaining areas of concern within the study. This sample 
consisted of 73 REITs. These 73 REITs represent all REITs 
for which data were available from the aforementioned sources 
for the years 1972 and 1974. Although the sample of 73 REITs 
comprised only 35 percent of all REITs in existance at the 
end of 1974, the sample REITs held 60 percent of all REIT
2gee Section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 for details of the restrictions placed on REIT invest- 
ments.
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assets as of year-end 1974.^ One additional requirement for 
inclusion in the sample was that the REIT must have paid its 
initial dividend prior to the beginning of 1972. This final 
requirement was to remove from the sample those REITs with an 
insufficient operating history. The sample REITs are listed 
in Appendix B.
Time Periods
All investigations conducted in this study cover the 
calendar years 1972 and 1974. The selection of the years 
1972 and 1974 and the corresponding decision to use cross- 
sectional instead of time series analysis are based on the 
fact that the years represent vastly different periods of 
growth and success for REITs. During 1972 REITs experienced 
tremendous growth. Total assets of all REITs increased from 
$8.1 billion to $14.2 billion, an increase of over 75 percent. 
The year 1974, however, was a much different growth situation 
for the industry. Total assets increased from $20.2 billion 
to $21.2 billion for a nearly stagnant increase of less than
4
5 percent.
The vast differences between the two years for REITs 
can also be seen by the public offerings and private place­
ments made by REITs during 1972 and 1974. During 1972 REITs
^These percentages are compiled from the sample and 
industry data contained in the 1975 REIT Fact Book.
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 14.
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raised $1,223.3 million in the capital market, $1,120.3 
million in public offerings and $103 million in private place­
ments. Yet during 1974 REITs tapped the capital market for 
only $23.7 million, $1.5 million in public offerings and $22.2 
million in private placements.^
The stock market reacted to REIT shares in a very 
different fashion in 1974 than in 1972. Many REIT shares 
were near their all-time peak in 1972 and as a whole were 
popular with investors. By the end of 1974 though, the stock 
price index computed by the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts of all REITs traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and the national OTC 
market had fallen from its 1972 high of 103.32 reached in 
November to its 1974 low of 16.87 reached in December, a 
decline of over 83 percent.^
The reasons behind the market's changing evaluation 
of REITs are reflected by the investment writedowns charged 
to loan reserves. From 1961 through 1973 all REITs had expe­
rienced writedowns of only about $12 million. During 1974
7
alone, REITs had realized losses of about $70 million.
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 11.
^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 35.
^"Investment Writedowns Charged to Loan Reserves,"
REIT Statistics, September 1975, 3.
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Performance Measures 
The performance measures used to examine the viability 
of REITs as an investment medium and those used as dependent 
variables in the multiple regressions to ascertain factors 
significantly affecting REIT performance are (1) Treynor's 
reward-to-volatility ratio, (2) Sharpe's reward-to-variabil- 
ity ratio, and (3) Jensen's total selectivity method. These 
and other one-dimensional performance measures found in 
finance literature have been reviewed earlier in this paper. 
It is not the purpose of this study to show the measures 
derived by Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen to be the best perfor­
mance measures. Rather, the study views the selected perfor­
mance measures, all derived from the capital asset pricing 
model, as adequate one-parameter performance measures.
Treynor's Reward-to-Volatility Ratio
Treynor's reward-to-volatility ratio is expressed by
0
the following equation:
bi
where T^ = Treynor's performance measure for asset i
r^ = the average return on asset i
fg = the average risk-free interest rate
b. = the beta coefficient of asset i
1
The average return on a security is calculated as the
0
Treynor, 75
75
geometric mean of the quarterly holding-period returns for
the year in question. The quarterly holding-period returns
g
are computed using the following formula:
(Pit+1 ■ Pit) + ^ it 
^it ---------------------------
Pit
where r .. = the holding-period return of security i for
^ quarter t
^it+1 ” price of security i at the end of quarter t
P. = the price of security i at the beginning of 
quarter t
d . = the cash dividends paid on security i during
quarter t
The average risk-free interest rate is measured as the geo­
metric mean of quarterly market yields of 3-month Treasury 
bills for the year. The beta coefficient for the security is 
the slope of its characteristic line, which relates the secu­
rity's return with the market's r e t u r n . T o  compute the 
beta coefficients for each REIT for 1972 and 1974, the fol­
lowing simple least-squares regression equation is used:^^
“'it = + ®t
where r^^ = the quarterly holding-period of security i
a = alpha coefficient of security i
i
b. = beta coefficient of security i (measure of
 ^ systematic risk)
^Francis, 20. 
lÛTreynor, 64. 
^Francis, 328.
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R = quarterly holding period return of the market 
(measured by Standard & Poor's 500 Composite 
Stock Index)
e = a random error term having an expected value 
of zero
In computing beta coefficients a problem arises con­
cerning the length of time available for generating the risk 
measure. If returns prior to 1972 are used, the sample of 
73 REITs would have to be drastically reduced in size because 
of insufficient data since so many of the trusts were formed 
in the early 1970s. Extending the period of observations 
beyond the one year horizon for 1972 and 1974 respectively
would not be desirable since evidence suggests calculating
12beta coefficients separately for bull and bear markets.
The only other alternative means available to obtain more 
observations of returns for use in calculating the beta coef­
ficient would be to use return periods shorter than the quar­
terly periods. The fact that REITs acquire much of their 
returns from dividends as opposed to price changes would work 
against using shorter holding-period returns such as monthly 
or weekly periods. Using periods shorter than a quarter 
would result in artifically distorted return data as the quar­
terly dividends would be reflected only periodically in the 
holding period returns for the month or week during which the 
dividend was paid.
12See for example Robert A. Levy, "Beta Coefficients as 
Predictors of Return," Financial Analysts Journal 30 (January- 
February 1974) ; 69 and Arthur E. Gooding and Terence P. O'Mal­
ley, "Market Phase and the Stationarity of Beta," Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 12 (December 1977); 854.
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No correct or preferred time interval for measuring 
beta exists. One suggested solution to the problem is to 
match the base period used for measurement to the investor's 
time horizon. For example, the use of weekly HPRs over a 
three month period to calculate beta might be appropriate 
for the short-term trader but not for the long-term investor. 
Others favor a very short measurement period regardless of 
the investor's time horizon. The use of short period for 
beta calculations would make it easier to detect changing 
betas. Statistical reliability can be questioned by using 
either too few observations or too many which may introduce 
noise. Thus, to summarize, there exists no optimal period 
for measuring beta.^^ This study uses quarterly HPRs for 
the years studied for the reasons presented in the preceding 
paragraph.
Sharpe's Reward-to-Variability Ratio
Sharpe's reward-to-variability ratio is expressed by
14
the following equation;
*i
where S^ = Sharpe's performance measure for asset i 
r^ = the average return on asset i
Jerome B. Cohen, Edward D. Zinbarg, and Arthur Zeikel, 
Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, 3rd ed. (Home- 
wood, Illinois : Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), 723-724.
^^Sharpe, "Mutual Fund Performance," 123.
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= the average risk-free interest rate
® . = the standard deviation of quarterly holding-
^ period returns on asset i
Values for r^ and f^ are the same as used in computing
Treynor's performance measure. The standard deviation of
quarterly holding-period returns is calculated for each REIT
for 1972 and 1974, using the returns received during the
respective year.
Jensen's Total Selectivity Method 
Jensen's total selectivity method of performance 
measurement is given by the following equation
"^ it - ^ft = “i + - fft» + ®it
where r^^ = the quarterly holding-period return on asset i
r = the average risk-free interest rate during 
quarter t
a . = the intercept that measures the ability of
^ the REIT manager
= a measure of systematic risk
= the holding-period return of a market portfolio 
for quarter t (measured by Standard & Poor's 
500 Composite Stock Index)
e . = a random error term having an expected value
of zero
The security's quarterly holding-period return is computed 
as in the Treynor and Sharpe models. The risk-free interest 
rate is the average quarterly market yield of 3-month Trea­
sury bills during the quarter. Values for and are 
determined using simple least-squares regression on the
IGjensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds," 393.
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quarterly data with (r%^ - as the dependent variable and
as the independent variable. Jensen's equation 
is the SML equation with two changes. First, the risk-free 
interest rate is subtracted from both sides of the equation 
to remove the intercept term. Secondly, a new intercept 
term, a^, is added. For superior performance will be 
positive; a negative cx^  indicates inferior performance. The 
intercept, represents the additional return provided by
investing in a managed portfolio rather than the market port­
folio. Jensen's performance measure is a^.
Critique of Performance Measures Used 
The three one-parameter performance measures to be 
used in this study have certain important differences that 
should be highlighted. Though the Treynor and Sharpe mea­
sures are both designed to rank relative performances, the 
two measures differ in the risk surrogate used. Treynor uses 
the beta coefficient, a measure of systematic risk, as his 
risk surrogate. Systematic risk refers to that portion of 
total variability in return caused by factors affecting the 
prices of all securities. Sharpe uses the standard devi­
ation of returns as his risk surrogate. Reconciliation of 
Treynor's and Sharpe's difference on risk measurement is 
straightforward. Total risk, as measured by the standard 
deviation of returns, consists of systematic and nonsystem- 
atic risk. Nonsystematic risk can be eliminated by
^^Fisher and Jordan, 105.
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1 n
diversification. Therefore, for an efficient portfolio, 
Treynor's and Sharpe's measures are identical since the only 
risk that exists for an efficient portfolio is systematic 
risk.
This study uses Treynor's performance measure because 
finance theory states that beta is the only relevant risk 
measure since all other risk can be eliminated by diversifi­
cation. Sharpe's performance measure is used because the 
typical REIT investor may react to total variability of 
return instead of return volatility. Treynor's and Sharpe's 
models provide one-parameter measures of relative performance.
Jensen's model is used in this study because it provides a
18measure of absolute performance.
None of these performance measures selected for use in 
this study was developed in relationship to REITs. All three 
of the performance measures were initially presented to mea­
sure mutual fund performance. The techniques developed by 
Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen are, however, applicable to any 
capital asset.
Ability of REITs to Diversify
One of the primary questions addressed by this study 
is the determination of whether or not REITs can achieve the 
benefits of risk reduction through Markowitz diversification.
Lorie and Hamilton, 205.
IBjensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds," 390.
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Various authors have shown that the combination of a relative­
ly few assets can significantly reduce the dispersion of the
19portfolio's returns. This reduction in risk can only take 
place, however, if the returns on the assets in the portfolio 
are not perfectly positively correlated. The less strongly 
correlated the returns of the component assets, the more risk 
is eliminated. In the extreme, if perfectly negatively cor­
related assets were found, a portfolio void of all risk could 
20be constructed.
Legal Constraints 
The tax law places limitations on the sources of 
income a REIT may have and still maintain its favored tax 
status. Section 856(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
essentially requires that a REIT receive at least 75 percent 
of its income from rents from real estate, interest on obli­
gations secured by mortgages on real estate, and gains from 
the sale of real estate or interests in mortgages on real 
estate. The section further requires that less than 30 per­
cent of a REIT's income can come from the sale of real pro­
perty held less than four years. The sample discussed 
earlier of 16 real estate related firms was chosen to
for example John L. Evans and Stephen H. Archer, 
"Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empiri­
cal Analysis," The Journal of Finance 23 (December 1968): 761-
769 and Lawrence Fisher and James J. Lorie, "Some Studies on 
Variability of Returns on Investments in Common Stocks," 
Journal of Business 43 (April 1970): 99-134.
9 n
Francis and Archer, 23-25.
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represent the types of real estate investments available to 
REITs.
Returns of Representative Real 
Estate Investments
REITs have the ability to efficiently diversify if 
they can invest in assets having less than perfectly posi­
tively correlated returns. Since the returns on individual 
real estate investments are not available from standard 
financial resources, the returns on assets available for 
inclusion in a REIT's portfolio must be proxied. Quarterly 
holding-period returns for 1972 and 1974 are computed for 
each of the 16 real estate firms, thus yielding 120 different 
pair combinations each year to test the ability of REITs to 
diversify. These pairs are used as surrogates for possible 
combinations of investments that a REIT could make.
Due to the small number of data points used to compute 
the correlation coefficients for the 120 pair combinations 
during 1972 and 1974, the calculations likely produce some 
correlation coefficients that are too high and some that are 
too low. Of concern, however, is not the individual correla­
tion coefficients but their average. The law of large numbers 
states that the average of the 120 correlation coefficients
computed each year ought to be very close to the true mean
21
correlation coefficients.
Tests are conducted to determine if the average
Zlchow, 211-212.
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correlation coefficient of the surrogate investment is equal 
to +1. Since the correlation coefficients cannot exceed +1, 
a one-tailed test of significance is used. If no statisti­
cally significant difference exists between the average cor­
relation coefficient of the 120 combinations and +1, then 
there will be considerable evidence that REITs cannot effi­
ciently diversify. With all of the real estate investments 
having their returns move_ together proportionately and in 
the same direction, as evidenced by a correlation coefficient 
of +1, combining the assets could only result in a portfolio 
risk that equals the weighted average of the risk of the 
components. If the correlation coefficient of the returns
of the real estate investments is less than +1, Markowitz
2 2efficient diversification is possible. If the average 
correlation coefficient between returns on real estate invest­
ments available to REITs is less than +1, successive tests 
will be conducted to statistically determine the extent of 
the correlation among the investments.
Viability of REITs as an 
Investment Medium
A corollary question addressed by this study is whether 
or not REITs are a viable investment medium. In essence, if 
REITs perform as well as or better than capital market theory 
says they should, they certainly would rightly be considered 
capable of growing and prospering. If REIT performance is
22prancis and Archer, 23.
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less than it should be, the viability of REITs can be seriously 
doubted. Performance, both for REITs and the standard of 
comparison, is viewed in a risk-return sense as dictated by 
the CAPM. Three different ways of examining the viability of 
REITs as an investment medium are used. The reason for using 
multiple tests is that there are certain shortcomings in each, 
so different approaches are used in order to arrive at a con­
sensus .
Comparison of REIT Performance 
to Market Performance
The first test of the viability of REITs as an 
investment medium consist of comparing average REIT perfor­
mance for the 73 sample trusts, as measured by the Treynor, 
Sharpe, and Jensen one-parameter performance measures, to 
the market's performance, also measured by the same three 
risk-adjusted return techniques. The Standard & Poor's 500 
Composite Stock Index is used as the market proxy. Two- 
tailed tests of significance are used to determine if the 
average REIT performance differs from the market performance.
If REITs perform as well as or better than the market, their 
viability would be supported. Performance by REITs below 
that of the market would indicate REITs not to be a viable 
investment medium.
Comparison of Theoretical 
and Empirical CML
The second test used to ascertain the viability of 
REITs as an investment medium consists of statistically
85
comparing the slopes and intercepts of the theoretical and
empirical capital market lines (CML). Two-tailed tests of
significance are used. The CML represents the risk-return
23relationship for efficient portfolios. Geometric means 
of quarterly Treasury bill yields, quarterly holding-period 
returns on the market, and quarterly holding-period returns 
on the 73 sample REITs along with the standard deviations of 
the quarterly returns are used to produce the theoretical 
and empirical CMLs using simple least-squares regression. 
Equal slopes indicate REITs have performed as the CAPM pre­
dicts. A flatter slope of the empirical CML compared to the 
theoretical CML indicates inferior performance of REITs as 
an investment medium. Performance of the REITs as the CML 
suggests would indicate that the diversification achieved 
by REITs in constructing their portfolios of real estate 
investments has resulted in their holding efficient port­
folios .
Comparison of Theoretical 
and Empirical SML
The last of the three tests used to ascertain the
viability of REITs as an investment medium consists of
statistically comparing the slopes and intercepts of the
^^Charles A. D'Ambrosio, Principles of Modern Inyest- 
ments (Chicago: Scientific Research Associates, Inc., 1978)
329.
^^William F. Sharpe, "Risk Aversion in the Stock Market: 
Some Empirical Evidence," The Journal of Finance 20 (September 
1965): 421-422.
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theoretical and empirical security market lines (SML). Two-
tailed tests of significance are used. The SML depicts the
25risk-return relationship for all assets. Geometric means 
of quarterly Treasury bill yields and market returns, as 
measured by the holding-period returns on Standard & Poor's 
500 Composite Stock Index, are used to generate the theoret­
ical SML. Simple least-squares regression techniques applied 
to the geometric means of quarterly holding-period returns 
and computed beta coefficients from the 73 REITs are used to 
produce the empirical SML. If the empirical SML produced by 
the REITs is not significantly different from the theoretical 
SML, the REITs will be shown to have performed as capital 
market theory would suggest. A slope of the empirical SML 
significantly greater or less than that of the theoretical 
SML would be indicative of the superiority or inferiority, 
respectively, of REITs as an intermediary in the capital 
market.
Factors Contributing to 
REIT Performance
The investigation into which of several factors are 
significant in explaining REIT performance is conducted using 
cross-sectional multiple regression analysis as the primary 
quantitative tool. The equations obtained are of the general 
form:
Ambrosio, 340-341.
^^M. Dutta, Econometric Methods (Dallas: South-Western
Publishing Co., 1975), 46.
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Y = a+ + ... + a X + e, n= 1,2,...,N
^ n n
While there are an infinite number of relationships that 
might be fitted to the collection of data, the method of 
least squares is particularly appropriate because it;
1. wastes little information
2. generates estimates of parameters which, under 
certain assumptions, are best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE), and
3. is a robust method
Assumptions of Regression Analysis
Most of the assumptions of regression analysis are
stated in terms of the random error term, e. The following
are the conventional assumptions of least squares regres- 
27Sion:
1. The individual errors or disturbances, e^, are 
random variables with finite means, variances, 
and covariances.
2. Every disturbance, e^, has zero expected value, 
irrespective of the value of X^.
3. The variance of each e^ is the same for all n
(n = 1, ..., N) and independent of X^.
4. The error terms of different observations are
distributed independently of each other.
5. The density function f(e) is normal
2 7Edward J . Kane, Economic Statistics and Econometrics 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 355.
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6. The independent variable is measured without 
error and has a finite mean and variance.
A final assumption that is specifically made for
multiple regression models is that the number of parameter
estimates to be made must be less than or equal to the
2 8number of observations. Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 
imply the consistency of the parameter estimates. The same 
assumptions also establish that least square estimators are 
BLUE. Assumptions 3 and 4 are critical requirements both for 
consistency and for best linear unbiasedness. Assumption 3 
calls for the homoscedasticity of the error term. This means 
the error term should have a constant variance; when the con­
stant variance assumption is violated, heteroscedasticity 
exists. Assumption 4 rules out autocorrelation, which exists 
when the error terms of different observations are not dis­
tributed independently of each other, but instead are cor- 
29
related.
Dependent Variables
The risk-adjusted return measures of Treynor, Sharpe, 
and Jensen are used as the dependent variables in the multiple 
regressions. These one-dimensional performance measures have 
been discussed at length previously in this paper. Various 
performance measures are used to see if the analysis is 
sensitive to any particular one.
^®Dutta, 43-44 
Z^Kane, 356-357.
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Independent Variables
The multiple regression procedure used employs six 
REIT characteristics as independent variables. These are 
tested for significant association with each of the three 
performance measures during each of the years studied. Each 
of the characteristics used as an independent variable is 
identified below. The discussion of each variable includes 
how it is measured and why it was selected for inclusion in 
the study.
REIT advisor. The first independent variable is an 
indication of trust sponsorship. This qualitative variable 
is included in the regression via the use of a dummy vari­
able. A REIT is categorized as either commerical bank or 
non-commercial bank sponsored. The sponsorship is determined 
from information in the Handbook of Member Trusts 1974-1975.
Sponsorship is limited to the dichotomous classifi­
cation of commercial bank or non-commercial bank for two 
reasons. First, REITs sponsored by commercial banks have 
more than double the assets of REITs sponsored by any other
on
type entity. Secondly, previous research has shown REIT 
sponsorship to be related to performance. In studying con­
struction and development trusts, Elebash used dummy variables 
to categorize the trusts as sponsored by mortgage bankers.
^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 7.
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commercial banks, life insurance companies, or o t h e r s . H e
found REIT sponsorship functionally related to two of his
32performance measures. This study has condensed the break­
down of sponsorship into just commercial bank or non-commer­
cial bank instead of the four used by Elebash since he found
that commercial bank sponsored REITs outperformed other 
33
trusts.
Type of REIT. The characteristic of trust type is 
included in the regression equation via two dummy variables 
to indicate the type as mortgage, equity, or hybrid. The 
number of dummy variables used to denote trust type is one 
less than the number of possible classifications in order to 
avoid the dummy variable trap.^^ Classification data for 
trust type are obtained from NAREIT published information.
There are some indications that mortgage REITs 
suffered the most as the REIT industry f a l t e r e d . P r e v i o u s  
research by Wurtzebach has shown a difference in performance 
related to the type of trust. He found hybrid REITs had the 
best performance on a risk-adjusted return basis followed in 
order by mortgage and equity trusts.
S^Elebash, 90. ^^Elebash, 111-112. ^^Elebash, 121, 
S^Dutta, 162.
^^Priscilla S. Meyer, "Realty Trust Woes," The Wall 
Street Journal, January 21, 1974, 1.
^^Wurtzebach, 116-117.
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Size of trust. Trust size is the third characteristic 
used as an independent variable. The year-end total assets 
of each sample REIT are determined from data found in the 
appropriate Moody's Banking and Finance Manual. Trust size 
is included in the regression equation in units of $100,000,000
Elebash found in his study of construction and develop­
ment REITs that two of his three performance measures were
37functionally related to trust size. Better performance is 
expected from the larger trusts because of their competitive 
edge in obtaining funds such as in the sale of commercial 
paper and because of greater investor confidence in large fi­
nancial institutions.
Trust's financial leverage. Financial leverage, 
defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, is the 
fourth characteristic used as an independent variable. Fig­
ures for computing the ratio are obtained from issues of 
Moody's Banking and Finance Manual. Since leverage is a 
two-edged sword, increasing returns on net worth when debt 
funds earn more than they cost and decreasing the returns 
when debt funds earn less than they cost, a positive relation­
ship with performance is expected in the 1972 period and a
38negative relationship is expected in the 1974 period.
3?Elebash, 127.
Op
See J. Fred Weston and Eugene F . Brigham, Managerial 
Finance, 5th ed (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1975),
587 and "Real Estate Investment Trust Industry," The Value 
Line Investment Survey (January 4, 1974), 1998.
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Using a debt to equity type leverage measure, Elebash
has found a significant relationship between performance and
39leverage for construction and development REITs. Wurtzebach
found no significant relationship between REIT shareholder
return and leverage. He used debt to equity as his leverage
m e a s u r e . I n  her study of mortgage REITs Hines found no
significant relationship between leverage and share price or
41leverage and earnings per share. Since past research has 
been inconclusive regarding the importance of leverage, as 
measured by the debt to equity ratio, to REIT performance, 
this study uses debt to total assets in an effort to achieve 
more definitive results.
Quality of trust's investments. A measure of the 
quality of a trust's investments is the fifth characteristic 
used as an independent variable. To measure the quality of 
the asset holdings, the ratio of net income divided by total 
assets is computed. Data for the computations are obtained 
from appropriate issues of Moody's Banking and Finance Manual.
Many REITs have found large portions of their invest­
ment portfolios not earning as loans go into default and the 
trusts increase their loan-loss r e s e r v e s . T h e  measure
40,
"Hines, 502-503
^^Elebash, 111. Wurtzebach, 112-116
41.
42 See for example; Priscilla S. Meyer, "Contracting 
Credit: Lenders are Wounded as Realty Portfolios are Shot
Full of Holes," The Wall Street Journal, January 1, 1975, 1; 
Priscilla S. Meyer, "Falling Out: Real Estate Trust Feud
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chosen for use in this study should adequately differentiate 
between those trusts having high quality investments and 
those having investments which have ceased to provide a re­
turn. Elebash found a similar quality measure, he called his
return on portfolio, to be functionally related to perfor-
43mance.
Trust's management expenses. The sixth characteristic 
used as an independent variable reflects management fees paid 
to the REIT's advisor. The variable is quantified by divid­
ing the annual management expense for the trust by its total 
assets. The necessary data are obtained from the appropriate 
issues of Moody's Banking and Finance Manual.
The advisory fees are negotiated between the trustees 
and the advisor; oftentimes the fees are structured with an
incentive feature based on the earnings performance of the
44trust. Hines found in her study of mortgage REITs that 
advisory fees averaged 1.2 percent of total a s s e t s . C o n ­
sidering Jensen's finding that mutual funds were on average 
not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform
With Advisers Over Their Obligations," The Wall Street Journal, 
March 13, 1975, 1; "Boston REIT Defaults on Debt of $559.7 
Million," The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1975, 4; and "First 
Mortgage Has $28 Million Operating Loss," The Wall Street 
Journal, April 10, 1975, 4.
^^Elebash, 111.
^^National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Inc., 1975 REIT Fact Book, 9.
45Hines, 500-502.
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the market, even when fund returns were measured gross of
management expense, it will be interesting to see if REIT
advisors can justify their fees by having a strong positive
46correlation between performance and advisor compensation.
Jensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds," 415.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA
In this chapter analyses of the data relative to the 
three areas investigated are presented. First, findings 
pertaining to the ability of REITs to diversify their port­
folio holdings are examined. Next, REIT performance as 
compared with market standards as established by capital 
market theory is analyzed. Finally, data are presented and 
examined to identify factors affecting REIT performance.
Ability of REITs to Diversify 
As risky assets are combined to form a portfolio, the 
risk of the resulting portfolio will be lowered if the cor­
relation between returns for the individual assets is less 
than perfectly positive. The general expression for the risk 
of the portfolio is:^
Op
where Op = standard deviation of portfolio return
w^ and Wj = weights invested in assets i and j
• = correlation coefficient between returns
of assets i and j
^William F . Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Mar­
kets (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), 46.
95
96
o . and o . = standard deviation of returns of assets 
 ^ ] i and j
In the simple case of a two-asset portfolio consisting of
assets that are perfectly negatively correlated, there will
exist some combination of weights (w. and w.) such that the
2
portfolio will have zero risk. Under all conditions, the 
lower the correlations of returns of assets comprising the 
portfolio, the lower the portfolio risk.
Correlation coefficients for quarterly HPRs for 1972 
and 1974 were computed for all possible pairs of those real 
estate related firms listed in Appendix A. The quarterly 
HPRs are presented in Appendix C. A total of 120 correla­
tion coefficients for each year resulted, as shown in Ap­
pendix D.
Table 5 presents a summary of testing conducted on 
the correlation of returns of the real estate firms. Since 
the correlation coefficient can have values of -1.0 to +1.0, 
one-tailed tests were conducted starting at a value of +1.0 
and stepping down in increments of 0.25 until the null hypo­
thesis could be accepted at a significance level of 0.05.
3
The test statistic used was:
m P - Po . sT = , where o„ =---------  X --------
0_
X
n-1
^D'Ambrosio, 319-320.
3
Paul Jedamus, Robert Fame, and Robert Taylor, Statis­
tical Analysis for Businss Decisions (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1976), 327-328.
TABLE 5
CORRELATION OF RETURNS OF REAL ESTATE RELATED FIRMS
Year P Po Null Hypothesis T-value
Accept or Reject 
Null Hypothesis at 
0.05 level of 
significance 
(one-tailed test)
1
0.4434 1.00 (3 =  Po -13.3798 reject
9 0.4434 0.75 P = Po - 7.3702 reject
7
2 0.4434 0.50 P - pQ - 1.3606 accept
1
0.5630 1.00 P “  Po -10.2342 reject
9 0.5630 0.75 P =  Po - 4.3794 reject
7
4 0.5630 0.50 P =  Po 1.4754 accept
V D
'J
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p = the average correlation coefficient for the 120 pairs 
of real estate related firms
Pq = correlation coefficient tested against
a- = estimate of the standard error of the mean
s = standard deviation of the sample
n = number of observations
Degrees of freedom are n-1.
The null hypothesis of no significant difference 
between pand p^ was rejected at p^ values of 1.00 and 0.75 
for both years, but could not be rejected at a of 0.50.
The implication is therefore that real estate firms do have 
positively correlated returns, but the returns are not highly 
correlated. Previous research has shown the average corre­
lation coefficient between stocks to be approximately 0.3549.^ 
Table 6 compares the correlation of real estate returns to 
the correlation found by Elton and Gruber for all stocks. 
Significant differences at the 0.05 level are found between 
the mean correlation coefficient for real estate firms and 
the 0.3549 value computed by Elton and Gruber. The implica­
tion is that the real estate firms are more highly correlated 
than stocks in general.
The real estate related firms produced correlation 
coefficients from -0.9166 to +0.9935 in 1972, having a mean 
value of 0.4434 and a standard deviation of 0.4542. For 1974
Edwin J. Elton and Martin J. Gruber, "Estimating the 
Dependence Structure of Share Prices - Implications for Port­
folio Selection," The Journal of Finance 28 (December 1973): 
1221.
TABLE 6
CORRELATION OF RETURNS OF REAL ESTATE RELATED FIRMS COMPARED TO 
CORRELATION OF ALL STOCK RETURNS
Year P Po Null Hypothesis T-value
Accept or Reject 
Null Hypothesis at 
0.05 level of 
significance 
(one-tailed test)
1972 0.4434 0.3549 P = Pq 2.1274 -reject
1974 0.5630 0.3549 P = Pq 4.8735 reject
V D
to
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the correlation coefficients varied from -0.7450 to +0.9983, 
with a mean value of 0.5630 and a standard deviation of 
0.4662. Returns among real estate related firms appear to be 
significantly and positively correlated. Since the mean 
correlations are less than perfect, and in fact high negative 
correlations of returns exist between some of the real estate 
firms, the risk reduction benefits available through diversi­
fication appear to be available to the holder of a portfolio 
of real estate investments. Returns of the real estate related 
firms do seem to be slightly, but significantly, more highly 
correlated than stocks in general. Despite the ability to 
diversify away much risk, evidence has been collected by 
others showing that both equity and mortgage REITs are not 
well diversified.^
REITs As a Viable Investment Medium 
The investigation into whether or not REITs serve as 
a viable investment medium occurred in three stages. First, 
REIT and market performance were compared using the perfor­
mance measures of Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen. These mea­
sures are presented in Appendix E. Secondly, REIT perfor­
mance was examined in the context of the CML. Thirdly, the 
SML was used to evaluate REIT performance. Each of these 
approaches to the evaluation of REITs as an investment medi­
um is now presented.
^Shulman, 71 and Cooley, 137-139
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One-Parameter Comparisons of 
REIT and Market Performance
The one-parameter performance measures of Treynor, 
Sharpe, and Jensen discussed earlier were used to test REIT 
performance vis-a-vis market performance. REIT performance 
is measured as the average value of the one-parameter mea­
sures for the 73 sample trusts. Market performance is proxied 
by the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock Index performance 
as measured by the same one-parameter measures. Table 7 sum­
marizes the comparisons.
For both years studied, Treynor's measure fails to 
show any difference between REIT performance and market per­
formance at the 0.10 level of significance, using two-tailed 
tests. Treynor's measure for 1974 omits Cameron-Brown Inves­
tors Group from the sample because its computed beta is so 
near zero that the resulting value for Treynor's performance 
measure is large enough to distort the average for all sample 
trusts from 0.1018 without Cameron-Brown to -1.9317 with the 
firm. Even if Cameron-Brown were included, the null hypothe­
sis would still be accepted. The test statistic used was;^
X - - S
T =  , where = ______
O- n-1
X
X = average REIT performance measure 
= market performance measure 
= estimate of the standard error of the mean
X
^Jedamus, Frame, and Taylor, 327-328.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF REIT PERFORMANCE TO MARKET PERFORMANCE
Year
Performance
Measure
Averate REIT 
Performance
Market
Performance
Null
Hypothesis T-Value
Accept or Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
at the 10% level 
of significance
1 Treynor 0.0233 0.0344 ^M -0.4022 accept
9
7 Sharpe 0.2888 1.0585 :R = "m
-11,7645 reject
2 Jensen -0.0141 0.0000 ^R = -1.8800 reject
1 Treynor 0.1018 -0.0907 ^R = ^M
0.5617 accept
9
7 Sharpe -1.6198 -0.6374 Sm -8.4110 reject
4 Jensen -0.2682 0.0000 JM -16.8679 reject
o
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S = standard deviation of the sample
n = number of observations
Degrees of freedom are n-1.
The performance measures of Sharpe and Jensen show 
that REITs performed significantly different than the market 
at the 0.10 level during 1972 and 1974. The level of signif­
icance exceeds 0.001 for the Sharpe measure for both years 
and for Jensen's measure for 1974.
The preponderance of evidence is suggestive that even 
during the relatively prosperous year for REITs of 1972 they 
did not perform as well as the market in general. The inferi­
or performance of REITs found for 1972 and 1974 was also 
found by Kahn in the 1962-1965 period and by Keintz for 1972.^ 
Shulman, using Treynor's and Jensen's performance measures, 
found equity REITs fared worse than the market from 1964
through 1974.^ Over the period 1971 through 1975 Cooley found
g
mortgage REITs substantially under-performed the market.
REIT Performance and the CML 
The CML relates return to risk, with risk measured as 
the standard deviation of return. All efficient portfolios, 
and only efficient portfolios, are expected to plot along the 
CML. Evidence presented earlier in this chapter suggests 
that REITs have available as investments assets that are 
fairly lowly correlated. Thus diversifying their portfolio
^Kahn, 77-78 and Keintz, 175-177. 
^Shulman, 77. ^Cooley, 158.
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holdings could result in REITs holding efficient portfolios 
and CML analysis would be appropriate for examining the 
trusts' performance. REIT performance on or above the theo­
retical CML would indicate the trusts to be a viable invest­
ment medium whereas REIT performance below the theoretical 
CML would indicate they are not.
Simple least squares regression techniques were used 
to generate the empirical CMLs. Geometric means of quarterly 
HPRs and the standard deviation of the quarterly HPRs for the 
73 sample REITs were used as the return and risk measures.
The data, resulting equations, and residuals for the empirical 
CMLs are presented in Appendix F. A summary of the regres­
sions is shown in Table 8. As shown in Table 8, the 1972 CML 
is not significant but the 1974 CML shows a significant re­
lationship between risk and return at the 0.005 level.
TABLE 8
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EMPIRICAL CML
1972 1974
intercept 0.0297 -0.1356
slope 0.0305 -0.7361
T-value of slope 0.2364 -3.2375
Prob >1T 1 0.8176 0.0035
R2 0.0008 0.1286
S. E. E. 0.0386 0.1237
F-value 0.0559 10.4813
d. f . 1,71 1,71
Prob >F 0.8176 0.0035
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The theoretical CMLs were computed using the geometric 
means of quarterly HPRs for the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock 
Index and the standard deviation of those HPRs. The geometric 
mean of quarterly yields on 3-month Treasury bills was used 
as the riskless rate of return. The theoretical CMLs com­
puted according to
^p = rg +
am
Up are:
CML^^: r = 0.0102 + 1.0585a
72 P P
CML^^: rp = 0.0196 - 0.6374Up
Figures 4 and 5 are plots of the theoretical and 
empirical CMLs for 1972 and 1974 respectively. Statistical 
comparisons of the lines are presented in Table 9. T-values
used as tests statistics were computed according to the fol­
lowing formulas
a - a
^intercept
—" 2n ' x^
^slope
b - 3
n(Zx*) - (Ex):
1 n(Ex^) - (Ex)2
Se V
where a = sample intercept
a = population intercept
Ojohn E. Freund and Frank J. Williams, Elementary 
Business Statistics 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), 390-392.
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FIGURE 4
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CAPITAL
MARKET LINES FOR 1972
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FIGURE 5
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CAPITAL
MARKET LINES FOR 1974
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TABLE 9
COMPARISONS OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET LINES
Year Parameter
Theoretical
Value
Empirical
Value
Null
Hypothesis T-value
Accept or Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
at 0.01 level of 
significance
1
9
intercept 0.0102 0.0297 a == a 1.6957 accept
7
2 slope 1.0585 0.0305 6 == b -7.9684 reject
1
9
intercept 0.9196 -0.1356 a == a -3.2605 reject
7
4 slope -0.6374 -0.7361 3 == b -0.4341 accept
o
C D
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b = sample slope
3 = population slope
S = standard error of the estimate e
n = number of observations
X = risk measure
degrees of freedom are n-2 .
As shown in Table 9 the intercept terms of the 1972 
theoretical and empirical CMLs are not significantly dif­
ferent at the 0.01 level. The slopes, however, are differ­
ent at a significance level of 0.01. The intersection of 
the theoretical and empirical lines for 1972 is at a risk 
value of 0.0190, meaning that REITs plotting to the right of 
this risk level were on average receiving a lower return 
than the theoretical CML would suggest they should for the 
risk experienced. The mean risk value for the 7 3 sample 
REITs is 0.0821 with a standard deviation of 0.0353. None 
of the sample had a risk value less than 0.0190. In ad­
dition, all REITs were experiencing a risk-return tradeoff 
that was significantly different from and lower than the 
tradeoff predicted by the slope of the theoretical CML.
Data in Table 9 shows that the 1974 theoretical and 
empirical CMLs have intercept terms that are significantly 
different at the 0.01 level. In contrast, the slopes of the 
lines are not found to be significantly different at the 0.01 
level. Since the two lines do not have significantly differ­
ent slopes the result is two lines roughly parallel to one
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another, but at significantly different levels. The theoreti­
cal line being the higher of the two.
CML analysis provides evidence that for the years 1972 
and 1974 REITs have failed to achieve what capital market 
theory suggests is the appropriate risk-return relationship. 
In each of the years the average return realized by the sam­
ple trusts was significantly below that suggested by the theo­
retical CML for risk levels actually encountered. Overall, 
the preceding analysis clearly discloses that inasmuch as the 
empirical CML is inferior to the theoretical CML, REITs have 
not shown themselves to be a viable investment medium.
REIT Performance and the SML
If REITs have proven themselves to be a viable invest­
ment medium, they should perform as well as or better than 
predicted by the security market line. The SML relates re­
turn to systematic risk for any asset. Simple linear regres­
sion was performed on the geometric means of quarterly HPRs 
and systematic risk measures of the 73 sample REITs to arrive 
at an empirical SML for each of the years studied. Appendix 
G presents the data, resulting equations, and residuals for 
the empirical SMLs. A summary of these regressions is shown 
in Table 10. As indicated by the low R^ values shown in 
Table 10, the returns of the trusts are not well explained 
by their levels of systematic risk. Systematic risk and 
return were not related significantly at the 0.10 level in 
either year. This finding is in agreement with Wurtzebach's
Ill
study which showed no significant relationship between risk 
and return for REIT shareholders.^^
TABLE 10
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EMPIRICAL SML
1972 1974
intercept 0.0275 -0.2812
slope 0.0041 -0.0113
T value of slope 1.4438 -0.3807
Prob >1T 1 0.1404 0.7110
r 2 0.0285 0.0020
S. E. E. 0.0381 0.1324
F value 2.0846 0.1449
d. f . 1,71 1,71
Prob >F 0.1404 0.7110
Of concern is whether or not the empirical SML differs 
significantly from the theoretical SMLs. The theoretical 
SMLs were computed using the geometric mean of quarterly 
yields on 3-month Treasury bills and the geometric mean of 
quarterly HPRs for the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index.
The systematic risk for the market portfolio as measured by 
the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index is 1.0 by definition. 
Theoretical SMLs were found, using the formula
r_ - r,
= ff + m
3m
3i' to be I
SML^g: = 0.0102 + 0.03443^
SMLy^: r^ = 0.0196 - 0.09073^
11Wurtzebach, 98-101.
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Figures 6 and 7 are plots of the theoretical and 
empirical SMLs for 1972 and 1974 respectively. Statistical 
comparisons of the theoretical and empirical SMLs are pre­
sented in Table 11. T-values used as tests statistics are 
computed according to the formulas used with the CML analysis.
The intercepts of the empirical SMLs were significantly 
different at the 0.01 level from the intercepts of the theo­
retical SMLs in both 1972 and 1974. The empirically deter­
mined intercept in 1972 exceeded the theoretical intercept 
while the reverse case occurred in 1974. Black, Jensen, and 
Scholes found that high beta securities tended to have nega­
tive intercepts and low beta securities tended to have posi-
12
tive intercepts. Since the average betas for the securities 
in the sample were 1.1520 and 0.1057 respectively for the 
years 1972 and 1974, the findings of this study are not in 
agreement with those mentioned of Black, Jensen, and Scholes. 
The empirical intercept for 1972 does agree with their find­
ings that the intercept seems to be greater than the risk-free 
interest rate.^^
The slopes of the theoretical and empirical SMLs were 
also found to be different at the 0.01 level of significance 
for both years studied. The slope of the empirical line was 
less than the slope of the theoretical line in 1972 and 1974.
Although the empirical SML had a higher intercept than
1 9^^Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 81. 
^^Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 82.
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FIGURE 6
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SECURITY
MARKET LINES FOR 1972
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TABLE 11
COMPARISONS OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SECURITY MARKET LINES
Year Parameter
Theoretical
Value
Empirical
Value
Null
Hypothesis T-value
Accept or Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
at 0.01 level of 
significance
1
9
intercept 0.0102 0.0275 a == a 3.1455 reject
7
2 slope 0.0344 0.0041 6 == b -10.6316 reject
1
9
intercept 0.0196 -0.2812 a == a -19.0380 reject
7
4 slope -0.0907 -0.0113 B == b 2.6662 reject
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the theoretical SML during 1972, the risk-return tradeoff 
of the empirical line, as measured by the slope, was sig­
nificantly different and lower so that overall during the 
rising stock market of 1972 the REITs were underperformers. 
Solving the two 1972 equations simultaneously yields a beta 
value of 0.57 as the intersection point. This means that in 
general those REITs having a beta greater than 0.57 performed 
such that the return achieved per incremental unit of risk 
undertaken was less than that warranted by the theoretical 
SML. Since the average beta for sample REITs during 1972 was 
1.15, most REITs were performing below the theoretical SML.
REITs performed at a much lower level during the 
falling stock market of 1974 than the theoretical SML indi­
cates they should. The significantly flatter and negative 
slope of the empirical line indicates worsening REIT perfor­
mance vis-a-vis the hypothesized theoretical returns as 
systematic risk decreases from the intersection point of the 
two SML lines at a beta value of 3.79. The average beta of 
sample REITs for 1974 was 0.11. Thus, most REITs did experi­
ence poor performance during 1974 as the risk-return tradeoff 
they experienced was significantly different from that sug­
gested by the theoretical SML.
Capital market theory postulates the SML as the 
relationship between systematic risk and return for any asset. 
If REITs have performed as well as or better than theory sug­
gests, the SML should show such performance by having an
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empirical risk-return tradeoff, i.e. —  slope of the line, 
equal to or better than the theoretical risk-return trade­
off. For each year studied, the REITs exhibited a risk- 
return tradeoff different at a 0.01 level of significance 
from the theoretical tradeoff. During 1972 the empirical 
SML shows superior performance compared to the theoretical 
SML only for those REITs having a beta below 0.57; during 
1974 the empirical SML shows superior performance only for 
those REITs having a beta above 3.79. The statistical com­
parisons of the SMLs for 1972 and 1974 are strongly sug­
gestive that REITs have not proven themselves to be a via­
ble investment medium.
Blume and Friend have perhaps shed some light on why 
the empirical risk-return relationships vary so from that 
which theory leads one to expect. No guarantee exists that
high-risk securities will yield high returns in any single
14period, regardless of how long that period is. The ex­
pected returns may be higher, but not the realized returns. 
Since the results for an investment over any particular time 
period represent only a single drawing from a probability
disbribution, the outcome may not be anywhere near the ex- 
15
pected result.
Marshall E. Blume and Irwin Friend, "Risk Investment 
Strategy and the Long-Run Rates of Return," The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 66 (August 1974): 259.
15Blume and Friend, "Risk Investment Strategy and the 
Long-Run Rates of Return," 267.
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Factors Affecting REIT Performance 
Multiple regression analysis is used to find variables 
that significantly affect the risk-adjusted performance of 
REITs. The variables used, both dependent and independent, 
are listed in Table 12. Appendix H presents the data, re­
sulting equations, and residuals for the multiple regressions.
In all, six regressions were calculated. Regressions 
were performed using the one-parameter performance measures 
of Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen for the years 1972 and 1974.
The regression results for Treynor's performance measure are 
summarized in Table 13, for Sharpe's measure in Table 14, and 
for Jensen's measure in Table 15.
The next six sections report the findings of how each 
of the characteristics used as independent variables was re­
lated to REIT performance during the two years examined.
After testing each of the hypotheses for each of the three 
dependent variables for each of the two years, a consensus 
is reached as to the importance of the independent variable 
in explaining REIT performance. The next section discusses 
how well the assumptions of regression analysis were adhered 
to in the multiple regressions conducted. Finally, a section 
summarizing the importance of the contribution of the factors 
studied upon REIT performance is presented.
Commercial Bank Sponsorship 
Variable CB was found to be significant at the 0.10 
level only with Jensen's performance measure during 1972. For
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TABLE 12
VARIABLES USED IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
Tj^  = one-parameter performance measure of Treynor; equals 
f - f_
S^ = one-parameter performance measure of Sharpe; equals 
” ^f
ap
J = one-parameter performance measure of Jensen; equals 
in the equation
■"it ■ ^ft = “i + - ^ft>
CB = dummy variable indicating REIT sponsorship as a com-
cercial bank or commercial bank holding company; 
equals 1 if commercial bank is involved, 0 if no 
commercial bank involvement
Eq = dummy variable indicating REIT invests solely in
equity positions in real property; equals 1 if only 
equity positions are held, 0 if holdings are either 
mortgages or a combination of mortgages and equities
Hyb = dummy variable indicating REIT invests in both mort­
gages and equities; equals 1 if investments are both 
mortgages and equities, 0 if investments are solely 
either mortgages or equities
TA = total assets of REIT at year-end; measured in units 
of $100,000,000
Lev = debt ratio as a measure of leverage; equals total 
debt/total assets
Qual = measure of the quality of the REIT's assets; equals 
net income/total assets
Exp = measure of the management fees incurred by the REIT; 
equals management expense/total assets
TABLE 13
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TREYNOR'S PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
T = Bp + BjCB + BgEq + B^Hyb + B^TA + B^Lev + B^Qual + B?Exp
1972 1974
Independent
Variable B Value T Value Prob >1T 1 B Value T Value Prob >1T 1
Bo
Bi
-0.0355 
0.0163 0.4231 0.6806
3.4220
3.5241 0.6728 0.5105
Bz 0.0252 0.4008 0.6966 3.3376 0.3779 0.7131
B 3 0.0442 1.2445 0.2073 5.1772 1.0761 0.2806
B, 0.0074 0.4424 0.6668 0.3681 0.2286 0.8236
B 5 -0.0403 -0.2315 0.8214 -16.3854 -0.9574 0.6588
Be 0.4576 0.2561 0.8028 -27.1798 -0.6427 0.5298
By 0.3518 0.3386 0.7416 131.3444 0.7152 0.5160
R^
F value
0.0365
0.3522, degrees of freedom
0.0399
0.3858, degrees of freedom
Prob >F
are (7,65)
0.9317
are (7,65)
0.9145
TABLE 14
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SHARPE'S PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
S = Bo + BjCB + BgEq + B^Hyb + B^TA + BgLev + BgQual + B?Exp
1972 1974
Independent
Variable B Value T Value Prob >1T 1 B Value T Value Prob >1T 1
Bz
Ba
B 4
Bs
Be
B 7
-0.6762
-0.0734
-0.4470
0.0397
-0.0835
1.3499
4.3861
8.1294
-0.5320
-1.9827
0.3119
-1.3941
2.1629
0.6845
2.1819
0.6040
0.0455
0.7612
0.1555
0.0310
0.5031
0.0297
-1.0337
0.1355
0.3490
0.1946
-0.0830
-0.7541
4.8635
8.2306
0.5196
0.7939
0.8127
-1.0353
-0.8853
2.3107
0.9005
0.6125
0.5643
0.5757
0.3007
0.6183
0.0226
0.6270
r 2
F value
0.1873
2.1404, degrees of freedom
0.2489
3.0770, degrees of freedom
Prob >F
are (7,65)
0.0475
are (7,65)
0.0089
to
TABLE 15
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR JENSEN'S PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
J = Eg + BjCB + BgEq + B^Hyb + B^TA + B^Lev + BgQual + B.^Exp
1972 1974
Independent
Variable B Value T Value Prob >1T 1 B Value T Value Prob ^ 1T 1
Bo
Bi
-0.0193
-0.0296 -1.6089 0.1005
-0.1600
-0.0300 -1.2170 0.2182
Bz 0.0415 1.3773 0.1607 0.1056 2.5428 0.0139
B 3 0.0269 1.5808 0.1065 0.0395 1.7449 0.0756
B 4 -0.0091 -1.1321 0.2545 0.0065 0.8576 0.6023
Bs 0.0370 0.4437 0.6659 -0.1558 -1.9366 0.0503
Be -0.7277 -0.8504 0.5981 1.1455 5.7611 0.0001
By 0.4547 0.9140 0.6347 0.7475 0.8657 0.6070
F Value
0.1913
2.1967, degrees of freedom
0.6086
14.4368, degrees of freedom
Prob ^F
are (7,65)
0.0425
are (7,65)
0.000006
NJ
N)
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1974 CB was significantly related to Jensen's measure at the 
0.22 level. In both instances the relationship was negative. 
Against the other dependent variables, CB was never more sig­
nificant than the 0.51 level. The negative relationship 
between commercial bank sponsorship and REIT performance is 
counter to the findings of Elebash.^^ Hinson found no rela­
tionship between REIT performance and institutional or inde-
17pendent sponsorship.
Although overall not much relationship exists between 
REIT performance and sponsorship of trusts by commercial banks, 
the statistical significance that does exist is counter to 
what might be expected. The evidence here is that during both 
prosperous and difficult periods the REITs sponsored by com­
mercial banks performed less well than the REITs having non­
commercial bank sponsors. The presumed easier access to money 
markets that the REITs with strong ties to their commerical 
bank sponsors have seems to not aid the trusts' performance.
Type of REIT
Variables Eq and Hyb combine to test if the type of 
REIT —  mortgage, equity, or hybrid —  influences performance. 
For 1972 Eq was negatively, significantly related to Sharpe's 
measure at the 0.05 level; Eg was positively related to 
Jensen's performance measure at the 0.16 level of significance. 
Given that the relationships between Eq and the performance
l^Elebash, 127. ^^Hinson, 83
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measures were so mixed for 1972, it seems that there were
only slight differences between equity and mortgage REITs,
with mortgage REITs having slightly better performance.
This finding agrees with Wurtzebach's finding that mortgage
REITs outperformed equity REITs during the 1970 to 1973 
18period. Hinson's study, however, over the same period 
detected no relationship between performance and REIT type.^^ 
During 1974 Eq was positively related to Jensen's 
measure at the 0.01 level of significance. Thus some evi­
dence is found that equity REITs were better performers than 
mortgage REITs during the 1974 period of generally poor REIT 
performance.
In 1972 Hyb was positively related to the Jensen and 
Treynor performance measures at the 0.10 and 0.20 levels of 
significance respectively. This indication of hybrid trusts 
outperforming mortgage trusts corresponds with the findings 
of Wurtzebach that hybrid trusts outperformed both mortgage 
and equity REITs during the early 1970s.
The superior performance of hybrid REITs seemed to 
continue through 1974 as Hyb was positively, significantly 
related to Jensen's measure at the 0.07 level and Treynor's 
measure at the 0.28 level. Considerable evidence is found, 
therefore, that the diversification inherent in the hybrid 
trusts, compared to those investing solely in mortgages or
l^Wurtzebach, 116-117. ^^Hinson, 74. 
^^Wurtzebach, 116-117.
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equities, provides consistently superior performance on a 
risk-adjusted basis.
Total Assets
Variable TA was negatively related to Sharpe's measure 
at the 0.15 level of significance and Jensen's measure at the 
0.25 level of significance during 1972. These negative rela­
tionships agree with Elebash's findings that the market ac­
cepted a lower yield on trusts with larger total assets during
21
the 1972-1973 period. The negative relationship between TA 
and performance did not continue during 1974. As total assets 
were regressed against each of the dependent variables, the 
coefficients were all positive, but never any more significant 
than the 0.60 level.
Leverage
During 1972 Lev was positively, significantly related
to Sharpe's performance measure at the 0.03 level. This
finding is in agreement with Elebash's research on construc-
22
tion and development REITs during 1972-1973. The studies
of Hines and Wurtzebach, however, did not find statistically
23
significant relationships between leverage and performance.
The double-edged effect of leverage was illustrated 
in 1974 as Lev was negatively related to Jensen's performance 
at the 0.05 level of significance. Of the other two
ZlElebash, 127. 22Eiebash, 106.
^^Hines, 502-503 and Wurtzebach, 109-114.
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performance measures, one was negatively and one was positively 
related to Lev, but neither at a signifncance level above 
0.54. The negative relationships should be expected during 
a period of adverse conditions such as existed for REITs dur­
ing 1974. Cooley found Jensen's performance measure to be
significantly, inversely related to leverage for mortgage
24
REITs from 1971 through 1975. Shulman, however, did not 
find a significant relationship between Treynor's measure and 
leverage for equity REITs over the 1964 through 1974 period.
Quality of Assets 
Variable Qual never had a level of significance above 
0.54 with any of the three performance measure for 1972. Dur­
ing 1974, however, Qual was positively related to Jensen's 
performance measure at the 0.0001 level of significance.
Qual was also positively related to Sharpe's measure at the
0.02 level of significance. The high correlation between 
Qual and performance during 1974 would seem to indicate the 
desire on the part of investors to come back to such basics 
as return on total assets during times of crisis. During the 
more prosperous period for REITs of 1972, investors were 
seemingly less interested in such basics.
Management Expense 
In 1972 Exp was positively related to Sharpe's perfor­
mance measure at the 0.03 level of significance. Significance
^^Cooley, 191-199. ^^Shulman, 104.
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levels between Exp and the other two performance measures 
were much less, 0.74 and 0.63 for Treynor's and Jensen's mea­
sures respectively. For 1974 the relationship between Exp 
and performance was similar to what it had been in 1972.
None of the performance measures were any more significantly 
related to Exp than the 0.5 level.
Despite various incentive plans common to most manage­
ment agreements in the REIT industry, not much evidence is 
found that high compensation of a trust's advisor will be 
accompanied with high performance. Likewise, low compensa­
tion does not appear to be associated with reduced perfor- 
mance.
Meeting the Assumptions of 
Regression Analysis
The residuals of the multiple regressions were 
examined to determine how well the assumptions of regres­
sion analysis discussed in Chapter III were met. In partic­
ular, the possible problem areas of multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation were examined.
Multicollinearity will almost always be found to exist. 
Of concern is not its existence but its severity. This study 
takes the often used position of arbitrarily setting a maxi­
mum correlation coefficient to be tolerated of ±0.8.^^
Z^Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicol­
linearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 1976) : 
98.
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The correlation matrices for the independent variables 
for the two years do not indicate unacceptable levels of 
multicollinearity. For 1972 the two highest correlation coef­
ficients were -.6850 between Lev and Qual and +.4263 between 
Eq and Exp. The same general relationships were found in 
the 1974 data where the highest correlation coefficients of 
-.4 641 and +.4996 were found between Lev and Qual and Eq and 
Exp respectively.
Examination of the residuals for nonconstance of 
variance involved plotting the error terms against the esti­
mated dependent variable. This is the method of examination 
suggested as appropriate for multiple regression models by 
Neter and Wasserman. None of the plots depicted the trape­
zoidal pattern expected if the assumptions of homoscedast-
2 7icity were not met.
Problems of autocorrelation are usually associated
with time-series data, but serial correlation cannot be as-
28
sumed away even in cross-sectional analysis. Durbin- 
Watson tests were conducted on successive error terms for 
each of the six multiple regressions. Only for the 1974 run 
with Jensen's performance measure as the dependent variable 
did the hypothesis p = 0 have to be rejected.
All of the assumptions of regression analysis were not 
met in every case. Since, however, regression analysis is a
27
John Neter and William Wasserman, Applied Linear 
Statistical Models (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1974), 103.
28outta, 108-114.
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robust method of data analysis, the infrequent violations of 
the assumptions are not deemed sufficient to invalidate the 
results of the multiple regression investigation into factors 
affecting REIT performance.
Summary of Factors Affecting 
REIT Performance
Of the six multiple regressions performed to determine 
factors significantly affecting REIT performance, four equa­
tions were obtained which are significant at the 0.05 level 
or higher. Statistically significant equations were obtained 
for both 1972 and 1974 using the performance measures of 
Sharpe and Jensen. Using Treynor's measure did not provide 
a satisfactory regression for either year. The reason for 
Treynor's performance measure yielding insignificant regres­
sions is probably due to computed betas being rather poor 
risk estimators. Beta coefficients are good at estimating
portfolio risk, but do a poorer job at estimating the system-
2 9atic risk of individual stocks.
Based on a consensus of the regression results, the 
following evaluations are made of the factors studied:
1. REITs sponsored by commercial banks do not seem 
to perform much differently from REITs not spon­
sored by commercial banks.
2. Equity REITs tend to underperform mortgage REITs
Russell Fogler, Analyzing the Stock Market: 
Statistical Evidence and Methodology (2nd ed.T Columbus, Ohio; 
Grid, Inc., 1978), 129.
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during periods of general prosperity for the trusts 
and to outperform them during periods of general 
adversity.
3. Under both favorable and unfavorable conditions 
hybrid REITs tend to outperform mortgage REITs.
4. The size of a REIT apparently has no bearing on 
its performance.
5. The use of financial leverage tends to improve 
REIT performance during periods of general pros­
perity for the trusts and to deteriorate it dur­
ing periods of general adversity.
6. The quality of a REIT's investment portfolio 
appears highly related to the trust's performance, 
especially during periods of general decline for 
REITs.
7. Expenses incurred by REITs to compensate their 
advisors do not seem too importantly related to 
REIT performance.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND REC0I4MENDATI0NS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Summary of the Study 
The investigation of REIT performance is the principal 
objective of this study. The research was conducted to an­
swer these specific questions: (1) can REITs diversify?
(2) are REITs a viable investment medium? (3) can factors 
significantly affecting REIT performance be identified?
A sample of 16 real estate related firms was used to 
ascertain the ability of REITs to diversify. In addition,
a sample of 73 trusts was used to study REIT performance for
the years of 1972 and 1974. The 73 trusts were all of the 
REITs for which needed data could be obtained for the years 
studied. Selection of the years 1972 and 1974 for the study 
is based on the fact that the years represent vastly differ­
ent periods of growth and success for REITs. During 1972
total assets of all REITs increased over 75 percent while 
there was only a 5 percent increase during 1974.
A number of empirical research studies concerning 
REITs were reviewed. The studies were deficient in that per­
formance was generally gauged only with some return measure.
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Performance evaluation was usually void of any risk dimension. 
This study seeks to more properly evaluate REIT performance 
by using one-dimensional performance measures derived from 
the CAPM. These one-dimensional performance measures con­
tain both risk and return attributes of the REITs. Also re­
viewed were the CAPM, effect of diversification on perfor­
mance, and performance measurement as viewed from various 
ways of measuring risk and return and the combination of the 
two attributes into one-dimensional performance measures 
founded in the CAPM.
The methodology employed to determine if REITs can 
diversify was to use the returns on the 16 real estate re­
lated firms to proxy the returns available on real estate 
investments open to REITs. Correlations were then computed 
on all possible pair combinations of the real estate invest­
ments. The lower the correlation coefficient, the greater 
are the benefits of diversification. To examine the viabil­
ity of REITs as an investment medium, various tests based on 
the capital asset pricing model were conducted. Factors 
significantly affecting REIT performance were investigated 
by regressing six REIT characteristics against three one­
dimensional performance measures derived from the CAPM.
Analysis of the data included simple correlation, 
T-tests of significance, computing descriptive statistics, 
analysis of variance, and simple and multiple regression.
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Conclusions of the Study
An examination of the data on 73 REITs comprising 60 
percent of all REIT assets supports the thesis that REITs 
have consistently failed to achieve adequate investment per­
formance; i.e., their return is consistently too low for 
the level of risk encountered. This conclusion was drawn 
from the following evidence derived in the study:
1. Making use of the SML concept to compare theo­
retical and empirical SMLs based on the 73 sample REITs 
reveals that realized REIT performance consistently is less 
than the SML model predicts. Both the slopes and the inter­
cepts of the theoretical and empirical lines were signifi­
cantly different for both years. Capital market theory 
postulates that all assets will exhibit the risk-return 
relationship shown by the theoretical SML. Performance 
achieved by REITs has been less than predicted throughout 
the periods studied.
2. Capital market theory provides another method of 
examining investment performance —  the CML. The CML depicts 
the risk-return relationship for efficient portfolios. In 
addition to its more limited applicability, the CML also dif­
fers from the SML in the risk measure used. The CML uses 
the standard deviation of return as its measure of risk 
whereas the SML uses the beta coefficient to measure the as­
sets' systematic risk. Comparing theoretical and empirical 
CMLs in the same way as the SMLs were compared yields
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essentially the same results. The REITs consistently 
realized lower returns than those warranted for the risk 
involved.
3. Using the one-dimensional performance measures 
derived from the CAPM by Treynor, Sharpe, and Jensen, aver­
age REIT performance was compared to market performance as 
proxied by Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock Index. Com­
parisons of these risk-adjusted return measures yielded a 
consensus that REITs performed below and significantly dif­
ferent from the market.
4. In order to ascertain the ability of REITs to 
hold efficient portfolios, the correlations of returns of 
16 real estate related firms were studied. The real estate 
firms were selected to correspond to those areas from which 
REITs may legally make their investments; 16 firms were 
chosen so that the 120 pair combinations they yield would 
provide a sufficiently large number of degrees of freedom.
The average correlation coefficients of returns between the 
real estate related firms were 0.4358 and 0.5554 for 1972 
and 1974 respectively. The correlation of returns on those 
types of investments open to REITs were found to be higher 
and significantly different from the average correlation 
coefficient between stocks of 0.354 9 found by Elton and 
Gruber. Thus, the risk reducing benefits of diversification 
are more difficult to obtain when making the types of invest­
ments REITs are restricted to than when investing in stocks 
in general.
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Addressing the subsidiary question of whether or not 
factors significantly affecting REIT performance, as indi­
cated by the aforementioned measures of Treynor, Sharpe, 
and Jensen, could be identified has led to the following 
conclusions :
1. Hybrid REITs appear to have significantly out­
performed mortgage REITs during both periods studied. Thus, 
even though this study previously found the ability of REITs 
to diversify somewhat restricted, the diversification the 
hybrid trusts have achieved has helped them realize better 
performance than mortgage trusts.
2. Equity REITs have performed countercyclically in 
comparison to mortgage REITs. Equity REITs performed some­
what poorly during the relatively prosperous year for REITs 
of 19 72. Conversely, equity REITs were found to perform well 
during 1974, a year of generally poor REIT performance for 
the trusts.
3. REIT performance was found not to be influenced 
by whether or not the trust was sponsored by a commercial 
bank. Slight indications at low levels of significance were 
found that commercial bank sponsored REITs exhibited worse 
performance than those REITs sponsored by other interests.
4. The size of a REIT seems to bear no significant 
relationship to its performance.
5. Management fees paid by REITs have no apparent 
relationship to their performance.
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6. Leverage affects REIT performance as financial 
theory would predict by magnifying returns and therefore 
performance measures both positively and negatively as 
earnings fluctuate. Financial leverage was found positive­
ly related to performance during 1972 and negatively re­
lated during 1974.
7. The quality of a REIT's investment portfolio, as 
measured by net income/total assets, was found significantly 
positively related to performance during 1974. For the more 
favorable year of 1972, REIT performance was not related to 
the quality of the trusts' portfolios; investors were evi­
dently content to base their investment decisions on prospec­
tive earnings. During 1974, as REITs experienced difficult­
ies, investors became much more interested in earnings 
currently available.
The implications of this study are found in two areas. 
First, the study does not lend support to the validity of 
the CAPM. The relized risk-return tradeoffs of the sample 
REITs, as indicated by empirical CMLs and SMLs, are signifi­
cantly different from the tradeoffs predicted by the theo­
retical CMLs and SMLs. The apparent shortcoming of the CAPM 
in explaining risk-return relationships may lie in misspeci- 
fication of the model and/or in problems of measurement. The 
second area for which this study has implications involves 
the management of REITs. It would appear that REITs restrict­
ing their investments exclusively to either mortgages or 
equities could achieve better performance by changing to the
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hybrid form. The benefits of the hybrid form could be 
enhanced by management's concerted effort to achieve an 
efficiently diversified portfolio of real estate investments. 
This study found correlations of returns on real estate re­
lated firms as low as -0.9166 in 1972 and -0.7450 in 1974. 
With such negatively correlated investments available, REIT 
managers should be able to construct portfolios with rela­
tively small risk and thus improved performance.
Recommendations for Further Study
The findings of this study reveal the need for addi­
tional research in the area of REIT performance.
1. As finance theory produces additional models of 
the risk-return relationship for assets, the performance 
measures derived from them should be used to test the sta- 
tionarity of the results of this study.
2. Alternative methods of calculating risk measures 
should be used to determine if the results of this study are 
sensitive to the particular techniques employed.
3. Although the returns on real estate securities 
seem to be positively correlated at a slightly higher level 
than stocks in general, additional periods should be checked 
to see if the higher correlations among real estate securi­
ties are a continuing relationship.
4. In investigating those variables having a signifi­
cant impact upon REIT performance, effort should be made to
determine what variables not studied in the current research 
do effect REIT performance.
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5. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 contains several pro­
visions relating to REITs. Possibly the one most likely to 
affect REIT performance is the provision that REITs may now 
carry forward a net operating loss for up to eight years. 
Under prior law a REIT was not allowed the net operating 
loss deductions. The effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
on REITs should be examined.
These unanswered questions indicate that additional 
research is needed regarding REIT performance. Hopefully, 
however, the results of this study have filled some of the 
void in the empirical research concerning REIT performance.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE GROUP OF REAL ESTATE RELATED FIRMS
Savings and loan associations
1 Financial Federation
2 United Financial of California
Real estate land development companies
3 Kampgrounds of America
4 Roger Properties
Subdividers and/or developers
5 Amrep Corporation
6 FPA Corporation
7 Holly Corporation
8 Land Resources
9 Lennar Corporation
10 Punta Gorda Isles Incorporated
11 Shapell Industries
Real estate operative builders
12 Presley Companies
13 Tishman Realty and Construction
Miscellaneous real estate companies
14 Canaveral International
15 Rossmoor Corporation
16 Rouse Company
150
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE REITS
Code
1 American Century Mortgage Investors
2 American Fletcher Mortgage Investors
3 American Realty Trust
4 Baird & Warner Mortgage and Realty Investors
5 Bankamerica Realty Investors
6 Barnett Mortgage Trust
7 Beneficial Standard Mortgage Investors
8 Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust
9 Cameron-Brown Investment Group
10 Capital Mortgage Investments
11 Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust
12 C. I. Mortgage Group
13 Citinational Development Trust
14 Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust
15 Citizens and Southern Realty Investors
16 Clevetrust Realty Investors
17 Colwell Mortgage Trust
18 Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investments
19 Cousins Mortgage and Equity Investments
20 Diversified Mortgage Investors
21 The Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty Investors
22 Fidelco Growth Investors
2 3 First of Denver Mortgage Investors
24 First Fidelity Investment Trust
2 5 First Memphis Realty Trust
26 First Mortgage Investors
27 First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust
2 8 First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Investments
2 9 Franklin Realty & Mortgage Trust
30 Fraser Mortgage Investments
31 General Growth Properties
32 Gould Investors Trust
33 Great American Mortgage Investors
34 Guardian Mortgage Investors
35 Gulf Mortgage and Realty Investments
36 Hamilton Investment Trust
37 Heitman Mortgage Investors
38 The Hotel Investors
151
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Code
39 Hubbard Real Estate Investments
40 Investors Realty Trust
41 Larwin Mortgage Investors
42 Lincoln Mortgage Investors
43 Lomas & Mettleton Mortgage Investors
44 M & T Mortgage Investors
45 Massmutual Mortgage and Realty Investors
46 Midland Mortgage Investors Trust
47 Mortgage Investors of Washington
48 Mortgage Trust of America
49 National Mortgage Fund
50 Northwestern Mutual Life Mortgage and Realty Investors
51 Old Stone Mortgage and Realty Trust
52 Palomar Mortgage Investors
53 Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust
54 PNB Mortgage and Realty Investors
55 Property Capital Trust
56 Real Estate Investment Trust of America
57 Realty Income Trust
58 Realty Refund Trust
59 Republic Mortgage Investors
60 B. F. Saul Real Estate Investment Trust
61 State Mutual Investors
62 Sutro Mortgage Investment Trust
63 Texas First Mortgage REIT
64 Tri-South Mortgage Investors
65 The UMET Trust
66 U. S. Leasing Real Estate Investors
67 U. S. Realty Investments
68 Virginia Real Estate Investment Trust
69 Wachovia Realty Investments
70 Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
71 Wells Fargo Mortgage Investors
72 Western Mortgage Investors
73 Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust
APPENDIX C
QUARTERLY HPRs OF REAL ESTATE RELATED FIRMS
Firm HPR 1972 1974
1 Q1 .3308 .0460
02 .0111 -.1868
03 -.0109 -.1791
04 .0394 .0169
2 01 .0633 .1852
02 .1059 -.1500
03 .2151 -.2745
04 -.0273 -.0513
3 01 .4545 .1500
02 .0000 -.2400
03 .2360 -.4375
04 .0183 -.1250
4 01 .5091 .0328
02 -.4639 -.4194
03 .0519 -.4286
04 -.0550 .0000
5 01 .4408 .1786
02 -.2124 -.2813
03 -.3296 -.1304
04 -.1322 -.2222
6 01 .5000 .0686
02 -.2037 -.1932
03 .0000 -.4128
04 .0617 -.3333
7 01 .5000 .0000
02 -.2500 -.1333
03 -.0833 -.0769
04 -.1667 -.0833
153
154
Firm HPR 1972 1974
8 01 .3462 .0000
02 -.0833 -.3750
03 -.2121 -.4000
04 -.3200 -.3333
9 01 .0108 .5238
02 -.1099 -.3175
03 -.2954 -.2683
04 -.1617 -.2414
10 01 .0658 .1290
02 -.2086 -.0857
03 -.4688 -.3438
04 .0469 -.3182
11 01 .1116 .2909
02 -.1738 -.3233
03 -.0340 -.0667
04 -.1259 -.1660
12 01 -.0479 .5455
02 -.2938 -.2500
03 -.1290 -.2917
04 .0714 -.2500
13 01 .1595 .0493
02 -.0670 -.1973
03 -.1348 -.0911
04 .1898 -.2347
14 01 .1875 .0000
02 -.0909 -.3571
03 .0333 -.3750
04 -.3667 -.4000
15 01 .3506 .1282
02 -.1852 -.3488
03 -.0116 .7778
04 .5059 -.1522
16 01 .0087 -.3731
02 -.1293 -.2439
03 .0971 -.4194
04 -.1422 -.0952
APPENDIX D
CORRELATIONS OF RETURNS OF REAL
ESTATE RELATED FIRMS
:ion of Firms 1972 1974
1& 2 -.2972 .8648
1& 3 .8072 .8577
1& 4 .8154 .9983
1& 5 .9935 .6008
1& 6 .9305 .5597
1& 7 .9604 .7320
1& 8 .9137 .7476
1& 9 .8322 .6976
I&IO .6508 .3776
l&ll .8446 .6464
1&12 .3000 .6691
1&13 .6081 .3280
1&14 .6048 .5848
1&15 .4763 -.2188
1&16 .1835 .2981
2& 3 .2445 .9970
2& 4 — . 0662 .8568
2& 5 -.3970 .7482
2& 6 -.2635 .8957
2& 7 -.0798 .7485
2& 8 .0026 .9411
2& 9 -.5339 .8909
2&10 -.9166 .7909
2&11 .1215 .7227
2&12 -.6096 .9025
2&13 -.9070 .5562
2&14 .5729 .8565
2&15 -.7550 -.3490
2&16 .7619 .0622
3& 4 .9174 .8540
3& 5 .7355 .6961
3& 6 .8685 .8876
3& 7 .9378 .6953
3& 8 .7963 .9154
3& 9 .3787 .8564
3&10 .1251 .7906
3&11 .9903 .6669
155
156
Combination of Firms 1972 1974
3&12 .2020 .8734
3&13 .1735 .4977
3&14 .8536 .8249
3&15 .2398 -.4206
3&16 .7283 .1248
4& 5 .7681 .5562
4& 6 .9621 .5412
4& 7 .9198 .6910
4& 8 .6401 .7209
4& 9 .3674 .6643
4&10 .3620 .3624
4&11 .9619 .6015
4&12 .5737 .6384
4&13 .5802 .2761
4&14 .5759 .5510
4&15 .5993 -.2671
4&16 .5735 .3525
5& 6 .9081 .7888
5& 7 .9240 .9659
5& 8 .8888 .9208
5& 9 .8777 .9627
5&10 .7295 .6773
5&11 .7825 .9901
5&12 .3242 .9382
5&13 .6760 .9522
5&14 .5214 .9403
5&15 .5173 .3297
5&16 .0714 -.5709
6& 7 .9613 .6757
6& 8 .7488 .9370
6& 9 .5996 .9120
6&10 .5759 .9750
6 &11 .9255 .7124
Ô&12 .5582 .9479
6&13 .6386 .7220
6 &14 .5318 .9498
6&15 .6541 -.2721
6&16 .3500 -.2577
7& 8 .8885 .8819
7& 9 .6523 .9184
7&10 .4526 .5178
7&11 .9600 .9905
7&12 .3090 .8748
7&13 .4603 .8608
7&14 .7305 .8531
7&15 .4251 .3582
7&16 .4461 -.4303
8& 9 .8083 .9916
8&10 .3924 .8388
8&11 .7781 .8893
157
Combination of Firms 1972 1974
8&12 -.1077 .9935
8&13 .2718 .8044
8&14 .8117 .9754
8&15 .0780 -.0631
8&16 .2736 -.2770
9&10 .7936 .8125
9&11 .4148 .9346
9&12 .0482 .9951
9&13 .6284 .8725
9&14 .3199 .9856
9&15 .3093 .0620
9&16 -.3301 -.3903
lO&ll .2349 .5765
10&12 .5666 .8658
10&13 .9598 .6606
10&14 -.1973 .8854
10&15 .7648 -.3358
10&16 -.5538 -.2867
11&12 .3279 .8974
11&13 .3002 .9224
11&14 .7764 .8902
11&15 .3719 .3911
11&16 .6664 -.5356
12&13 .7749 .8550
12&14 -.3375 .9941
12&15 .9630 -.0113
12&16 -.0312 -.3735
13&14 -.2577 .8898
13&15 .9147 .4685
13&16 -.4286 -.7874
14&15 -.2868 .0300
14&16 .7296 -.4572
15&16 -.1707 -.7450
mean value for year .4434 .5630
APPENDIX E
PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF SAMPLE REITS AND MARKET
REIT Treynor
1972
Sharpe Jensen Treynor
1974
Sharpe Jensen
1 -0.0020 -0.0510 -0.0829 0.5218 -2.2642 -0.4468
2 0.0166 0.4907 —0.0466 1.2589 -1.4725 -0.3824
3 0.1501 0.3644 0.0281 -2.5081 -2.9891 -0.3632
4 0.0534 1.1974 0.0238 -0.2838 -1.7464 -0.1413
5 0.0189 0.5034 -0.0339 0.5722 -1.2610 -0.2936
6 0.0087 0.2092 -0.0373 —1.3661 -2.1303 -0.4178
7 -1.0149 0.6973 0.0384 -0.4334 -1.2298 -0.2149
8 0.0098 0.3006 -0.0363 -0.3835 -1.8170 -0.2780
9 0.0038 0.0635 -0.0459 -148.3443 -5.8293 -0.4262
10 -0 . 0083 -0.1778 -0.0673 1.9031 -1.8780 -0.4129
11 0.0132 0.3039 -0.0526 -0.3410 -1.8815 -0.2726
12 0.0081 0.1857 -0.0563 0.8357 -1.5417 -0.4491
13 -0.0633 -0.2505 -0.0159 6.2474 -1.6091 -0.3369
14 0.0406 0.5194 0.0214 -0.7473 -1.7412 -0.3294
15 0.0064 0.1728 -0.0975 -2.8691 -2.4893 -0.4315
16 0.0267 0.2171 -0.0016 0.5037 -1.3170 -0.3691
17 0.0231 0.5775 -0.0193 -0.6209 -2.1529 -0.3537
18 -0.0541 -0.2953 -0.0260 1.9036 -0.7590 -0.0918
19 0.0241 0.6225 -0.0183 9.6248 -1.7478 -0.4569
20 0.0156 0.3728 -0.0322 9.5579 -1.7902 -0.4151
21 0.0006 -0.0159 0.0349 0.6193 -0.7123 -0.1146
22 0.0166 0.4100 -0.0481 1.9218 -1.8160 -0.3249
23 0.0231 0.6860 -0.0307 -1.8700 -1.4729 -0.3310
24 0.0359 -0.6727 0.0127 0.6285 -0.8945 -0.2598
25 -0.0050 -0.1016 -0.0899 -0.5901 -1.5927 -0.2358
ui
00
REIT Treynor
1972
Sharpe Jensen Treynor
1974
Sharpe Jensen
26 0.0139 0.1424 -0.0127 0.7142 -2.6222 -0.5205
27 -0.0069 -0.1243 -0.0376 -2.4213 —1.6661 -0.2761
28 0.0101 0.2628 -0.0317 -0.2498 -0.6662 -0.0577
29 -0.0211 -0.4456 -0.0461 -0.1526 -0.9075 -0.0416
30 -0.0238 -0.4758 -0.0848 0.4516 -0.5361 -0.1148
31 -0.0074 0.2244 0.2777 -0.0296 -0.2039 0.0437
32 0.0793 1.6035 0.0405 0.2343 -0.8043 -0.2117
33 0.0196 0.5548 -0.0426 -14.5575 -6.1230 -0.5696
34 0.0104 0.2955 -0.0766 -0.5921 -3.7102 -0.3784
35 0.0416 0.8534 0.0117 -1.3035 -1.9975 -0.3528
36 0.0395 0.8443 0.0110 -0.9073 -1.3661 -0.3173
37 0.0696 0.5969 0.0214 -0.8015 -1.8999 -0.2549
38 -0.0965 0.2139 0.0099 0.3695 -0.8095 -0.1370
39 0.0185 -0.0712 0.0085 8.9640 -1.2753 0.0191
40 -0.0215 0.6435 0.0819 0.2431 -1.0519 -0.2538
41 0.0080 0.2420 -0.0980 1.3290 -2.8973 -0.4390
42 0.0212 0.5689 -0.0218 -0.2792 -1.5458 -0.2199
43 0.0179 0.5000 -0.0562 -0.1387 -0.6208 -0.0368
44 0.0280 0.3825 -0.0024 -1.5192 -1.2038 -0.0582
45 -0.0032 0.0291 0.0298 0.2308 -0.6217 -0.1693
46 0.0661 1.8115 0.0441 1.0532 -2.2378 -0.3543
47 0.0157 0.3226 -0.0390 -1.5178 -1.2038 -0.2350
48 0.3036 -0.1962 -0.0027 -0.5268 -0.8155 -0.1767
49 0.0480 0.7399 0.0099 0.9769 -1.4545 -0.4410
50 0.0206 0.2790 -0.0120 1.3568 -1.3558 -0.1999
51 0.0095 0.2507 -0.0227 -2.8143 -2.2920 -0.3066
52 0.0202 0.2074 -0.0053 -0.9025 -1.3821 -0.3464
53 0.0288 0.7655 -0.0058 -0.4209 -1.1026 -0.0876
54 0.0085 0.2539 -0.0542 -0.3472 -1.3869 -0.2297
u i
V D
REIT Treynor
1972
Sharpe Jensen Treynor
1974
Sharpe Jensen
55 -0.0181 0.2085 0.1130 -0.5538 -0.7538 -0.1125
56 -0.0382 -0.9611 -0.1105 -0.4547 -0.4216 -0.0299
57 -0.0569 -0.3431 -0.0539 0.7101 -1.8431 -0.3012
58 0.0716 1.5332 0.0319 0.0851 -0.5031 -0.1755
59 0.0044 0.1189 -0.0192 -1.1459 -1.5775 -0.3721
60 0.0414 0.0450 0.0010 -0.6532 -1.2893 -0.1863
61 0.0166 0.4019 -0.0318 0.9891 -2.9233 -0.3535
62 -0.0080 -0.1488 -0.0678 1.7965 -2.1135 -0.3080
63 -0.0064 -0.1424 -0.1109 1.0590 -1.5705 -0.3766
64 0.0324 0.6165 0.0010 -1.8631 -2.0117 -0.3714
65 -0.0023 -0.0926 -0.0890 -0.5784 -2.0275 -0.3470
66 -0.0078 -0.1441 -0.0730 -0.5095 -0.5810 -0.1065
67 -0.0408 -1.2481 -0.0907 0.7935 -0.9084 -0.2591
68 -0.1120 0.9766 0.1708 -0.5363 -0.9535 -0.1865
69 0.0091 0.2286 -0.0565 -1.5553 -1.6579 -0.3110
70 0.0316 0.7885 -0.0041 -0.6443 -1.1054 —0.0668
71 0.0133 0.2870 -0.0340 -0.8050 -1.4006 -0.2642
72 0.0874 0.7005 0.0476 1.4435 -1.4501 -0.3390
73 -0.0473 0.6525 0.1345 -0.7746 -1.2587 -0.2302
Market 
(S&P 500)
0.0344 1.0585 0.0 -0.0907 -0.6374 0.0
<T\
O
APPENDIX F
DATA, RESULTING EQUATIONS, AND RESIDUALS FOR EMPIRICAL CMLs
Data
REIT
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly PHR
1972
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
1 .0058 .0863 -.3841 .1783
2 .0552 .0917 -.3849 .2747
3 .0477 .1029 -.3654 .1288
4 .0739 .0532 -.1891 .1195
5 .0549 .0888 -.2577 .2199
6 .0234 .0631 -.4610 .2256
7 .0443 .0489 -.2737 .2385
8 .0246 .0479 -.3725 .2158
9 .0162 .0945 -.4106 .0738
10 -.0036 .0776 — . 4046 .2259
11 .0453 .1155 -.3757 .2101
12 .0273 .0948 -.4352 .2950
13 -.0023 .0499 -.3365 .2213
14 .0824 .1390 -.3847 .2322
15 .0332 .1331 — .4449 .1866
16 .0310 .0958 -.3303 .2656
17 .0549 .0774 -.4155 .2021
18 — .0066 .0569 -.0752 .1249
19 .0572 .0755 -.4780 .2847
20 .0395 .0786 -.4258 .2488
21 .0096 .0378 -.0923 .1571
22 .0603 .1222 -.3098 .1814
CTi
REIT
1972
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
23 .0777 .0984 -.3613 .2586
24 -.1240 .1995 -.2508 .3023
25 -.0020 .1201 -.2725 .1834
26 .0227 .0878 -.4697 .1866
27 .0037 .0523 -.2833 .1818
28 .0230 .0487 -.0802 .1498
29 -.0070 .0386 -.1687 .2075
30 -.0261 .0763 -.0918 .2078
31 .0557 .2028 -.0024 .1079
32 .0838 .0459 -.1538 .2156
33 .0694 .1067 -.5627 .0951
34 .0451 .1181 -.4323 .1218
35 .0626 .0614 -.3811 .2006
36 .0780 .0803 -.3748 .2887
37 .0490 .0650 -.2783 .1568
38 .0173 .0332 -.1011 .1491
39 .0046 .0786 -.1050 .0977
40 .0407 .0474 -.1934 .2025
41 .0403 .1244 -.4066 .1471
42 .0486 .0675 -.3330 .2281
43 .0757 .1310 -.1292 .2397
44 .0478 .0983 -.0436 .0525
45 .0123 .0721 -.1229 .2292
46 .1015 .0504 -.3210 .1522
47 .0424 .0998 -.2539 .2272
48 .0051 .0260 -.2363 .3138
49 .0469 .0496 -.4374 .3142
50 .0348 .0879 -.1793 .1467
N)
REIT
197
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
2
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Std. Deviation 
of Quarterly HPR
51 .0193 .0363 -.3077 .1428
52 .0242 .0675 -.4119 .3122
53 .0373 .0354 -.0954 .1043
54 .0281 .0705 -.3328 .2541
55 .0284 .0873 -.1384 .2096
56 -.0491 .0617 -.0226 .1001
57 -.0251 .1029 -.2624 .1530
58 .0726 .0407 -.0779 .1938
59 .0131 .0244 -.4273 .2833
60 .0156 .1201 -.2108 .1787
61 .0393 .0724 -.3157 .1147
62 -.0033 .0907 -.2858 .1445
63 -.0084 .1306 -.3647 .2447
64 .0573 .0764 -.3914 .2043
65 .0046 .0605 -.4151 .2144
66 -.0031 .0923 -.1421 .2783
67 -.0391 .0395 -.2501 .2969
68 .1395 .1324 -.2428 .2752
69 .0305 .0888 -.3322 .2122
70 .0721 .0785 -.0601 .0721
71 .0319 .0756 -.3024 .2299
72 .0771 .0955 -.3293 .2406
73 . 0868 .1174 -.2626 .2242
<J\
U)
164
Resulting regression equations for empirical CMLs
1972; Tp = 0.0297 + 0.0305Op
1974: r = -0.1356 - 0.73610^
P P
165
Residuals
REIT Return
1972
Predicted
Return Deviation
1
Return
1974
Predicted
Return Deviation
1 .0058 .0324 -.0266 -.3841 -.2669 -.1172
2 .0552 .0325 .0227 -.3849 -.3375 -.0474
3 .0477 .0329 .0148 -.3654 -.2304 -.1350
4 .0739 .0314 .0425 -.1891 -.2236 .0345
5 .0549 .0324 .0225 -.2577 -.2975 .0398
6 . 0234 .0317 -.0083 -.4610 -.3017 -.1593
7 .0443 .0312 .0131 -.2737 -.3112 .0375
8 .0246 .0312 -. 0066 -.3725 -.2945 -.0780
9 .0162 .0326 -.0164 -.4106 -.1899 -.2207
10 -.0036 .0321 -.0357 -.4046 -.3019 -.1027
11 .0453 .0333 .0120 -.3757 -.2903 -.0854
12 .0278 .0326 -.0048 -.4352 -.3528 -.0824
13 -.0023 .0313 -.0336 -.3365 -.2985 -.0380
14 .0824 .0230 .0484 -.3847 -.3065 -.0782
15 .0332 .0338 -.0006 -.4449 -.2730 -.1719
16 .0310 .0327 -.0017 -.3303 -.3311 .0008
17 .0549 .0321 .0228 -.4155 -.2844 -.1311
18 -.0066 .0315 -.0381 -.0752 -.2276 .1524
19 .0572 .0320 .0252 -.4780 -.3452 -.1328
20 .0395 .0321 .0074 -.4258 -.3188 -.1070
21 . 0096 .0309 .0213 -.0932 -.2513 .1581
22 .0603 .0335 .0268 -.3098 -.2691 -.0407
23 .0777 .0327 .0450 -.3613 -.3260 -.0353
24 -.1240 .0358 -.1598 -.2508 -.3581 .1073
25 -.0020 .0334 -.0354 -.2725 -.2706 -.0019
26 .0227 .0324 -.0097 -.4697 -.2730 -.1967
27 .0037 .0313 -.0276 -.2833 -.2694 -.0139
28 .0230 .0312 -.0082 -.0802 -.2459 .1657
29 -.0070 .0309 -.0379 -.1687 -.2884 .1197
30 -.0261 .0 321 -.0582 -.0918 -.2886 .1968
31 .0557 .0359 .0198 -.0024 -.2150 .2126
32 .0838 .0311 .0527 -.1538 -.2943 .1405
33 .0694 .0330 .0364 -.5627 -.2056 -.3571
34 .0451 .0333 .0118 -.4323 -.2253 -.2070
35 .0626 .0316 .0310 -.3811 -.2833 -.0978
36 .0780 .0322 .0458 -.3748 -.3481 -.0267
37 .0490 .0317 .0173 -.2783 -.2510 -.0273
38 .0173 .0308 -.0135 -.1011 -.2454 .1443
39 .0046 .0321 -.0275 -.1050 -.2075 .1025
40 .0407 .0312 .0095 -.1934 -.2847 .0913
41 .0403 .0335 .0068 — .4066 -.2439 -.1627
42 .0486 .0318 .0168 -.3330 -.3035 -.0295
166
REIT Return
1972
Predicted
Return Deviation Return
1974
Predicted
Return Deviation
43 .0757 .0337 .0420 -.1292 -.3121 .1829
44 .0478 .0327 .0151 -.0436 -.1743 .1307
45 .0123 .0319 -.0196 -.1229 -.3043 .1814
46 .1015 .0313 .0702 -.3210 -.2476 -.0734
47 .0424 .0328 .0096 -.2539 -.3029 .0490
48 .0051 .0305 -.0254 -.2363 — . 3666 .1303
49 .0469 .0313 .0156 -.4374 -.3669 -.0705
50 .0348 . 0324 .0024 -.1793 -.2436 .0643
51 .0193 .0308 -.0115 -.3077 -.2407 -.0670
52 .0242 .0318 -.0076 -.4119 — .3554 -.0465
53 .0373 .0308 .0065 -.0954 -.2124 .1170
54 .0281 .0319 -.0038 -.3328 -.3227 -.0101
55 .0248 .0324 -.0040 -.1384 -.1899 .1515
56 -.0491 .0316 -.0807 -.0226 -.2093 .1867
57 -.0251 .0329 -.0580 -.2624 -.2482 -.0142
58 .0726 .03ia .0416 -.0779 -.2783 .2004
59 .0131 .0305 -.0174 -.4273 -.3441 -.0832
60 .0156 .0334 -.0178 -.2108 -.2672 .0564
61 .0393 .0319 .0074 -.3157 -.2200 -.0957
62 -.0033 .0325 -.0358 -.2858 -.2420 -.0438
63 -.0084 .0337 -.0421 -.3647 -.3157 -.0490
64 .0573 .0321 .0252 -.3914 -.2860 -.1054
65 .0046 . 0316 -.0270 -.4151 -.2934 -.1217
66 -.0031 .0326 -.0357 -.1421 -.3405 .1984
67 -.0391 .0309 -.0700 -.2501 -.3542 .1041
68 .1395 .0338 .1057 -.2428 -.3382 .0954
69 .0305 .0324 -.0019 -.3322 -.2918 -.0404
70 .0721 . 0321 .0400 -.0601 -.1887 .1286
71 .0319 .0320 -.0001 -.3024 -.3048 .0024
72 .0771 .0327 .0444 -.3293 -.3127 -.0166
73 .0868 . 0333 .0535 -.2626 -.3006 .0380
APPENDIX G
DATA, RESULTING EQUATIONS, AND RESIDUALS FOR EMPIRICAL SMLs
Data
REIT
1972
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
1 .0058 2.2551 -.3841 -.7737
2 .0552 2.7073 -.3849 -.3213
3 .0477 .2499 -.3654 .1535
4 .0739 1.1929 -.1891 .7353
5 .0549 2.3645 -.2577 -.4846
6 .0234 1.5229 -.4610 .3518
7 .0443 -0.0336 -.2737 .6195
8 .0246 1.4741 -.3725 1.0224
9 .0162 1.5900 -.4106 .0029
10 -.0036 1.6548 -.4046 -.2229
11 .0453 2.6650 -.3757 1.1590
12 .0278 2.1750 -.4352 -.5442
13 -.0023 .1974 -.3365 -.0570
14 .0824 1.7762 -.3847 .5410
15 .0332 3.6150 -.4449 .1619
16 .0310 .7793 -.3303 -.6946
17 .0549 1.9319 -.4155 .7008
18 -.0066 .3108 -.0752 -.0498
19 .0572 1.9468 -.4780 -.0517
20 .0395 1.8790 -.4258 -. 0466
21 .0096 -.9745 -.0923 -.1807
22 .0603 3.0256 -.3098 -.1714
(T,
REIT
1972
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
23 .0777 2.9191 -.3613 .2037
24 -.1240 -3.7423 -.2508 -.4302
25 -.0020 2.4165 -.2725 .4950
26 .0227 .8970 -.4697 -.6851
27 .0037 .9420 -.2833 .1251
28 .0230 1.2651 -.0802 .3995
29 -.0070 .8144 -.1687 1.2342
30 -.0261 1.5257 -.0918 -.2467
31 .0557 -6.1412 -.0024 .7422
32 .0838 .9278 -.1538 -.7401
33 .0694 3.0254 -.5627 .0400
34 .0451 3.3618 -.4323 .7632
35 .0626 1.2607 -.3811 .3074
36 .0780 1.7170 -.3748 .4347
37 .0490 .5571 -.2783 .3717
38 .0173 -.0736 -.1011 -.3267
39 .0046 -.3032 -.1050 -.0139
40 .0407 -1.4184 -.1934 -.8762
41 .0403 3.7847 — .4066 -.3207
42 .0486 1.8088 -.3-30 1.2627
43 .0757 3.6559 -.1292 1.0731
44 .0478 1.3427 -.0436 .0416
45 .0123 — .6666 -.1229 -.6173
46 .1015 1.3818 -.3210 -.3234
47 .0424 2.0552 -.2539 .1802
48 .0051 -.0168 -.2363 .4858
49 .0469 .7640 -.4374 -.4678
50 .0348 1.1950 -.1793 -.1466
<y\
00
REIT
1972
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
1974
Geometric Mean 
of Quarterly HPR
Beta
Coefficient
51 .0193 .9542 -.3077 .1163
52 .0242 .6938 -.4119 .4781
53 .0373 .9419 -.0954 .2732
54 .0281 2.0978 -.3328 1.0150
55 .0284 -1.0063 -.1384 .2853
56 -.0491 1.5529 -.0226 .0928
57 -.0251 .6202 -.2624 -.3971
58 .0726 .8712 -.0779 -1.1455
59 .0131 .6552 -.4273 .3900
60 .0156 .1305 -.2108 .3527
61 .0393 1.7527 -.3157 -.3390
62 -.0033 1.6818 -.2858 -.1700
63 -.0084 2.9196 -.3647 -.3629
64 .0573 1.4551 -.3914 .2206
65 .0046 2.4840 -.4151 .7516
66 -.0031 1.7019 -.1421 .3174
67 -.0391 1.2070 -.2501 -.3399
68 .1395 -1.1541 -.2428 .4893
69 .0305 2.2384 -.3322 .2262
70 .0721 1.9586 -.0601 .1237
71 .0319 1.6288 -.3024 .4000
72 .0771 .7654 -.3293 -.2417
73 .0868 -1.6179 -.2626 .3643
V D
170
Resulting regression equations for empirical SMLs;
1972: r^ = 0.0275 + 0.0041g^
1974: r. = -0.2812 - 0.01138.
171
Residuals
REIT Return
1972
Predicted
Return Deviation Return
1974
Predicted
Return Deviation
1 .0058 .0368 -.0310 -.3841 -.2724 -.1117
2 .0552 .0386 .0166 -.3849 -.2776 -.1073
3 .0477 .0285 .0192 -.3654 -.2830 -.0824
4 .0739 .0324 .0415 -.1891 -.2896 .1005
5 .0549 .0372 .0177 -.2577 -.2757 .0180
6 .0234 .0338 -.0104 -.4610 -.2852 -.1758
7 .0443 .0274 .0169 -.2737 -.2882 .0145
8 .0246 .0336 -.0090 -.3725 -.2928 -.0797
9 .0162 .0340 -.0178 -.4106 -.2812 -.1294
10 -.0036 .0343 -.0379 -. 4046 -.2787 -.1259
11 .0453 .0385 .0068 -.3757 -.2944 -.0813
12 .0278 .0365 -.0087 -.4352 -.2750 -.1602
13 -.0023 .0283 -.0306 -.3365 -.2806 -.0559
14 .0824 .0248 .0476 -.3847 -.2873 -.0974
15 .0332 .0424 -.0092 -.4449 -.2831 -.1618
16 .0310 .0307 .0003 -.3303 -.2733 -.0570
17 .0549 .0355 .0194 -.4155 -.2892 -.1263
18 -.0066 .0288 -.0354 -.0752 -.2806 .2054
19 .0572 .0355 .0217 -.4780 -.2806 -.1974
20 .0395 .0352 .0043 -.4258 -.2807 -.1451
21 .0096 .0235 -.0139 -.0932 -.2792 .1860
22 .0603 .0399 .0204 -.3098 -.2793 -.0305
23 .0777 .0395 .0382 -.3613 -.2835 -.0778
24 -.1240 .0121 -.1361 -.2508 -.2763 .0255
25 -.0020 .0374 -.0394 -.2725 -.2868 .0143
26 .0227 .0312 -.0085 -.4697 -.2734 -.1963
27 .0037 .0314 -.0277 -.2833 -.2826 -.0007
28 .0230 .0327 -.0097 -.0802 -.2857 .2055
29 -.0070 .0309 -.0379 -.1687 -.2952 .1265
30 -.0261 .0338 -.0599 -.0918 -.2784 .1866
31 .0557 .0023 .0534 -.0024 -.2896 .2872
32 .0838 .0313 .0525 -.1538 -.2728 .1190
33 .0694 .0399 .0295 -.5627 -.2817 -.2810
34 .0451 .0413 .0038 -.4323 -.2899 -.1424
35 .0626 .0327 .0299 -.3811 -.2847 -.0964
36 .0780 .0346 .0434 -.3748 -.2861 -.0887
37 .0490 .0298 .0192 -.2783 -.2854 .0071
38 .0173 .0272 -.0099 -.1011 -.2775 .1764
39 .0046 .0263 -.0217 -.1050 -.2811 .1761
40 .0407 .0217 .0190 -.1934 -.2713 .0779
41 .0403 .0431 -.0028 — .4066 -.2776 -.1290
42 . 0486 .0349 .0137 -.3330 -.2955 -.0375
172
REIT Return
1972
Predicted
Return Deviation Return
1974
Predicted
Return Deviation
43 .0757 .0425 .0332 -.1292 -.2934 .1642
44 .0478 .0330 .0148 -.0436 -.2817 .2381
45 .0123 .0248 -.0125 -.1229 -.2742 .1513
46 .1015 .0332 .0683 -.3210 -.2775 -.0435
47 .0424 .0360 .0064 -.2539 -.2833 .0294
48 .0051 .0274 -.0223 -.2363 -.2867 .0504
49 .0469 .0307 .0162 -.4374 -.2759 -.1615
50 .0348 .0324 .0024 -.1793 -.2796 .1003
51 .0193 .0314 -.0121 -.3077 -.2825 -.0252
52 .0242 .0304 -.0062 -.4119 -.2866 -.1253
53 .0373 .0314 .0059 -.0954 -.2843 .1889
54 .0281 .0361 -.0080 -.3328 -.2927 -.0401
55 .0284 .0234 .0050 -.1384 -.2844 .1460
56 -.0491 .0339 -.0830 -.0226 -.2823 .2597
57 -.0251 .0301 -.0552 -.2624 -.2867 .0143
58 .0726 .0311 .0415 -.0779 -.2682 .1903
59 .0131 .0302 -.0171 -.4273 -.2856 -.1417
60 .0156 .0280 -.0124 -.2108 -.2852 .0744
61 .0393 .0347 .0046 -.3157 -.2774 -.0383
62 -.0033 .0344 -.0377 -.2858 -.2793 -.0065
63 -.0084 .0395 — .0479 -.3647 -.2771 -.0876
64 .0573 .0335 .0238 -.3914 -.2837 -.1077
65 .0046 .0377 -.0331 -.4151 -.1897 -.1254
66 -.0031 .0345 -.0376 -.1421 -.2848 .1427
67 -.0391 .0325 -.0716 -.2501 -.2774 .0173
68 .1395 .0228 .1167 -.2428 -.2868 .0440
69 .0305 .0367 -.0062 -.3322 -.2838 -.0484
70 .0721 .0356 .0365 -.0601 -.2826 .2225
71 .0319 .0342 -.0023 -.3024 -.2857 -.0167
72 .0771 .0307 .0464 -.3293 -.3785 -.0508
73 .0868 .0209 .0659 -.2626 -.2853 .0227
APPENDIX H
DATA, RESULTING EQUATIONS, AND RESIDUALS FOR 
THE MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS
Independent Variables Used in 1972 Multiple Regressions 
(values for dependent variables found in Appendix E)
REIT CB la Hyb TA Lev Qual Exp
1 0 0 0 1.6594 .6754 .0326 .0102
2 0 0 0 .8104 .6039 .0425 .0083
3 0 0 1 .4168 .6005 .0502 .0266
4 0 0 1 .5706 .6972 .0278 .0079
5 1 0 1 1.7890 .6322 .0368 .0118
6 1 0 0 1.3296 .7055 .0323 .0094
7 0 0 0 .7857 .7210 .0325 .0094
8 0 1 0 1.1960 .5121 .0482 .0085
9 0 0 0 1.0611 .5613 .0481 .0122
10 0 0 1 1.3165 .7819 .0247 .0082
11 1 0 1 6.5210 .8058 .0315 .0133
12 0 0 0 2.3173 .6594 .0377 .0104
13 1 0 0 .2705 .5868 .0416 .0129
14 1 0 1 .6468 .6994 .0341 .0102
15 1 0 1 2.8009 .7550 .0323 .0088
16 1 0 1 .9714 .5166 .0413 .0078
17 0 0 1 1.1180 .6679 .0381 .0122
18 0 0 1 2.9551 .6248 .0313 .0091
19 0 0 0 1.7480 .6667 .0291 .0092
20 0 0 0 3.1459 .5351 .0624 .0132
21 0 0 1 2.1695 .3854 .0536 .0125
22 0 0 1 .6657 .4188 .0646 .0091
23 1 0 0 .6555 .5641 .0463 .0135
24 0 1 0 .2936 .6393 .0000 .0062
25 1 0 1 .5287 .6036 .0379 .0109
26 0 0 1 4.2011 .7467 .0361 .0084
27 1 0 0 1.2278 .5410 .0443 .0148
28 0 0 1 1.3688 .7543 .0037 .0044
29 0 1 0 .4292 .7639 .0170 .0076
30 0 0 0 .4619 .6179 .0515 .0141
31 0 1 0 1.3677 .8100 .0224 .0334
32 0 0 1 . 3578 .7442 .0264 .0582
33 0 0 1 3.0397 .8059 .0367 .0035
34 0 0 0 2.9375 . 7791 .0290 .0091
173
174
REIT CB Eq Hyb TA Lev Qual Exp
35 0 0 1 .9983 .5960 .0334 .0089
36 0 0 0 .8831 .6944 .0273 .0083
37 0 0 0 1.2107 .8105 .0248 .0074
38 0 0 1 .6336 .6115 .0400 .0114
39 0 0 1 .9666 .0299 .0633 .0033
40 0 0 1 .5328 .6251 .0260 .0051
41 0 0 0 1.2209 .6677 .0433 .0116
42 0 0 1 .4923 .8001 .0146 .0063
43 0 0 0 2.8805 .6437 .0361 .0125
44 0 0 0 .3467 .6197 .0405 .0085
45 0 0 1 2.1346 .5719 .0409 .0087
46 0 0 1 .9960 .7628 .0300 .0079
47 0 0 1 .6449 .7241 .0291 .0130
48 0 0 1 1.6897 .5884 .0444 .0118
49 1 0 0 .6396 .5412 .0342 .0067
50 0 0 1 1.6330 .4595 .0450 .0098
51 1 0 1 .2986 .7153 .0141 .0049
52 0 0 0 .6411 .6224 .0415 .0075
53 0 1 0 .2549 .4720 .0634 .1424
54 1 0 1 1.0110 .6011 .0430 .0099
55 0 0 1 .6792 .5774 .0510 .0107
56 0 1 0 .4204 .2843 .0518 .0099
57 0 0 1 .6152 .6693 .0348 .0031
58 0 0 1 1.0360 .8151 .0194 .0027
59 0 0 1 .7544 .4816 .0498 .0143
60 0 0 1 2.2489 .6694 .0338 .0050
61 0 0 0 .9529 .4360 .0614 .0108
62 1 0 0 .8337 .5379 .0452 .0095
63 0 0 0 .5045 .6195 .0353 .0089
64 1 0 0 1.2986 .7113 .0336 .0110
65 0 0 1 .9621 .6412 .0407 .0131
66 0 0 1 .4015 .2592 .0438 .0138
67 0 0 1 1.2808 .7895 .0273 .0105
68 0 0 1 .3839 .5881 .0277 .0059
69 1 0 0 1.5103 .5804 .0560 .0128
70 0 1 0 .3323 .5853 .0718 .0121
71 1 0 1 1.8917 .6298 .0397 .0121
72 0 0 0 .1860 .5065 .0397 .0099
73 0 1 0 .5110 .7389 .0212 .0572
Resulting regression equations for 1972:
T. = -0.355 + 0.0163CB. + 0.0252Eq. + 0.0442Hyb. + 0.0074TA. - 
 ^ 0.0403Lev^ + 0.45)6Quali + 0.3518Exp^
S. = -0.6762 - 0.0734CB. - 0.4470Eq. + 0.0397Hyb. - 0.0835TA. + 
1.3498Lev^ + 4.386ÏQual^ + 8.1294Exp^
J. = -0.0193 - 0.0296CB. + 0.0415Eq. + 0.0269Hyb. - 0.0091TA. + 
0.0370Lev^ - 0.727ÏQual^ + 0.4^47Exp^
175
Residuals for Treynor's Performance Measure - 1972
REIT
Treynor's 
Measure
Predicted Value 
for Treynor's Measure Deviation
1 -0.0020 -0.0320 0.0300
2 0.0166 -0.0315 0.0481
3 0.1501 0.0199 0.1302
4 0.0534 0.0003 0.0531
5 0.0189 0.0337 -0.0148
6 0.0087 -0.0198 0.0285
7 -1.0149 -0.0406 -0.9743
8 0.0098 0.0029 0.0069
9 0.0038 -0.0240 0.0278
10 -0.0083 0.0011 -0.0094
11 0.0132 0.0597 -0.0465
12 0.0081 -0.0241 0.0322
13 -0.0633 -0.0173 -0.0460
14 0.0406 0.0207 0.0199
15 0.0064 0.0331 -0.0267
16 0.0267 0.0329 -0.0062
17 0.0231 0.0117 0.0114
18 -0.0541 0.0228 -0.0769
19 0.0241 -0.0329 0.0570
20 0.0156 -0.0006 0.0162
21 0.0006 0.0381 -0.0375
22 0.0166 0.0295 -0.0129
23 0.0231 -0.0112 0.0343
24 0.0359 -0.0317 0.0676
25 -0.0050 0.0257 -0.0307
26 0.0139 0.0291 -0.0152
27 -0.0069 -0.0065 -0.0004
28 0.0101 -0.0084 0.0185
29 -0.0211 -0.0275 0.0064
30 -0.0238 -0.0285 0.0047
31 -0.0074 -0.0109 0.0035
32 0.0793 0.0139 0.0654
33 0.0196 0.0167 0.0029
34 0.0104 -0.0287 0.0391
35 0.0416 0.0104 0.0312
36 0.0395 -0.0416 0.0811
37 0.0696 -0.0453 0.1149
38 -0.0965 0.0110 -0.1075
39 0.0185 0.0447 -0.0262
40 -0.0215 0.0011 -0.0226
41 0.0080 -0.0295 0.0375
42 0.0212 -0.0111 0.0323
43 0.0179 -0.0193 0.0372
44 0.0280 -0.0364 0.0644
45 -0.0032 0.0232 -0.0264
46 0.0661 0.0018 0.0643
47 0.0157 0.0021 0.0136
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Treynor's Predicted Value
ŒIT Measure for Treynor's Measure Deviation
48 0.3036 0.0219 0.2817
49 0.0480 -0.0183 0.0663
50 0.0206 0.0262 -0.0056
51 0.0095 0.0065 0.0030
52 0.0202 -0.0342 0.0544
53 0.0288 0.0516 -0.0228
54 0.0085 0.0313 -0.0228
55 -0.0181 0.0175 -0.0356
56 -0.0382 0.0085 -0.0467
57 -0.0569 0.0032 -0.0601
58 0.0716 -0.0067 0.0783
59 0.0044 0.0226 -0.0182
60 0.0414 0.0155 0.0259
61 0.0166 -0.0142 0.0308
62 -0.0080 -0.0107 0.0027
63 -0.0064 -0.0375 0.0311
64 0.0324 -0.0191 0.0515
65 -0.0023 0.0132 -0.0155
66 -0.0078 0.0261 -0.0338
67 -0.0408 0.0025 -0.0433
68 -0.1120 0.0025 -0.1145
69 0.0091 -0.0014 0.0105
70 0.0316 0.0056 0.0260
71 0.0133 0.0359 -0.0226
72 0.0874 -0.0329 0.1203
73 -0.0473 -0.0065 -0.0408
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Residuals for Sharpe's Performance Measure - 1972
Sharpe's Predicted Value
REIT Measure for Sharpe's Measure Deviation
1 -0.0510 0.3228 -0.3738
2 0.4907 0.3252 0.1655
3 0.3644 0.5757 -0.2113
4 1.1974 0.4431 0.7543
5 0.5034 0.2515 0.2519
6 0.2092 0.3098 -0.1006
7 0.6973 0.4504 0.2469
8 0.3006 -0.2513 0.5519
9 0.0635 0.3030 -0.2395
10 -0.1778 0.4840 -0.6618
11 0.3039 0.0796 0.2243
12 0.1857 0.2703 -0.0846
13 -0.2505 0.3037 -0.5578
14 0.5194 0.4127 0.1067
15 0.1728 0.2886 -0.1158
16 0.2171 0.1509 0.0662
17 0.5775 0.4380 0.1395
18 -0.2953 0.1714 -0.4667
19 0.6225 0.2802 0.3423
20 0.3728 0.1644 0.2084
21 -0.0159 0.0393 -0.0552
22 0.4100 0.2306 0.1794
23 0.6860 0.2700 0.4160
24 -0.6727 -0.2343 -0.4384
25 -0.1016 0.3156 -0.4172
26 0.1424 0.2473 -0.1049
27 -0.1243 0.1928 -0.3171
28 0.2628 0.3194 -0.0566
29 -0.4456 0.0085 -0.4541
30 -0.4758 0.4598 -0.9356
31 0.2244 0.2258 -0.0014
32 1.6035 0.9271 0.6764
33 0.5548 0.3870 0.1678
34 0.2955 0.3314 -0.0359
35 0.8534 0.3035 0.5499
36 0.8443 0.3746 0.4697
37 0.5969 0.4857 0.1112
38 0.2139 0.4042 -0.1903
39 -0.0712 -0.3724 0.3012
40 0.6435 0.3183 0.3252
41 0.2420 0.4074 -0.1654
42 0.5689 0.5177 0.0512
43 0.5000 0.2121 0.2879
44 0.3825 0.3781 0.0044
45 0.0291 0.2074 -0.1783
46 1.8115 0.5058 1.3057
47 0.3226 0.5204 -0.1978
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Sharpe's Predicted Value
REIT Measure for Sharpe's Measure Deviation
48 -0.1962 0.2073 -0.5035
49 0.7399 0.1320 0.6079
50 0.2799 0.1245 0.1554
51 0.2507 0.3324 -0.0817
52 0.2074 0.3534 -0.1460
53 0.7655 0.9284 -0.1629
54 0.2539 0.2862 -0.0323
55 0.2085 0.3969 -0.1884
56 -0.9611 -0.4668 -0.4943
57 -0.3431 0.3934 -0.7365
58 1.5332 0.4843 1.0489
59 0.1189 0.2853 -0.1664
60 0.0450 0.2682 -0.2232
61 0.4019 0.1899 0.2120
62 -0.1488 0.1824 -0.3312
63 -0.1424 0.3451 -0.4875
64 0.6165 0.3390 0.2775
65 -0.0926 0.4337 -0.5263
66 -0.1441 -0.0158 -0.1283
67 -1.2481 0.5274 -1.7755
68 0.9766 0.2948 0.6818
69 0.2286 0.2575 -0.0189
70 0.7885 0.0524 0.7361
71 0.2870 0.2548 0.0322
72 0.7005 0.2466 0.4539
73 0.6525 0.3895 0.2630
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Residuals for Jensen's Performance Measure - 1972
Jensen's Predicted Value
ŒIT Measure for Jensen's Measure Deviatio]
1 -0.0829 -0.0285 -0.0544
2 —0.0466 -0.0315 -0.0151
3 0.0281 0.0015 0.0266
4 0.0238 0.0115 0.0123
5 -0.0339 -0.0363 0.0024
6 -0.0373 -0.0541 0.0168
7 0.0384 -0.0192 0.0576
8 -0.0363 -0.0010 -0.0353
9 -0.0459 -0.0376 -0.0083
10 -0.0673 0.0103 -0.0776
11 -0.0526 -0.0682 0.0156
12 -0.0568 -0.0386 -0.0182
13 -0.0159 -0.0541 0.0382
14 0.0214 -0.0223 0.0437
15 -0.0975 -0.0390 -0.0585
16 -0.0016 -0.0383 0.0367
17 -0.0193 -0.0001 -0.0192
18 -0.0260 -0.0147 -0.0113
19 -0.0183 -0.0275 0.0092
20 -0.0322 -0.0674 0.0352
21 0.0349 -0.0312 0.0661
22 -0.0481 -0.0259 -0.0222
23 -0.0307 -0.0616 0.0309
24 0.0127 0.0459 -0.0332
25 -0.0899 -0.0272 -0.0627
26 -0.0127 -0.0253 0.0126
27 -0.2376 -0.0656 -0.1720
28 -0.0317 0.0223 -0.0540
29 -0.0461 0.0376 -0.0837
30 -0.0848 -0.0317 -0.0531
31 0.2777 0.0386 0.2391
32 0.0405 0.0391 0.0014
33 -0.0426 -0.0153 -0.0273
34 -0.0766 -0.0341 -0.0425
35 0.0117 0.0003 0.0114
36 0.0110 -0.0177 0.0287
37 0.0214 -0.0150 0.0364
38 0.0099 0.0005 0.0094
39 0.0085 -0.0447 0.0532
40 0.0819 0.0092 0.0727
41 -0.0980 -0.0319 -0.0661
42 -0.0218 0.0249 -0.0467
43 -0.0562 -0.0422 -0.0140
44 -0.0024 -0.0252 0.0228
45 0.0298 -0.0164 0.0462
46 0.0441 0.0085 0.0356
47 -0.0390 0.0132 -0.0522
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Jensen's Predicted Value
REIT Measure for Jensen's Measure Deviation
48 -0.0027 -0.0129 0.0102
49 0.0099 -0.0566 0.0665
50 -0.0120 -0.0185 0.0065
51 -0.0227 -0.0064 -0.0163
52 -0.0053 -0.0289 0.0236
53 -0.0058 0.0559 -0.0617
54 -0.0542 -0.0358 -0.0184
55 0.1130 -0.0095 0.1225
56 -0.1105 -0.0044 -0.1061
57 -0.0539 0.0028 -0.0567
58 0.0319 0.0154 0.0165
59 -0.0192 -0.0112 -0.0080
60 0.0010 -0.0104 0.0114
61 -0.0318 -0.0516 0.0198
62 -0.0678 -0.0652 -0.0026
63 -0.1109 -0.0226 -0.0883
64 0.0010 -0.0539 0.0549
65 -0.0890 -0.0011 -0.0879
66 -0.0730 -0.0121 -0.0609
67 -0.0907 0.0100 -0.1007
68 0.1708 0.0083 0.1625
69 -0.0565 -0.0761 0.0196
70 -0.0041 -0.0060 0.0019
71 -0.0340 -0.0393 0.0053
72 0.0476 -0.0267 0.0743
73 0.1345 0.0554 0.0791
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Independent Variables Used in 1974 Multiple Regressions 
(values for dependent variables found in Appendix E)
REIT CB Eq Hyb TA Lev Qual
1 0 0 0 1.6530 .5883 -.1559 .0150
2 0 0 0 1.2611 .7424 .0030 .0064
3 0 0 1 .5202 .5126 -.0539 .0261
4 0 0 1 .5411 .6344 .0212 .0049
5 1 0 1 2.5857 .7603 -.0063 .0062
6 1 0 0 2.8285 .9274 -.0862 .0052
7 0 0 0 1.0300 .7919 -.0488 .0076
8 0 1 0 2.0917 .7754 -.0410 .0082
9 0 0 0 1.6175 .7614 -.0238 .0000
10 0 0 1 1.8011 .8714 -.0512 .0057
11 1 0 1 8.8792 .9738 -.1045 .0062
12 0 0 0 3.6196 .8220 -.0553 .0031
13 1 0 0 .1912 .5465 -.1010 .0099
14 1 0 1 1.2769 .9261 -.0738 .0009
15 1 0 1 4.5850 .8674 -.0190 .0056
16 1 0 1 1.2989 .7215 -.0509 .0043
17 0 0 1 1.8025 .8369 -.0649 .0029
18 0 0 1 4.3869 .7453 . 0198 .0056
19 0 0 0 3.2886 .7466 -.0516 .0051
20 0 0 0 3.6807 .7110 -.0923 .0056
21 0 0 1 3.4512 .5050 • .0309 .0068
22 0 0 1 1.3578 .7185 .0146 .0092
23 1 0 0 1.3147 .8308 -.0346 .0047
24 0 1 0 .2881 .6519 .0001 .0089
25 1 0 1 .7191 .7730 -.0443 .0042
26 0 0 1 5.4440 1.0571 -.2695 .0093
27 1 0 0 1.7481 .7105 -.0328 .0091
28 0 0 1 1.6040 .7759 .0194 .0069
29 0 1 0 .5102 .8201 -.0105 .0075
30 0 0 0 .5075 .6558 .0304 .0103
31 0 1 0 2.0913 .8466 .0255 .0495
32 0 0 1 .4330 .8059 .0102 .0650
33 0 0 1 4.5098 • .9714 -.1053 .0041
34 0 0 0 4.4656 .9235 -.0733 .0100
35 0 0 1 1.5199 .7665 -.0213 .0038
36 0 0 0 1.0763 .7581 -.0981 .0040
37 0 0 0 2.2916 .8597 .0017 .0015
38 0 0 1 .8677 .6665 .0251 .0204
39 0 0 1 .9420 .0247 .0562 .0032
40 0 0 1 .6386 .7152 .0115 .0044
41 0 0 0 1.7681 .7794 -.0498 .0091
42 0 0 1 .4730 .8666 -.0525 .0046
43 0 0 0 3.7492 .6785 .0288 .0124
44 0 0 0 .4202 .6391 .0374 .0100
45 0 0 1 2.7408 .6651 .0254 .0052
46 0 0 1 1.2565 .8118 -.0331 .0089
47 0 0 1 1.1458 .8059 -.0503 .0079
182
REIT CB la izb TA Lev Qual
48 0 0 1 1.7519 .6150 -.0115 .0060
49 1 0 0 . 7703 .9001 -.1948 . 0066
50 0 0 1 2.5941 .6445 .0269 .0052
51 1 0 1 .4811 .7912 .0018 .0031
52 0 0 0 .5904 .7458 -.1280 .0038
53 0 1 0 .7255 .7690 .0304 .0653
54 1 0 1 1.5131 .7014 .0165 .0056
55 0 0 1 .7834 .6395 .0340 .0103
56 0 1 0 .4404 .2118 .0563 .0101
57 0 0 1 .9334 .7793 .0153 .0031
58 0 0 1 1.4775 .8702 .0138 .0035
59 0 0 1 .7735 .6608 -.1492 .0167
60 0 0 1 3.4497 .7961 -.0002 .0045
61 0 0 0 1.4411 .7762 -.1320 .0051
62 1 0 0 1.1149 .6558 .0119 .0064
63 0 0 0 .6396 .7699 -.0550 .0050
64 1 0 0 2.1885 .8483 -. 0488 .0026
65 0 0 1 1.3975 .7646 -.0332 .0054
66 0 0 1 .8296 .6598 .0108 .0054
67 0 0 1 1.4201 .8288 .0029 .0131
68 0 0 1 .4709 .7143 -.0272 .0170
69 1 0 0 1.7687 .6785 -.0033 .0073
70 0 1 0 .3135 .5139 .0584 .0143
71 1 0 1 2.4532 .7161 .0057 .0058
72 0 0 0 .2944 .7326 -.0209 .0095
73 0 1 0 .4056 .7720 -.0337 .0747
T. = 3.4220 + 3.5241CB, 
16.3854Lev^ - 27
Resulting regression equations for 1974:
. + 3.3376Eq. + 5.1772Hyb. + 0.3681TA. - 
I797Qual + 131.3444Exp^
S. = -1.0337 + 0.1354CB. + 0.3489Eq. + 0.1946Hyb. - 0.0829TA.
^ -.7540Lev^ + 4.8635Qual^ + 8.2^06Exp^ ^
J. = -0.1600 - 0.0300CB. + 0.1056Eq. + 0.0395Hyb. + 0.0065TA.
^ 0.1558Lev^ + 1.145&Qual^ + 0.7&75Exp^ ^
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Residuals for Treynor's Performance Measure - 1974
Treynor's Predicted Value
lEIT Measure for Treynor's Measure Deviatio!
1 0.5218 0.5984 -0.0766
2 1.2589 -7.5193 8.7782
3 -2.5081 5.2845 -7.7926
4 -0.2838 -1.5292 1.2454
5 0.5722 1.6027 -1.0305
5 -1.3661 -4.1828 2.8167
7 -0.4334 -6.8499 6.4165
8 -0.3835 -2.9844 2.6009
9 -148.3448 -7.8116 -140.5332
10 1.9031 -2.8759 4.7790
11 -0.3410 3.0899 -3.4309
12 0.8357 -6.8043 7.6400
13 6.2472 2.1073 4.1401
14 -0.7473 -0.4573 -0.2900
15 -2.8691 0.8500 -3.7191
16 0.5037 2.7238 -2.2201
17 -0.6209 -2.3055 1.6846
18 1.9036 -1.8008 3.7044
19 9.6248 -5.5286 15.1534
20 9.5579 -3.6291 13.1870
21 0.6193 1.6481 -1.0288
22 1.9218 -1.8624 3.7842
23 -1.8700 -4.6253 2.7553
24 0.6285 -2.6498 3.2783
25 -0.5901 1.4777 -2.0678
26 0.7142 1.8284 -1.1142
27 -2.4213 -1.9656 -0.4557
28 -0.2498 -3.1449 2.8951
29 -0.1526 -5.2198 5.0672
30 0.4516 -6.5987 7.0503
31 -0.0196 -0.5341 0.5054
32 0.2343 3.8137 -3.5794
33 -14.5575 -2.2572 -12.3003
34 -0.5921 -6.7606 6.1685
35 -1.3035 -2.3228 1.0193
36 -0.9073 -5.4119 4.5046
37 -0.8015 -9.6703 8.8688
38 0.3695 -0.0051 0.3746
39 8.9640 7.4340 1.5300
40 0.2431 -2.6193 2.8624
41 1.3290 -6.1492 7.4782
42 -0.2792 -3.3952 3.1160
43 -0.1387 -5.4696 5.3309
44 -1.5192 -6.5980 5.0788
45 0.2308 -1.2974 1.5282
46 1.0532 -2.1714 3.2246
47 -1.5178 -1.7793 0.2615
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Treynor's Predicted Value
ÎEIT Measure for Treynor's Measure Deviation
48 -0.5268 0.2676 -0.7944
49 0.9769 -1.3574 2.3343
50 1.3568 -1.0546 2.4114
51 -2.8143 -0.3056 -2.5087
52 -0.9025 -4.6028 3.7003
53 -0.4209 2.1767 -2.5976
54 -0.3472 1.4745 -1.8217
55 -0.5538 -1.1622 0.6084
56 -0.4547 3.2476 -3.7023
57 0.7101 -3.8351 4.5452
58 0.0851 -5.0310 5.1161
59 -1.1459 4.3050 -5.4509
60 -0.6532 -2.5791 1.9259
61 0.9891 -4.5083 5.4974
62 1.7965 -2.8720 4.6685
63 1.0590 -6.8061 7.8651
64 -1.8631 -4.4803 2.6172
65 -0.5784 -1.8031 1.2247
66 -0.5095 -1.4909 0.9814
67 0.7935 -2.8166 3.6101
68 -0.5363 0.0405 -0.5768
69 -1.5553 -2.4719 0.9166
70 -0.6443 -1.2546 0.6103
71 -0.8050 1.8994 -2.7044
72 1.4435 -6.6578 8.1013
73 -0.7746 4.9867 -5.7613
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Residuals for Sharpe's Performance Measure - 1974
Sharpe's Predicted Value
ÎEIT Measure for Sharpe's Measure Deviation
1 -2.2642 -2.2492 -0.0250
2 -1.4725 -1.6309 0.1584
3 -2.9891 -1.3161 -1.6730
4 -1.7464 -1.2189 -0.5275
5 -1.2610 -1.4711 0.2101
6 -2.1303 -2.2086 0.0783
7 -1.2298 -1.8911 0.6613
8 -1.8170 -1.5749 -0.2421
9 -5.8293 -1.8578 -3.9715
10 -1.8780 -1.8477 -0.0303
11 -1.8815 -2.6317 0.7502
12 -1.5417 -2.1972 0.6555
13 -1.6091 -1.7360 0.1269
14 -1.7412 -1.8594 0.1182
15 -2.4893 -1.7844 -0.7049
16 -1.3170 -1.5668 0.2498
17 -2.1529 -1.9115 -0.2414
18 -0.7590 -1.6226 0.8636
19 -1.7478 -2.0785 0.3307
20 -1.7902 -2.2780 0.4878
21 -0.7123 -1.2999 0.5876
22 -1.8160 -1.3468 -0.4692
23 -1.4729 -1.7634 0.2905
24 -0.8945 -1.1265 0.2320
25 -1.5927 -1.5271 -0.0656
26 -2.6222 -3.3220 0.6998
27 -1.6661 -1.6637 -0.0024
28 -0.6662 -1.4061 0.7399
29 -0.9075 -1.3348 0.4273
30 -0.5361 -1.3372 0.8011
31 -0.2039 -0.9652 0.7613
32 -0.8043 -0.8981 0.0938
33 -6.1230 -2.4241 -3.6989
34 -3.7102 -2.3747 -1.3355
35 -1.9975 -1.6155 -0.3820
36 -1.3661 -2.1388 0.7727
37 -1.8999 -1.8515 -0.0484
38 -0.8095 -1.1237 0.3142
39 -1.2753 -0.6362 -0.6391
40 -1.0519 -1.3393 0.2874
41 -2.8973 -1.9354 -0.9619
42 -1.5458 -1.7493 0.2035
43 -0.6208 -1.6142 0.9934
44 -1.2038 -1.2864 0.0826
45 -0.6217 -1.4017 0.7800
46 -2.2378 -1.6432 -0.5946
47 -1.2038 -1.7215 0.5177
48 -0.8155 -1.4547 0.6392
49 -1.4545 -2.5340 1.0795
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Sharpe's Predicted Value
tEIT Measure for Sharpe's Measure Deviation
50 -1.3558 -1.3667 0.0109
51 -2.2920 -1.3059 -0.9861
52 -1.3821 -2.2363 0.8542
53 -1.1026 -0.6395 -0.4631
54 -1.3869 -1.2317 -0.1552
55 -0.7538 -1.1362 0.3824
56 -0.4216 -0.5241 0.1025
57 -1.8431 -1.4043 -0.4388
58 -0.5031 -1.5219 1.0188
59 -1.5775 -1.9897 0.4122
60 -1.2893 -1.6895 0.4002
61 -2.9233 -2.3386 -0.5847
62 -2.1135 -1.3747 -0.7388
63 -1.5705 -1.8937 0.3232
64 -2.0117 -1.9354 -0.0763
65 -2.0275 -1.6486 -0.3789
66 -0.5810 -1.3075 0.7275
67 -0.9084 -1.4600 0.5516
68 -0.9535 -1.4092 0.4557
69 -1.6579 -1.5126 -0.1453
70 -1.1054 —0 .6 966 -0.4088
71 -1.4006 -1.3717 -0.0289
1£ -1.4501 -1.3717 0.1839
73 -1.2587 -0.8496 -0.4091
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Residuals for Jensen's Performance Measure - 1974
Jensen's Predicted Value
IE IT Measure for Jensen's Measure Deviation
1 -0.4468 -0.4084 -0.0384
2 -0.3824 -0.2593 -0.1231
3 -0.3632 -0.2393 -0.1239
4 -0.1413 -0.1880 0.0467
5 -0.2936 -0.2548 -0.0388
6 -0.4178 -0.4110 -0.0068
7 -0.2149 -0.3270 0.1121
8 -0.2780 -0.2025 -0.0755
9 -0.4262 -0.2954 -0.1308
10 -0.4129 -0.2991 -0.1138
11 -0.2726 -0.3597 0.0871
12 -0.4491 -0.3257 -0.1234
13 -0.3369 -0.3822 0.0453
14 -0.3294 -0.3704 0.0410
15 -0.4315 -0.2735 -0.1580
16 -0.3691 -0.3097 -0.0594
17 -0.3537 -0.3115 -0.0422
18 -0.0918 -0.1814 0.0896
19 -0.4569 -0.3103 -0.1466
20 -0.4151 -0.3485 —0.0666
21 -0.1146 -0.1364 0.0218
22 -0.3249 -0.2001 -0.1248
23 -0.3310 -0.3471 0.0161
24 -0.2598 -0.1474 -0.1124
25 -0.2358 -0.3139 0.0781
26 -0.5205 -0.5517 0.0312
27 -0.2761 -0.3201 0.0440
28 -0.0577 -0.2037 0.1460
29 -0.0416 -0.1854 0.1438
30 -0.1148 -0.2163 0.1015
31 0.0437 -0.1066 0.1503
32 -0.2117 -0.1831 -0.0286
33 -0.2696 -0.3602 0.0906
34 -0.3784 -0.3514 -0.0270
35 -0.3528 -0.2517 -0.1011
36 -0.3173 -0.3806 0.0633
37 -0.2549 -0.2761 0.0212
38 -0.1370 -0.1748 0.0378
39 0.0191 -0.0515 0.0706
40 -0.2638 -0.2114 -0.0524
41 -0.4390 -0.3203 -0.1187
42 -0.2199 -0.3092 0.0893
43 -0.0368 -0.1992 0.1624
44 -0.0582 -0.2066 0.1484
45 -0.1693 -0.1734 0.0041
46 -0.3543 -0.2702 -0.0841
47 -0.2350 -0.2904 0.0554
48 -0.1767 -0.2137 0.0370
49 -0.4410 -0.5435 0.1025
188
Jensen's Predicted Value
%EIT Measure for Jensen's Measure Deviation
50 -0.1999 -0.1695 -0.0304
51 -0.3066 -0.2663 -0.0403
52 -0.3464 -0.4162 0.0698
53 -0.0876 -0.0859 -0.0017
54 -0.2297 -0.2269 -0.0028
55 -0.1125 -0.1685 0.0560
56 -0.0299 -0.0126 -0.0173
57 -0.3012 -0.2161 -0.0851
58 -0.1755 -0.2282 0.0527
59 -0.3721 -0.3769 0.0048
60 -0.1863 -0.2191 0.0328
61 -0.3535 -0.4190 0.0655
62 -0.3080 -0.2665 -0.0415
63 -0.3766 -0.3351 -0.0095
64 -0.3714 -0.3619 -0.0095
65 -0.3470 -0.2646 -0.0824
66 -0.1065 -0.2016 0.0951
67 -0.2591 -0.2274 -0.0317
68 -0.1865 -0.2473 0.0608
69 -0.3110 -0.2826 -0.0284
70 —0.0668 -0.0549 -0.0119
71 -0.2642 -0.2353 -0.0289
72 -0.3390 -0.2891 -0.0499
73 -0.2302 -0.1549 -0.0753
